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“‘Diverse Bloods’: White Womanhood and Interracial Kinship in Nineteenth-Century American 
Literatures,” demonstrates how interracial kinship refigures the meanings of whiteness and 
womanhood in the nineteenth century. The figure of the white woman is often central to 
discourses of race and racism in frontier romances, abolitionist literature, and literatures of race, 
reunion, and Reconstruction. I argue that white women’s relations to non-whites, in adoption or 
marriage to non-white people, or bearing children who are not understood to be white like 
themselves, challenges conventional rhetorics of white womanhood in the texts I discuss. 
Focusing on the centrality of interracial kinship relations prevents characters from being read in 
line with dominant ideas of white womanhood, such as Amy Kaplan’s notion of white women’s 
participation in “Manifest Domesticity” or Linda Kerber’s model of “Republican Motherhood.” 
Exposing how this raced and gendered icon is constructed by her positioning against white and 
non-white kin, literary narratives of white women’s interracial kinship relations work to shape 
discourses of domesticity, heterosexuality, nationalism, abolitionism, and racial uplift. 
Ultimately, “Diverse Bloods” shows how nineteenth-century texts shifted the expectations of 
white women’s kinship towards a model of womanhood able to incorporate structures of national 
multiracial family.
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Introduction 
“Diverse Bloods” 
 
 
It is clear that no race can long endure without a commingling of its blood with that of 
other races.  The condition of all human progress is miscegenation.  The Anglo-Saxon 
should learn this in time for his own salvation. If we will not heed the demands of justice, 
let us, at least, respect the law of self-preservation. Providence has kindly placed on the 
American soil, for his own wise purposes, four millions of coloured people. They are our 
brothers, our sisters. By mingling with them we become powerful, prosperous, and 
progressive: by refusing to do so we become feeble, unhealthy, narrow-minded, unfit for 
the nobler offices of freedom, and certain of early decay. 
 
David Goodman Croly and George Wakeman, Miscegenation: The Theory of the 
Blending of the Races, Applied to the American White Man and Negro, from 
Chapter III, “The Blending of Diverse Bloods Essential to American Progress” 
 
 
Louisa May Alcott’s most well-known story of interracial family and post-Civil War 
reunion is her Civil War Era tale originally published as “The Brothers,” (1863).1 Alcott’s title 
emphasizes the mixed-race, formally-enslaved Robert’s biological relation to “Marster Ned,” his 
white, slaveholding half-brother. The narrative of interracial sibling-kinship frames civil war and 
racial conflict as familial matters, preparing readers for a new narrative of national reunion that is 
even more necessary because it also constitutes familial reconciliation. “The Brothers,” by 
framing relations of interracial kinship between Civil War soldiers, places the white military 
nurse, Faith Dane, in the position of mother to white, black, and racially-mixed “boys.” In this 
figuring of Faith, the “white” and “black” brothers need not be in competition for her love (and 
                                                 
1
 This story originally appeared in Atlantic Monthly 12, no 73 (November 1863) as “The Brothers” despite Alcott’s 
preference for the title “My Contraband.” The story was reprinted as “My Contraband; or the Brothers.” in Hospital 
Sketches and Camp and Fireside Stories (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1869).  For further discussion of the publication 
history of this story and the significance of the changing title, see Sarah Elbert’s Louisa May Alcott on Race, Sex, 
and Slavery (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1997), xli. 
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importantly, she is not in danger of rape, as Robert’s wife was victimized), but mothers all her 
“boys” equally, standing as a surrogate mother to the nation.2    
Importantly, this positioning of Faith Dane as universal mother forecloses the possibility 
of any of these “boys’” sexual relation to Faith. While Alcott’s alternate title, “My Contraband” 
frames the story around the relation between Nurse Dane and Robert, the “contraband” soldier, 
“The Brothers,” in its prioritization of the relation between the two men, directs attention away 
from the subject of Faith’s interracial sexual desire. While Alcott’s story ultimately refuses to 
pursue the possibility of Dane’s participation in interracial sex, it nevertheless suggests its 
possibility, as Sarah Elbert and other readers of Alcott and race have suggested.
3
 Faith’s 
positioning at the center of the story in Alcott’s alternate title, “My Contraband,” draws attention 
to this possibility for interracial sexual desire in the story. Faith’s desire is not restrained because 
of any general inclination against “amalgamation,” but is thwarted more specifically by her 
preoccupation with Robert’s status as a previously-enslaved person.   
By refusing to explicitly denounce “amalgamation,” its possibility is not entirely 
foreclosed, other than through the shift toward reading Faith Dane as maternal. In the moment at 
which Faith touches Robert and “in an instant the man vanished and the slave appeared,” the 
                                                 
2
 Throughout this dissertation, I use terms such as “white,” “black,” “Indian,” and “mixed-race” or “racially-mixed” 
to designate the racial categories of the characters I discuss, where this is essential to understanding my arguments 
about race.  I sometimes employ “scare quotes” around these terms in order to draw attention to the problems of 
their conventional uses to convey assumedly- definite and biological racial categories.  I wish to draw attention to 
this common usage as a metaphorical one – as adjectives that purport to denote physical appearance, but which 
actually suggest a complex set of assumptions about biological and social categories of race, racial genealogy, and 
racial dualism.  I retain these terms because these are the terms used in the literary texts I discuss, and because they 
are legible terms for thinking about how race was understood in the nineteenth century.  I also use them because 
they are so common to the literature and scholarship with which this dissertation is concerned, as even texts that 
outwardly challenge these racial categories cannot escape the limitations of the language we (still) use to talk about 
race in the United States.  Although sometimes these quotation marks will serve as a distracting reminder of the 
various problems of these content-laden terms, at other times they drop out, for mere ease of conversation.  Even 
where I do not use quotation marks, however, I intend to refer to literary or national tropes of whiteness and 
blackness (which are admittedly content-laden) rather than to actual qualifications of race that I would rather apply 
to either literary characters or historical figures. 
3
 Elbert, Louisa May Alcott on Race, xli.  
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construction of difference in legal personhood rather than racialized biology demands that 
Faith’s further affections are only maternal in nature.4 As Sarah Elbert notes, “Alcott thus insists 
that it is the man, tragically conscious of social boundaries and the consequences of crossing 
them, who forces Faith Dane to see her whiteness. Faith’s sexual attraction to the ‘man’ is 
immediately disarmed by his performance as the ‘slave,’ and she resumes her own mask of 
comforting mother and, not incidentally, her dominance.”5 However, this familial orientation of 
Faith as mother does not simply trump racial and gender hierarchies in the story, but only thinly 
veils them.  Nor does this prioritization of motherhood evacuate the story’s subtext of interracial 
sexual relations. 
Redirecting the possibility of Faith’s interracial sexual desire in “My Contraband” toward 
her motherly relation to both white and black “boys” in “The Brothers” importantly reinscribes 
some of the racial hierarchy of enslavement. Viewing Faith as a suitable mother (but not as a 
suitable lover) retains the hierarchy of race relations between black men and white women. As 
mother, Faith Dane retains a position of power and is regarded as a caregiver, rather than an 
equal. This relation of white motherhood to black children is rendered visible in an illustration of 
Tribulation Periwinkle nursing Baby Africa, from Alcott’s 1869 collection, Hospital Sketches, 
and Camp and Fireside Stories.  (See Figure 1) 
Regarding the white mother in a position of stewardship to the black nation shows a 
simple re-gendering of the paternalism inherent in pro-slavery arguments, which often claimed 
that whites were merely caregivers to black people who could not be expected to care for 
themselves outside the system of plantation slavery. Like Nurse Periwinkle, Faith Dane is 
similarly positioned as a white mother to the black nation, as black people are understood as 
                                                 
4
 Louisa May Alcott, Hospital Sketches, and Camp and Fireside Stories (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1869), 172. 
5
 Elbert, Louisa May Alcott on Race, xlii.  
 4 
 
perpetual children in Alcott’s story. The presence of the black woman in the background of the 
illustration also signifies her displacement. If Nurse Periwinkle, a white woman, must tend to 
“Baby Africa,” the implication is that black mothers are somehow failing, either through their 
own fault (as Daniel P. Moynihan would later blame black mothers for the economic condition  
of black families) or through the structural inequalities that denied most black women access to 
the same educational and economic privileges that facilitated traditional models of white 
motherhood.   
 
 
Figure 1: Nurse Tribulation Periwinkle holding Baby Africa 
Louisa May Alcott, Hospital Sketches and Camp Fireside Stories (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 
1869) 
“One hand stirred gruel for sick America, and the other hugged baby Africa.” 
 5 
 
Another potential reading of the figure of the white woman exists, however, if we take 
serious the possibility of Nurse Periwinkle’s kinship to Baby Africa or Faith Dane’s mothering 
of black “boys.” I want here to suggest a more radical reading of white mothering of black 
children than what is usually understood by the black mother’s displacement or absence.  
Reading Faith Dane as a potential mother to black “boys” is provocative when one considers this 
relation as biological, in the possibility of bearing her own black children. If Faith Dane and 
Nurse Periwinkle are understood as capable of having biological relations to black children, 
rather than as surrogate or figurative mothers only, the prospect of interracial kinship suggests 
new readings and potentialities for white motherhood.  
When the suggestion of biological motherhood is taken seriously, the image of Nurse 
Periwinkle can be read as returning to the possibility of sexual desire between Faith Dane and 
Robert. Here we might re-read Robert’s assumption of Faith’s surname, either as a lover in a 
reverse of gendered marital name-exchange or as a child who has inherited it, in light of this 
possibility for interracial kinship. Putting aside the more obvious problem of figuring power 
relations between the white woman and the black man in this story, we are left with the 
possibility of racial intermixture. In this case, white women’s desire for racial Others leads 
logically to the possibility for other interracial kinship relations, both in the relation of sexual 
kinship with non-white men in marriage or other domestic relations, and in relations of 
interracial motherhood. The fact that interracial sexual desire can lead to the literal embodiment 
of racial mixture (i.e., the production of racially-mixed bodies) places the white woman involved 
in interracial sexual relations in a racially-precarious position. While white women have often 
been read as key protectors and preservers of whiteness, their interracial sexual encounters may 
result in the (re)production of the racial Other: the children white women bear from such 
 6 
 
encounters will not be designated as “white” like themselves.6 When read in this light, the 
suggestion of interracial sexual relations in “My Contraband” also hints at the possibility of 
Nurse Dane’s bearing racially-mixed children like Robert. Taking the possibility of interracial 
kinship seriously, we arrive at another reading of Nurse Periwinkle and Baby Africa: a reading of 
familial relations, rather than of national/racial stewardship or paternalism.   
My aim here is to re-think the possibilities of kinship in this illustration and Alcott’s Civil 
War story in order to emphasize a particular version of white womanhood that does not foreclose 
her involvement in interracial kinship relations. If we think beyond these usual understandings of 
kinship as a metaphor for understanding either the nation or assumptions of racial dependency 
and stewardship, we can better understand depictions of white women who are at the center of 
interracial kinship relations – relations of adoption, potentially procreative sexual relations, or 
relations of motherhood. “‘Diverse Bloods’: White Womanhood and Interracial Kinship in 
Nineteenth-Century American Literatures” is a study of texts that represent white women both at 
the center of and as key figures in narratives of interracial kinship. 
Demonstrating how interracial kinship refigures the meanings of whiteness and 
womanhood in the nineteenth century, this dissertation demonstrates how the figure of the white 
woman is often central to discourses not only of race and racism, but also of interracial kinship 
relations, in frontier romances, abolitionist literature, “anti-amalgamation” literature, and 
literatures of race, reunion, and Reconstruction. White women’s relations to non-white or 
racially mixed people in adoption or marriage, or bearing children who are not understood to be 
white like themselves, challenges conventional rhetorics of white womanhood in the texts I 
                                                 
6Barbara J. Fields cites the concept of “interracial” motherhood in her discussion of the absurdity of  biologically-
construed race, referring to “the well-known anomaly of American racial convention that considers a white woman 
capable of giving birth to a black child but denies that a black woman can give birth to a white child.”  See 
“Ideology and Race in American History” in Region, Race, and Reconstruction Ed. J. Morgan Kousser and James 
M. McPherson. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 149.  
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discuss. Focusing on the centrality of interracial kinship relations prevents characters from being 
read in line with dominant ideas of white womanhood in which white women are figured only as 
preservers and reproducers of whiteness, rather than as figures able to conceive of themselves as 
members of multiracial families. 
The word “kin” denotes both “family” and “race,” signifying “blood relation” as the 
defining characteristic of both categories. The connection between kinship recognition and racial 
identification is therefore clear. However, when the bounds of biological kinship cross imagined 
bounds of race, or when the kinship relation is behaviorally- rather than biologically-defined, 
these connections between kin and race become less clear: assumptions about racial definition 
often depend upon the articulation of race despite biological kinship ties, while literatures that 
highlight racial complexity often demand that kinship ties be acknowledged exclusively along 
the lines of racial identification. My use of the word “kinship” seeks to encompass a spectrum of 
relationships, both biological and behavioral, as the different texts I discuss may have it.   
Just as notions of biological race or imagined quanta of “white,” “black,” or “Indian” 
“blood” are complicated by interracial kinship, representations of white womanhood are re-
constructed through these relations. Attention to racialized kinship poses new possibilities for 
practices of reading the white woman, as interracial kinship challenges ideologies of biological, 
legal, or visually-identifiable race predominant in popular nineteenth-century literary genres. De-
prioritizing biological paradigms and normative ideologies of race, my project extends beyond 
models of white womanhood to explore the intersections of African-American and Native 
American identities with whiteness as a means for theorizing how mixed- or ambiguously-raced 
characters function in literary and cultural texts. 
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 “Diverse Bloods” focuses on how race and gender are constructed in nineteenth-century 
depictions of white women’s interracial marriage and adoption, in presentations of racialized 
maternity, and in the acknowledgement and rejection of biological kinship ties in racial anti-
passing narratives. Because the various iterations of kinship relations I discuss contradict popular 
assumptions about racial difference, they collapse simplified tropes of “white womanhood,” 
revealing the category as constructed, just as kinship might be understood to extend beyond 
literal biological relatedness. As construction, the “white woman” is not a finite category of 
identification in the texts I discuss, but a role that characters might perform to varying degrees, 
or a literary, national, and cultural trope against which they, as characters, are read.   
The construction of white womanhood has been essential to American discourses of race 
and racism, evidenced in places such as Amy Kaplan’s presentation of white women expelling 
“the foreign within” the domestic spaces of the home and the nation in “Manifest Domesticity,” 
and Linda Kerber’s model of a decidedly white “Republican Mother,” who reproduces whiteness 
by producing her sons as white, male citizens. The function of the “white woman” in nineteenth-
century American literature and culture has clear implications, then, for an emerging American 
nation in which race is a significant point of national legal and social discourse and contention. 
American literary models of white womanhood have been associated with popular genres such as 
the captivity narrative and the sentimental novel, through which notions of white feminine 
beauty, racial and sexual purity, and middle-class domesticity come to signify national racial 
discourse.   
While writers such as Vron Ware have given extensive attention to the construction of 
white womanhood and its importance for Western notions of race and racism in the British 
Empire, Amy Kaplan argues that at the crux of the connection between the domestic and the 
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national is the (white) American woman, whose domestic sphere is a microcosm of the nation. 
Similarly, June Namias locates the popularity of the captivity narrative within this ideology of 
white womanhood as an original literary site of American national purity and Shirley Samuels 
discusses the white woman’s centrality to the relationship between the family and the state in the 
early Republic. My own readings deal with representations of women who complicate and usurp 
tropes of white womanhood even as their narratives draw upon the figure of the white woman as 
a national literary and cultural trope. Like Samuels, I regard the white woman’s participation in 
structures of kinship as central to her importance for notions of political and national identity. 
With previous attention to the white woman as national and literary cultural trope in mind, I look 
to re-think the figure of the white woman with regard to interracial kinship. The texts I discuss 
here draws heavily upon the trope of the white woman. They do so, however, not to reinforce but 
to challenge the imagined figure of the “white woman,” to claim, disavow, or re-work its rhetoric 
in their own representations of American femininity. 
I therefore focus on the figure of the “white woman” as a recurring trope, visible to 
varying degrees in the literature I discuss, rather than a viable category of identification for its 
characters, authors, or potential readers. I do not attempt to broadly represent the category “white 
women,” but focus on literary figures that do not fall neatly into the ideological category of 
white womanhood, but occupy its margins by virtue of their participation in structures of 
interracial kinship. In light of this, my project interrogates the category “white women,” itself; I 
do not aim to categorize literary or historical figures by any degree to which they may or may not 
resemble an ideal trope, but instead examine their rhetorical uses of the “white woman” as a 
literary and cultural national figure. I explore the uses of this figure in my focus on literary 
representations of women whose identification as “white women” shifts or changes as they are 
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racially marked by the various events of their respective narratives or women who are racially-
mixed or ambiguously-identified, and therefore do not fit neatly into the category of “white 
womanhood” even as their narratives draw upon this literary trope.  
Writers, such as Eve Allegra Raimon, who have discussed mixed- or ambiguously-raced 
figures as the “tragic mulatta” trope often emphasize interracial figures as liminal, locating them 
between two (or more) racial extremes that don’t escape essentialization. This approach to 
hybridity, though acknowledging the social construction of race, is nevertheless dependent upon 
biological concepts of racialization. I interrogate these biological assumptions about race in my 
discussion of the assumptions necessary for both racial performance and kinship that 
traditionally prioritize essentialist notions of race and biological-relation. It is my aim to de-
prioritize notions of biological kinship in light of the recognized, enacted, or performed kinship 
relations that take place in adoption, the mother/mammy relation, and sexual-kinship or 
marriage, opening up the idea of performing white femininity beyond cues of visual appearance 
usually associated with “passing” narratives, or descriptions of “white slavery.” Further, I am 
interested both in figures who might be understood more conventionally as “biologically” white, 
and those who are racially mixed. In either case, notions of biological or visual “whiteness” is 
complicated and compromised by interracial kinship relations, revealing whiteness as neither 
simply biological nor visual, but as constructed.   
While nineteenth-century discourses on race are often invested in illuminating theories of 
racial essentialism and discussions of race as biological difference, in which race is detectible, 
essential, and determinate, scholarly work on race in the American nineteenth-century is often 
invested in coupling this discourse of racial separatism with evidence of racial mixture. Elise 
Lemire examines the role of racial mixture in American history and literature in her work on 
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“miscegenation” while Martha Hodes and Peggy Pascoe treat the relationships between white 
women and black men and the history of American “anti-miscegenation” law, respectively. In 
another vein, Tavia Nyong’o’s recent work examines the figure of the racial hybrid as a vehicle 
for nineteenth- and twentieth- century nationalism. My own work seeks to take up these threads 
of discussion surrounding racial mixture, gender, and national formation by examining the 
construction of race through kinship relations that inflect upon understandings of popular cultural 
tropes, literary genre, and models of nationhood.  
The national figure of the mother as a vehicle for reproducing the nation must be 
differently understood in the context of interracial-marriage, adoptive or surrogate motherhood, 
or interracial children. Kimberly Wallace-Sanders’ writing on the figure of the mammy, for 
example, illustrates how differently-constructed kinship relations force us to think more 
comprehensively about how black women participated in nineteenth-century nation-building. My 
treatment of racially-mixed or ambiguous literary figures examines their relationship to national 
rhetorics of race and gender in which they might either participate (as Harriet Beecher Stowe’s 
or William Wells Brown’s “whitewashed” mixed-race heroines are often read) or defy (as in the 
examples of Frances Ellen Watkins Harper’s Iola Leroy or Charles Chesnutt’s “New Negro 
Mother.”) “Diverse Bloods” emphasizes the ways in which these assumedly-marginal figures 
complicate the rhetoric of white womanhood at work in the texts I discuss. Reading the figure of 
the “white woman” from these marginal positions will provide a deeper understanding of both 
the complications and impossibilities embodied in this figure, as well as the racial theories 
characteristic of the nineteenth century, which are dependent, in part, upon constructions of the 
“white woman.”   
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The first chapter, “Mary Jemison’s Cabin: The “White Woman” of the Genesee and the 
Cultural Logic of Adoption” examines the position of adopted kinship from which Jemison’s 
relation to her Seneca family is narrated in James Seaver’s Narrative of the Life of Mrs. Mary 
Jemison (1824). When read alongside contemporary literatures of white woman’s captivity in the 
frontier romances of James Fenimore Cooper’s The Last of the Mohicans (1826), Lydia Maria 
Child’s Hobomok (1824) and Catherine Maria Sedgewick’s Hope Leslie (1826), the structures of 
kinship at work in Jemison’s narrative reveal more possibilities for “interracial” kinship than are 
available in the captivity narrative with which Jemison is most often associated. Jemison’s 
narrative refuses essentialist understandings of the terms “white” and “Indian,” rejecting logics 
of captivity in favor of those of adoption. Relations of “interracial” kinship are also apparent in 
the domestic spaces Jemison inhabits throughout her story, as her relation to non-whites suggests 
notions of kinship and fugitivity that work against the models of white republican motherhood 
central to both Seaver’s framing and most critical work on this text. 
Focusing on the most anxiety-laden nineteenth-century trope of interracial kinship, 
chapters two and three examine the rhetoric by which antebellum discourses of interracial 
(hetero)sexual relations describe blackness as transferred from black men (who “have” race) to 
white women (who “receive” race.) Chapter two, “Blackface Desdemona; or, the White Woman 
‘Begrimed,’” analyzes the appearance of Desdemona in nineteenth-century American minstrel 
productions of Othello. While Othello and Desdemona become iconic figures for discourses of 
racial mixture in the American nineteenth-century, more complex rhetorics of racial marking and 
desire are at play in blackface minstrel productions of Othello, in which even Desdemona is 
represented in blackface. I demonstrate how a white woman’s appearance on stage “begrimed 
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and black as mine own [Othello’s] face” literalized cultural and political anxieties about the 
“transfer” of racial marking from black men to white women through interracial sex. 
Chapter three, ““Almost…Eliza”: Reading Mary King as Mixed-Race Heroine,” 
discusses the proposed marriage of William Allen, the “Coloured Professor” of New York 
Central College, and Mary King, the white daughter of abolitionists, recounted in Allen’s 1853 
The American Prejudice Against Color. While newspaper accounts position King as the 
“damsel” at the center of white racial anxieties, abolitionist supporters of their marriage read her 
in the tradition of Eliza Harris, the mixed-race heroine of Stowe’s recently-published Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin. Rethinking Mary King’s function in Allen’s narrative reframes the “white woman” 
according to different literary genres. These generic characterizations indicate how King’s 
racialization becomes a literary practice. 
Chapters four and five take up chapter three’s concluding claim that interracial sexual 
kinship also implies the production of racially-mixed offspring. These chapters therefore focus 
on literary depictions of interracial motherhood. In my fourth chapter, “Mothers and Mammies: 
Reading Racialized Maternity,” I discuss the parallel racial representations of motherhood and 
“mammyhood” in Charles Chesnutt’s “Her Virginia Mammy” (1899) and Mark Twain’s 
Pudd’nhead Wilson (1894). Continuing chapter three’s discussion of racialization as a practice of 
reading, I discuss how Chesnutt’s and Twain’s texts construct the image of the mixed-race 
mother, working against both notions of idealized white motherhood and the racist type of the 
black “mammy.” The categories of “mother” and “mammy” intersect here, blurring kinship 
relations that usually determine racial identification and allegiance.  
My fifth and final chapter, “Kinfullness: Thinking Interracial National Kinship, presents 
an alternative to Hortense Spiller’s notion of the “kinlessness” of African Americans in 
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enslavement, in my concept of “kinfullness.” In my discussion of Frances Harper’s Iola Leroy 
(1892), I argue that kinship is not evacuated in Harper’s novel, but is instead filled with the 
excess content of enslavement, either in the inheritance of the legal “condition of the mother” or 
in an excess of white biological kin who must then be rejected by texts that prioritize kinship 
relations articulating African American racial affiliation. Taking up notions of desire and 
heterosexual futurity that I introduced in chapter two, I relate my discussion of Iola Leroy to 
texts such as Louisa May Alcott’s “M.L.” (1863) and Kate Chopin’s “Désirée’s Baby” (1893), 
which also defy prominent racist discourse that would foreclose interracial desire. In Alcott’s and 
Chopin’s stories, the “problem” of white women’s interracial desire is inseparable from her 
relation to a reproductive future of mixed-race children. Concluding with a brief discussion of 
Chesnutt’s The Marrow of Tradition (1901), I read Chesnutt’s “New Negro Mother” as a figure 
who both acknowledges interracial kinship relations, but resists national racial reconciliation.  
My conclusion, “‘Diverse Bloods’: “White” Womanhood and Interracial National 
Kinship,” points us to how the rhetoric of white womanhood comes to bear on antebellum and 
Reconstruction era narratives of racial mixture and national kinship. My examples here are the 
antiracist narratives of racial (re)union such as William Wells Brown’s Clotel (1853), and Lydia 
Maria Child’s Romance of the Republic (1867). These texts work against ideologies of white 
womanhood that necessitate her rejection of the racial “Other,” as in Linda Kerber’s model of 
“republican motherhood” or Amy Kaplan’s theory of “manifest domesticity.” Rather, Brown’s 
and Child’s heroines both embody and reproduce racial difference, indicating a shift towards a 
model of womanhood able to incorporate the Other into structures of national multiracial family. 
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Though literary scholarship often positions the middle-class, heterosexual white woman 
against a racial “other” who is located outside the sphere of the American national family, many 
nineteenth-century literary texts do not depend upon the white woman’s racial separatism, but on 
her ability to create interracial structures of kinship. In the texts I discuss here, women characters 
appear in interracial kinship relations that allow them to challenge familiar literary tropes of 
white womanhood. The dominant model and accompanying ideology of white womanhood – 
even in the presentation of racially-ambiguous or mixed-race characters – becomes an important 
component of varied narrative discourses of domesticity, heterosexuality, nationalism, 
abolitionism, and racial uplift. Literary genres such as the frontier romance, abolitionist 
literature, and literatures of race, reunion, and Reconstruction, include complex structures of 
kinship that re-figure their white women characters against the more normative models of white 
womanhood based on assumptions of biological, racialized kinship relations. 
Exposing how this raced and gendered icon is constructed by her positioning against 
white and non-white kin, literary narratives of white women’s interracial kinship relations work 
to shape discourses of domesticity, heterosexuality, nationalism, abolitionism, and racial uplift. 
Ultimately, “Diverse Bloods” shows how nineteenth-century texts shifted the expectations of 
white women’s kinship towards a model of womanhood able to incorporate structures of national 
multiracial family. This project therefore examines the tropes of white womanhood at work texts 
in which models of white womanhood are prominently figured in interracial kinship relations.   
 
  
 16 
 
Chapter One 
Mary Jemison’s Cabin: 
 The “White Woman” of the Genesee and the Cultural Logic of Adoption 
 
 
“To him she was a white woman, and he knew stories of white women being  
taken by Indians.” 
Rayna M. Gangi, Mary Jemison: White Woman of the 
Seneca: a novel (1996) 
 
“. . . you yourself have done some strange things.  You know what they say about 
you and that mute Negro, don’t you?”  
    Deborah Larsen, The White (2002) 
 
 
Separated from her husband, and with five small children to feed, in the autumn 1779 
Mary Jemison hired herself out to harvest corn for two African American men living on Gardow 
Flats in Western New York, the land that was later to become Jemison’s property. In her 1824 
as-told-to narrative, she remembers, “I have laughed a thousand times to myself when I have 
thought of the good old negro, who hired me, who fearing that I should get taken or injured by 
the Indians, stood by me constantly when I was husking, with a loaded gun in his hand, in order 
to keep off the enemy, and thereby lost as much labor of his own as he received from me, by 
paying good wages.”7 After General Sullivan’s army, on orders from George Washington, had 
succeeded in burning Seneca corn and houses, killing their cattle and horses and destroying their 
fruit trees, it is clear to Jemison that “the enemy” is the white Continental Army, rather than the 
local Indians who both she and her racially-mixed children recognize as kin.
8
   
More than an anecdotal event in Jemison’s tale, the winter Jemison and her children 
spend in the cabin of these self-emancipated men is representative of how her narrative resists 
                                                 
7
 James E. Seaver, A Narrative of the Life of Mrs. Mary Jemison, ed. June Namias (1824; reprint, Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 105. Further references to A Narrative of the Life of Mrs. Mary Jemison are to 
this edition and will be cited parenthetically in the text. 
8
 During the Revolutionary War, the Sullivan Expedition waged as an offensive attack against the Iroquois 
Confederacy. In Western New York, George Washington ordered Sullivan’s army to carry out a scorched earth 
campaign, destroying Indian villages as part of a genocidal attack on the Iroquois tribes who had aligned themselves 
with the British. 
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conventional underpinnings of white womanhood, speaking to the ways Jemison does not 
conform to the models of white femininity and domesticity usually associated with literatures of 
the early republic. The irony of the above scene reminds us of both the perceived vulnerability of 
white women on the frontier and the actual vulnerability of Senecas such as Jemison and her 
children during the Revolution. But the irony of Jemison’s laughter here is eclipsed by the 
further irony of her would-be-defenders: two self-emancipated “negro” men – rather unlikely 
protectors of white womanhood in American literatures of the 1820s. Taken in the entirety of its 
irony, this part of Jemison’s story is more than just one example of the several ways she fails to 
function within the bounds of white womanhood, but reveals something more fundamental about 
the way whiteness itself is working throughout her narrative. While most scholarly discussions of 
Jemison have either ignored or given minimal attention to the autumn and winter she and her 
children spent with the two African American men who helped save them from starvation, 
attending  to the significance of these events gives insight into the ways Jemison’s tale reveals an 
identity generated by associations of kinship and domesticity that are dependent upon cultural or 
behavioral relationships, rather than biological ones.   
On the surface, Mary Jemison’s narrative of captivity, adoption, marriage and child-
rearing presents a story of either “cross-racial” or “transcultural” kinship and domesticity. It is 
most often associated with the captivity narrative genre, and read as the story of a (biologically) 
white woman who “becomes” (culturally) Indian through her adoption into a Seneca community.   
Although Jemison continually reiterates her sense of belonging with her Indian family 
throughout the narrative, and is never “recovered” by her former Anglo community (other than 
through James E. Seaver’s retelling her story for a presumably white audience),9 the assumedly-
                                                 
9
 Harriet S. Caswell gives an account of Jemison’s religious recovery, however, in Our Life Among the Iroquois 
Indians (Boston: Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society, 1892), 56-58. Caswell recounts a visit 
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biological marker “white” persists in her story’s framing and in subsequent academic discussions 
of the text.  Jemison’s amanuensis and the first editor of A Narrative of the Life of Mrs. Mary 
Jemison, James Seaver, as well as most subsequent depictions of Mary Jemison, paint “the White 
Woman of the Genesee” as a figure bifurcated by these conflicting biologically- and culturally-
construed identities – a woman who may “become” Indian, but who never ceases to be “white.”10  
(See Figures 2 and 3)  However, Jemison tells a different story in the narrative, exposing the 
biological conception of whiteness as insufficient for identity-formation, and challenging 
assumptions that prioritize biological kinship relations.
11
  It is through domestic relations of 
                                                                                                                                                             
made to Mary Jemison (“The White Woman”) and one of her daughters by Mrs. Wright, a missionary, in 1833. The 
narrative describes Jemison’s eagerness to speak with a Christian missionary and her retelling the story of her 
biological mother’s final instructions to always remember the Christian prayer she had taught her to repeat every 
day, and her guilt at eventually forgetting the words. Mrs. Wright then recites the Lord’s Prayer in English, and 
Jemison is overcome at the recollection. This response, followed by Mrs. Wright’s praying with Jemison, and 
reading to her from the gospel, is read as Jemison’s return to Christianity. The story of the encounter concludes, “we 
think she died in the cheering faith of the gospel, and not in the darkness of paganism” (58). Jemison’s supposed 
return to the Christianity of her white relatives in this scene stands in for the “recovery” to white society that 
Jemison’s narrative itself refuses. When read as an appendix to Seaver’s original account, its presence evidences a 
compulsion, of sorts, to read Jemison’s as a tale of captivity, even while the narrative itself resists this genre.  This 
account is later incorporated into the second edition of Jemison’s Narrative, De-he-wä-mis: or A Narrative of the 
Life of Mary Jemison: Otherwise Called the White Woman, Who was Taken Captive by the Indians in MDCCLV and 
Who Continued with Them Seventy Eight Years . . . (Batavia, N.Y., 1842), edited by William Seaver (brother of the 
then-deceased James Seaver) and Ebenezer Mix. On this supposed-conversion, see June Namias’ introduction to A 
Narrative of the Life of Mrs. Mary Jemison, 38-39 and Namias’ White Captives (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1993), 326-328.  For a detailed publishing history of Jemison’s narrative, see Namias’ introduction 
to A Narrative of the Life of Mrs. Mary Jemison, p. 33-43.  
10
 More offensively, a plaque on the Chambersburg trail, marking the location of Jemison’s initial capture in 
Buchanan valley, Pennsylvania, calls Jemison the “white squaw of the Genessee.”   
11
 Writing on “as-told-to” narratives often addresses the problem of differentiating the writer from the narrator in 
these texts. Karen Oakes has written about the difficulty of locating Jemison’s voice separately from Seaver’s as a 
tension between oral transmission and writing. See “We Planted, Tended, and Harvested Our Corn: Gender, 
Ethnicity, and Transculturation in A Narrative of the Life of Mrs. Mary Jemison” Women and Language 18.1 (1995) 
45-51.  Michelle Burnham discusses the competing voices of Jemison/Dickewanis and Seaver  in the narrative.  See 
“However Extravagant the Pretention: Bivocalism and U.S. Nation-Building in A Narrative of the Life of Mrs. Mary 
Jemison,” Nineteenth-Century Contexts 23.3 (2001):327-333.  Elena Ortells Montón terms Seaver’s authorship of 
Jemison’s narrative “rhetorical drag” in “A Narrative of the Life of Mrs. Mary Jemison: Rhetorical Drag and the 
Defiance of Hegemonic Cultural Models,” ATLANTIS 32.1 (June 2010): 73–86. Because my intent here is to put 
Jemison’s narrative into conversation with thematically-related popular literature of the 1820s, I read Seaver’s 1824 
text as the narrative of Mary Jemison, the literary figure, here and throughout my discussion, referring to the literary 
Mary Jemison as its narrator and protagonist, (though acknowledging that some differences must exist between this 
figure and the historical Mary Jemison.) For this reason, I call her by the name ascribed in the title, rather than her 
Seneca Name, Dehgewanus (spelled Dickewamis in the first edition of Jemison’s narrative, Deh-he-wä-mis in some 
later editions, and variously elsewhere), as Susan Walsh appropriately does in reading her narrative as Native 
autobiography. See Susan Walsh “‘With Them Was My Home’: Native American Autobiography and A Narrative 
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cultural or behavioral kinship, (rather than through the fiction of Jemison’s “biological” 
whiteness), I argue, that this narrative is best understood.   
 
Figure 2:”Statue of Mary Jemison” at her gravesite, Letchworth State Park in Western New York 
Lukas Neville, September 5, 2009, Flickr, Creative Commons Attribution 
 
 
 
Figure 3: “Mary Jemison Plaque,” Chambersburg Trail, Buchanan Valley, Pennsylvania 
Claes Jonsson, n.d. <http://www.claesjonsson.com/Jemison.htm>   
“The monument marking the home of the “White Squaw of the Genessee” prior to her capture by 
the French and Indians is 3 miles north. The remainder of Mary Jemison’s life was spent as an 
Indian.” 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the Life of Mrs. Mary Jemison,” American Literature 64.1 (1992): 49-70. Laura L. Mielke also treats Jemison’s 
narrative as Native autobiography.  See Moving Encounters: Sympathy and the Indian Question in Antebellum 
Literature (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2008), 78-85. 
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This chapter reads Jemison’s narrative in light of these non-biological kinship 
relationships that dominate her narrative, and which ultimately articulate her Indianness, rather 
than her whiteness. Further, the narrative reveals Jemison’s supposed whiteness as culturally-
constructed through the nationally-conceived figure of the white woman, with which Jemison’s 
text is in conversation despite its pretense to biological fixedness. First, I take up the tension 
between the Western bio-logic of racial identity and the native cultural logic of kinship at work 
in Jemison’s tale of adoption. I then move to a discussion of her “interracial” marriages, 
connecting the history of legal racial determination in federal Indian law and “anti-
miscegenation” law to the particular position of a woman whose landed property is determined 
both by white patriarchal and native matrilineal systems. Lastly, I draw upon models of white 
femininity in theories of republican motherhood and manifest domesticity, to show how the role 
of women in the early national period is dependent upon assumedly-biological kinship relations 
and corresponding domestic spaces, and what is at stake in early republican literatures that call 
this prioritization of biology into question.   
Though scholars have had much difficulty placing Jemison’s narrative within the genre of 
the captivity narrative, this text might be better regarded in its relation to other popular American 
literatures of the 1820s, as the discussions of writers such as Harry Brown, Annette Kolodny, and 
(most explicitly) Ezra Tawil suggest. The model of white womanhood with which I am most 
concerned is also visible in literary texts contemporary to Seaver’s, particularly in the popular, 
distinctly “American,” literary genre of the 1820s: the frontier romance. In novels such as Lydia 
Maria Child’s Hobomok (1824), James Fenimore Cooper’s Last of the Mohicans (1826) and 
Catherine Maria Sedgewick’s Hope Leslie (1827) the figure of the “white woman” in (potential 
or actual) interracial kinship relations with Indians is central to the storyline.  It is with these 
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texts that I find A Narrative of the Life of Mrs. Mary Jemison in direct conversation, along with 
the body of federal Indian law that comes to impress upon relations of “interracial” kinship 
relations and domestic arrangements between “whites” and “Indians.” In my discussion, I intend 
to highlight the conflation of race and culture in the ideology of “the White Woman” of the 
Genesee. This conflation illuminates the ways in which the bio-logic of race is imposed upon 
claims of cultural “whiteness” or “Indianness,” and how early republican discourses of kinship 
are dependent upon the bio-logic of racial formation. A closer reading of the challenges to this 
bio-logic in Jemison’s narrative will suggest new ways for reading kinship relations in this and 
other texts that re-figure “the white woman” as a cultural trope not necessarily dependent upon 
notions of racial biologism.   
 
The Cultural Logic of Adoption and the “White” Woman of the Genesee  
The daughter of Scotch-Irish parents who emigrated to North America, Mary Jemison 
was captured by the Shawnees in 1758. Though her parents, two of her brothers, and her sister 
were killed by the Shawnees, she was adopted into a Seneca family, married (twice) within her 
Indian community, raised her children among them, and remained with the Senecas for the rest 
of her long life. It was not until 1823 that James Seaver sought her out and heard her life story, 
writing and publishing the “as-told-to” narrative the following year. By that time, Jemison’s 
story was situated within an established genre of white women’s captivity narratives that relied 
on clear racial distinctions between whites and Indians.
12
 Constructed across various revised 
                                                 
12
 June Namias discusses the genre of the white woman’s captivity narrative extensively in White Captives, 
characterizing the most prominent female types as “the Survivor, the Amazon, and the Frail Flower,” the last of 
these being most prominent after 1820 (24). It is clear that Jemison differs greatly from Namias’ “Frail Flower,” 
who rarely recovers from the trauma of her captivity and whose narrative often contains elements of “brutality, 
sadomasochistic and titillating elements, strong racist language, pleas for sympathy and commiseration with the 
author’s suffering, special appeals to her sad lot as a distressed mother, and occasional invectives against dirt and 
sex among Indians” (37). Significantly, Namias regards Jemison’s story as an evolving one, charting it through the 
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editions and novelized retellings since her narrative’s first publication, Mary Jemison’s story has 
elicited critical work that often attempts to place her within the framework of the white woman’s 
captivity narrative, attesting to an ongoing desire to render her story appropriate to the 
conventions of the genre, while wrestling with the problem of how to place a figure who is often 
described in “transcultural” terms.13 Jemison’s portrayal as a “white Indian” presents a certain 
degree of irony as the racially-construed categories “white” and “Indian” (following the history 
of racial biologism prevalent during the nineteenth century and from which a more recent history 
of social-race theory cannot fully free ideologies of race) are generally assumed to be mutually 
exclusive. The phrase “white Indians,” employed to describe Anglo-Americans who, though 
(“biologically”) white, adopt the cultural designation “Indian,” does not break down the bio-logic 
of racial identity.
 14
 Rather, the construction suggests a difference in how “white” and “Indian” 
identities are understood and maintained. In this construction, the retention of the adjective 
“white,” referring to an essentialist notion of “whiteness” as an inherent, biological quality that 
cannot be lost works against the designation “Indian” as cultural identifier that can be assumed, 
even by people who are not racially “Indian.” This epithet that so frequently accompanies 
                                                                                                                                                             
various editions of Seaver’s narrative and noting that Jemison as a figure is remade throughout her literary “life 
cycle” (114).  Christopher Castiglia also discusses the difficulty of placing Jemison among other representations of 
the white female captive.  See Bound and Determined: Captivity, Culture-Crossing, and White Womanhood from 
Mary Rowlandson to Patty Hearst (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 9. James Axtell discusses the 
captivity narrative genre more generally in The European and the Indian: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial 
North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
13
 For examples of such discussions, see Christopher Castiglia, Bound and Determined, 34-48; Karen Oakes, “We 
Planted, Tended, and Harvested Our Corn,” 45-51;  Pauline Turner Strong Captive Selves, Captivating Others: The 
Politics and Poetics of Colonial American Captivity Narratives (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), 2, 145; 
and Hilary Wyss, “Captivity and Conversion,” American Indian Quarterly 23.3/4 (1999): 64-65. 
14
I use this term to refer to the racial logic of biologism, as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “the 
interpretation of human life from a strictly biological point of view,” and as can be particularly found in the 
scientific racism that emerges as the dominant discourse of race in the nineteenth century. My use her follows Eric 
Cheyfitz, who uses the term bio-logic in opposition to a cultural logic of identification and identity-formation, which 
he holds is a more appropriate paradigm by which to understand American Indian identity. See Eric Cheyfitz, “The 
(Post)Colonial Construction of Indian Country” in The Columbia Guide to American Indian Literatures of the 
United States since 1945, ed. Cheyfiyz (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 16. Further references to The 
Columbia Guide are from Cheyfitz’s book-length introduction to this edition and will be cited parenthetically in the 
text. William Stanton discusses the development of biological understandings of race throughout the nineteenth 
century more generally in The Leopard’s Spots (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). 
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depictions of Mary Jemison reminds readers of the permanence of biological identifiers, and the 
potential transience of the cultural ones: although Jemison can and does “become” Indian in 
Seaver’s narrative, she never ceases to be “white.” Examining the cultural kinship relations by 
which Mary Jemison identifies both herself and her “mixed-blooded” children as Indians 
challenges constructions of identity that are based around imagined quantities of Indian or white 
“blood.” Jemison’s narrative works against the bio-logic of race, particularly exhibited in the 
kinship and gender relations she describes. In this respect, Jemison defies models of white 
womanhood characteristic to the captivity narrative genre, exchanging this model for a narrative 
centered on her adoption into and kinship role within the Seneca community.   
 In her adoption ceremony, the Seneca women who will become Jemison’s sisters couple 
welcoming their new sister and mourning their lost brother, who she will “replace” in their 
family. Their mournful lamentation at his loss is immediately followed by the introduction of 
their new family member as they say, “‘His spirit has seen our distress, and sent us a helper 
whom with pleasure we greet. Dickewamis has come: then let us receive her with joy! She is 
handsome and pleasant! Oh! she is our sister, and gladly we welcome her here. In the place of 
our brother she stands in our tribe. With care we will guard her from trouble; and may she be 
happy till her spirit shall leave us’” (77). 15 As Jemison explains that she has been brought into 
their family to replace a brother who had been killed, she also relates that this is a common 
practice among Indian communities who lose members in war. The substitution of an adopted 
sister for a supposed blood relation implies that the weight of the kinship relation rests in a 
cultural or behavioral, rather than a biological determination. This holds even truer when we 
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 The spellings of all Indian names I use are from Seaver’s first edition of Jemison’s narrative, published in 1824 
(and on which June Namias’ scholarly edition is based), unless otherwise indicated. The English spellings of these 
names vary across other historical documents, as does the last name of Mary Jemison and her descendents. I keep 
Seaver’s original spellings merely for consistency with the narrative about which I am most concerned here.   
 24 
 
recognize that characterizing this brother as “biological” kin would be a matter of conjecture.  
That is, we do not know whether this brother was biologically related to them. Jemison’s status 
as sister is equal to that of her new family’s dead brother in this equation (“she is our sister;” not 
merely “like” a sister), as the adoption articulated in this welcoming reception fully incorporates 
her into the family structure.   
Later, when she returns to her “Indian mother” and sisters after two years separation from 
them, Jemison recounts that “the warmth of their feelings, the kind reception which I met with, 
and the continued favors that I received at their hands, rivetted [sic] my affection for them so 
strongly that I am constrained to believe that I loved them as I should have loved my own sister 
had she lived, and I had been brought up with her” (89). Like her adopted family, Jemison 
explains her feelings of kinship by substituting the memory of a dead blood relation, citing her 
familial love as no different than that she might have for a blood relation. Familial presence – 
implying kinship as behavioral rather than biological relation – marks Jemison’s affections, as 
she cites the familial “warmth” of her sisters as eliciting and constituting this sense of kinship.  
Jemison’s account of her “Indian brother,” Kau-jises-tau-ge-au is similarly based on an emotive 
account of feelings of familial relation. Reflecting on his death, she calls him “an excellent man . 
. . [who] ever treated me with kindness . . . I mourned his loss as that of a tender brother, and 
shall recollect him through life with emotions of friendship and gratitude” (119). When 
contemplating leaving her family to join white settlers, she similarly describes her dependence 
on her now-grown son, Thomas, “To go myself, and leave him, was more than I felt able to do; 
for he had been kind to me, and was one on whom I placed great dependence” (119). In both 
instances, Jemison locates kinship within these feelings of kindness and dependence and in 
familial behavior that suggests a cultural understanding of family relations and values. What ties 
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Jemison to her Seneca family members is this cultural understanding of kinship – specifically, in 
the experience of especial kindness and dependence her various family members have shown her 
– which she prioritizes over a biological relation to her living white relatives and acts upon in her 
relations to her “Indian family.” Though Jemison certainly laments the loss of her immediate 
(biological) family, she does not express any special feelings of connection to other whites to 
whom she is related by blood, but emphasizes feelings of familial belonging as she describes her 
familial interactions.  
Throughout her narrative, Jemison continually describes this relation to her adopted 
family as comparable to a blood relation, emphasizing the fact that her adoption does not render 
her any lesser status among “Indian family” members. She recounts, “I was ever considered and 
treated by them as a real sister, the same as though I had been born of their mother” (78). 
Jemison’s sisters diligently teach her the Seneca language and make her accustomed to their way 
of life, and thereby bring her into a cultural kinship that bears no hint of being a substandard 
form of family. For the Anglo-American audience of Jemison’s narrative, however, these 
familial relations can only be explained by their comparison to blood kinship. Even in 
interpreting her adoption, the referent of blood-relations and their recognition is continually in 
the background of Jemison’s tale. It is not enough that we learn that she has become these 
women’s adopted sister; she must explain this cultural kinship relation to her predominantly-
white readership “as if” it were a relation of blood, suggesting the limits of bio-logic for 
conceiving non-biological kinship relations – limits which will also become apparent in federal 
Indian law’s determination of Indian identity, particularly under the infamous court of Chief 
Justice Roger Taney.   
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The 1846 case of United States v. Rogers begins with a question of jurisdiction for a 
murder trial. Whether William S. Rogers (a “white” man who claimed to have been adopted into 
a Cherokee tribe) is to be tried by federal or Cherokee courts depends upon the legal 
determination of his racial identity. As the case approaches the Supreme Court, Rogers’ alleged 
murder of Jacob Nicholson takes a back seat to the question of identification it raises: can a 
white man, adopted into the Cherokee tribe become an Indian? Eric Cheyfitz points to a tension 
between bio-logic and cultural logic in determining Native American identity in the discourse of 
federal Indian law, illuminating the problem of determining Indian identity solely on the basis of 
blood quantum while diminishing the importance of tribal recognition and community. Two 
potentially conflicting definitions of “Indian” emerge from this tension.  Discussing United 
States v. Rogers, Cheyfitz writes “it should be emphasized, adoption by the community did not 
make an ‘Indian,’ a Western racial-political category, but a community member, a person 
belonging to a Native cultural category” (23). Ultimately, the case is specifically concerned with 
a biologically, racially-conceived legal definition of “Indian,” and concludes that Rogers, though 
adopted by the Cherokee tribe, is “a white man, of the white race, and therefore not within the 
exception [of the law in relation to Indians].”16 The peculiar wording of the Rogers decision, 
which refers only to white men, Cheyfitz notes, “suggests white youths and white females can 
become Indians through the cultural logic of adoption” (22). Putting aside the gender-distinction 
that Rogers raises, (to which I will return in the following section) I would like to further explore 
the similarities of this cultural logic of adoption as it applies to the representation of Mary 
Jemison.   
Apart from their gender difference, William S. Rogers’ adoptive situation is not 
dissimilar to Jemison’s: he was a white man who claimed to have been adopted into the 
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Cherokee community; he had married a Cherokee woman with whom he had several children. 
Upon his adoption into the Cherokee tribe Rogers claimed that he “became and continued to be 
one of them, and made the same his home, without any intention of returning to the said United 
States.”17 As Cheyfitz argues, “Rogers’ self-identification as a ‘Cherokee Indian’ suggests an 
important tension between the cultural-political identity ‘Cherokee’ and what was at this moment 
emerging as the racial designation ‘Indian’” (21). However, it becomes clear that the court is not 
concerned with whether Rogers or Nicholson are accepted members of an Indian community, the 
situation of their homes among – and comprised of – people who identify as Cherokee, or their 
relationships with Indian people or culture, as the Rogers decision refuses a cultural logic of 
identity. The court’s final verdict tells us that Rogers “is not an ‘Indian,’ within the meaning of 
the law” because “no white man can rightfully become a citizen of the Cherokee tribe of Indians, 
either by marriage, residence, adoption, or any other means, unless the proper authority of the 
United States shall authorize such incorporation.”18 The emphasis on Rogers’ (biological) 
whiteness indicates that there is no way to become Indian in this determination; both “whiteness” 
and “Indianness” are confined to strict categories of race. Rogers’ designation of his “home” as 
with the Cherokee (and therefore not within the United States) is also of no import to the court’s 
decision.  
Ultimately, the Rogers case is more concerned with who has the authority to determine 
Indian identity than with questions of what constitutes that identity. As Cheyfitz tells us that “the 
identity of ‘Cherokee Indian’ articulates a coupling of cultural logic with bio-logic,” (21) so does 
the designation of Mary Jemison as a “white Indian,” as the adjective and the noun here refer to 
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 United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 568.  
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 United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 571, 570. 
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two oppositional paradigms of identification. In this construction only the former term designates 
race, while the latter refers to the cultural identity she assumes through her adoption. 
Rogers also raises questions of blood quantum in its legal rendering of Indian identity, as 
it asks whether the 1834 trade and intercourse act can be applied to  
crimes committed by natives of the Indian tribes of full blood, against native Indians of 
full blood only; or do the said section and proviso have reference also to Indians 
(natives), or others adopted by, and permanently resident within, the Indian tribes; or 
have they relation to the progeny of Indians by whites or by negroes, or of whites or 
negroes by Indians, born or permanently resident within the Indian tribes and limits, or to 
whites or free negroes born and permanently resident in the tribes, or to negroes owned as 
slaves, and resident within the Indian tribes, whether procured by purchase, or there born 
the property of Indians.
19
  
 
I quote here at length to convey the complicated nature of this passage, which demonstrates the 
problem of the bio-logic of “blood” for determining identity in a society in which racial mixture, 
in its many possible forms, is undeniable.
20
 Further, the logic of blood quantum denies the 
cultural logic that inextricably links Indian identity to Indian culture. If one can be identified as 
Indian by virtue of having a certain percentage of Indian “blood” alone, then one can be Indian 
even without access to Indian land, language, customs, et cetera. By rendering “Indian” a purely 
biological (or, as often characterized, “racial”) category, the importance of the cultural basis for 
identity is not only replaced with something that the United States government can regulate; it 
threatens to devalue cultural practices as essential to Indian identity.  
The occurrence of adoption of whites into Native communities, however, is indicative of 
the insufficiency of this bio-logic for determining identity and belonging in cultural terms.  
Located within the practices of everyday life, the cultural logic of family and community 
belonging is evident in both Jemison’s narrative and the Rogers case, as whites are adopted or 
                                                 
19
 United States v. Rogers,  45 U.S. 570. 
20
 The pairing of blood quantum requirements and tribal enrollment as requirements for federal recognition of Indian 
status illuminates the continued political and social importance of bio-logic for determining Native identity. 
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marry into Indian families and become full members of their communities. In opposition to rigid 
notions of biological race, an understanding of identity as more complexly involved with 
community relations and daily living reveals the cultural relation of adoption as an equally (if not 
more) legitimate basis for Native identity. Although in A Narrative of the Life of Mrs. Mary 
Jemison, a cultural logic of adoption works against the bio-logic of racial identity, even in 
interpreting Jemison’s adoption, the importance of blood-relations and their recognition is 
continually in the background of writing on “white Indians.” Perhaps because of the emphasis on 
blood relations, discourses of inherited “interracial” kinship overshadow those of adoptive 
kinship in much of American literature. Closely accompanying these discussions of interracial 
blood is the discourse of interracial sexual kinship, often highlighted specifically (for reasons I 
will discuss below) as interracial marriage relations.  
 
“Interracial” Marriage, Land and the (Un)Making of White Womanhood21  
 One of the most prominent early republican literary discourses on Indian-white 
“interracial” marriage is, curiously, about two marriages that never occur: Cora Munro’s would-
be forced marriage to Magua and her marriage-in-death to Uncas in James Fenimore Cooper’s 
Last of the Mohicans. The (unsurprising) implication in Cooper’s story is that such a marriage 
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 Throughout this section I refer to “interracial” marriage between “Indians” and “whites.” My persistent inverted 
commas here are meant to convey the problematic assumptions in terming these marriages “interracial,” i.e., that 
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unions can easily be placed into one group or the other. As I argue, this is not simply the case with Mary Jemison, as 
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intermarriage. I will not, however, use the word “miscegenation” unless referring to writers who specifically use this 
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addition, I refer to marriage rather than to heterosexual sexual relations, in general, because marriage is the more 
prevalent topic in the texts I discuss. Further, marriage has legal implications regarding legitimacy and inheritance, 
and therefore becomes the more pressing concern throughout the history of anti-amalgamation and anti-
miscegenation discourse in the United States. I will discuss some of the more obvious implications for prioritizing 
legal marriage in anti-amalgamation discourse later in this section. 
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would be but a “horrid alternative” to Cora’s death.22 Further, an “interracial” sexual union 
would seem to pose a “threat” of sorts to Cora’s claim to white womanhood and its couched 
assumptions of sexual-racial purity. This threat is mitigated, of course, by Colonel Munro’s 
revelation that his daughter Cora, born of a different mother than her fair sister Alice, is 
“descended from that unfortunate class who are so basely enslaved to administer to the wants of 
a luxurious people” (180). That is, Cora does not have the claim to white womanhood that her 
sister does, according to societal rules of hypodescent. As Colonel Munro explains the status of 
his (though apparently remotely) racially-mixed daughter to Duncan Heyward, “these 
unfortunate beings are considered of a race inferior to your own” (180). The bio-logic of race 
(and racial hierarchy) is clear in Cooper’s text as Hawkeye, although he appears culturally closer 
to the Indians with whom he associates than with the white settlers, must continually remind us 
that he is a “white” man “without a cross” of “Indian blood.”   
 Like Hawkeye’s cultural (though not “cross-blooded”) Indianness, Cora’s cultural 
whiteness appears subordinate to her biologically (hypodescended) race in the novel. Still, she 
seems to have enough purchase in white womanhood for Hawkeye to reject the Delawares’ 
funeral song about the “future prospects” of Cora and Uncas at their dual-interment. We read that 
he “shook his head, like one who knew the error of their simple creed” and that “[h]appily for the 
self-command of both Heyward and Munro, they knew not the meaning of the wild sounds they 
heard” (387). Apparently, (though not suitably white enough to marry Duncan Heyward,) Cora is 
still white enough that these white men reject any semblance of her marriage to an Indian, even 
in death. 
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 James Fenimore Cooper, The Last of the Mohicans, ed. John McWilliams (1826; reprint, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 125.  Further references to The Last of the Mohicans are to this edition and will be 
cited parenthetically in the text. For further discussion of the theme of interracial marriage in the frontier romance, 
see Harry Brown, “‘The Horrid Alternative’: Miscegenation and Madness in the Frontier Romance,” Journal of 
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While Cooper seems particularly careful to foreclose any possibility of white-Indian 
marriage in Last of the Mohicans, in the more controversial Catherine Maria Sedgwick’s Hope 
Leslie, (published the following year, in 1827) white-Indian marriage is not excluded from the 
captivity narrative plot. In this story line, Hope’s sister Faith Leslie is captured by the Pequot 
chief Mononotto, who has come to reclaim his children, Magawesca and Oneco, who have been 
servants to the white settler-colonist family who have adopted Hope and Faith. Several years 
later, Magawesca informs Hope of her sister’s condition, telling her that she has married Oneco, 
(who had saved her life on the occasion of her captivity) and helps to arrange a meeting between 
Hope and Faith, only for Faith and Magawesca to be captured by English soldiers. Although 
Magawesca is imprisoned, Faith is restored to the care of her sister’s guardians. But Faith is not 
happy with the family that she “racially” resembles; she remembers little of her sister or her 
childhood, and can no longer speak or understand English. Ultimately, Faith is rescued by her 
husband Oneco, and returns to the family of her marriage. In Sedgwick’s story, Faith (whose 
original name is Mary before she is rechristened following the death of her biological mother), 
resists the narrative of captivity (just as Mary Jemison does) in her refusal to reenter white 
society. Faith is never permanently reclaimed in Hope Leslie; her choice to remain with her 
Indian husband and family still stands at the conclusion of Sedgwick’s novel.  
The white settlers’ inability to reclaim Faith as a white woman is explained, primarily, 
through the story’s assertion of her cultural Indianness. Her complete loss of both English and 
her white community’s religion (her Catholicism serves as little consolation to the Puritans), and 
her insistence on retaining the dress and ornamentation of the Indians after she is captured by the 
English mark her as culturally irrecoverable. The implication here is that the biological claim to 
whiteness is not sufficient to retain white culture. Mary Jemison’s clothes are also vested with 
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such cultural significance in the accounts of her being re-dressed “in complete Indian style” (76) 
as part of her adoption ceremony, and in Seaver’s description of Jemison on the occasion of their 
meeting as “made and worn after the Indian fashion” in his introduction (56). Despite this 
description, however, the 1856 edition of her narrative includes a frontispiece of Jemison 
“Relating her History to the Author,” wearing a dress, apron, shawl and bonnet more distinctive 
of white settler colonists.
 23
 Some degree of cultural whiteness is preserved in this imagining of 
Jemison, presenting for the reader with that rendered impossible in image of Faith Leslie in her 
persistently “savage” attire. 
Apart from this visual marker of culture, Faith’s Indianness is also described in terms of 
the kinship she feels for her Indian family, which has replaced what she no longer feels for her 
white sister. In their last meeting, we read that “there had been nothing in the intercourse of the 
sisters to excite Hope’s affections” and thus she recognizes that Faith can no longer be her sister 
in feeling, despite their biological relation.
24
 Further, Sedgwick describes Faith’s marital kinship 
in terms of its equivalency to biological relation, as Magawesca tells Hope that “she is dear to 
Mononotto as if his own blood ran in her veins” (188). This “as if” equivocates Faith’s marital 
kinship with blood relation, just as Mary Jemison’s adoptive kinship with her Indian family is 
represented in terms of its equality to biological kinship.  With Faith, as with Mary Jemison, if 
cultural kinship – a kinship marked by relations of behavior and feelings – has not trumped 
biological kinship, it must at least be regarded on equal terms. We see here a significant 
difference between Hawkeye’s ability to assume (to some extent) Indian culture and Cora’s 
position as a white(?) captive and would-be wife of an Indian or Faith Leslie’s assimilation into 
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the community of her husband. The gender distinction of the Rogers case (i.e., that although 
white men cannot, white women might be able to become Indian) seems to precede it in the logic 
that places white women as particularly – both sexually and racially – vulnerable in the frontier 
romance.  
 In early republican constructions of race (both in the frontier romance and elsewhere), the 
sexual encounter with the racial Other is coded as a point of biological contact through which 
race might be transferrable. According to these ideologies of racial formation, women have the 
greater (or at least different) potential to “receive” race than men. Ezra Tawil argues that Mary 
Jemison’s narrative is involved in parsing out questions of Indian and white identity as “it must 
tell us what makes white people [and particularly, white women, I would argue] white.”25 This 
discourse of white womanhood regards white women as people who must be protected from the 
racially Other – particularly the male racial Other, who poses a sexual threat to white feminine 
(sexual, and therefore racial) purity. In this sense, for women, the prospect of “going native” has 
not merely cultural but sexual implications, which (as will become apparent in the following 
section) are also construed to imply biological significance through the potential for “interracial” 
motherhood.  
 If the ideology of the different claims for men and women’s “racial” potential in the 
Rogers case holds, the logic of whiteness and Indianness is a gendered logic. Either “Indianness” 
(coded as a category of race and understood biologically) might be transferred to women more 
easily than to men (i.e., through the heterosexual encounter by which men “give” and women 
“receive” race) or the cultural construal of “Indian” can be adopted more readily by women 
(who, perhaps in alignment with narratives of captivity, are perceived as more susceptible to 
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and will be cited parenthetically in the text. 
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cultural “corruption” than men). In either case, the result is that white women are positioned at 
the center of discourses of “interracial” marriage. It is clear why the emphasis on Jemison’s 
marriages to two subsequent Indian husbands would be of particular interest to Seaver’s readers 
(either as titillating or horrifying details of her story) despite the difference of her narrative from 
prevalent tales of white women and Indian men in the frontier romance. 
Much as Cheyfitz describes the circular relation between bio-logic and cultural logic in 
Rogers, Tawil argues that the logic of whiteness in Jemison’s and other captivity narratives 
expresses a cultural rather than a racial logic. The preservation of Jemison’s whiteness, Tawil 
holds, is representative of the historical shift towards scientific racism that occurs between hers 
and earlier captivity narratives which “distinguished the Indian, not by ‘racial’ characteristics, 
but by what might properly be called national and religious ones” (101-102). In this sense, he 
writes, “her narrative could do something that narratives such as [Mary] Rowlandson’s could 
not: it defined the captive’s race as something that could not be lost or taken away. To do so, it 
had to create a distinction between cultural identity, or her Englishness, from national identity or 
race. While the former was classified as a contingent and alterable condition, the latter was 
defined as essential and permanent” (101). If the bio-logic of race is prioritized over the cultural 
logic of belonging to a community in this shift, then this understanding of “whiteness” parallels 
the one found in Rogers. Jemison’s adoption and marriage into the Seneca tribe, then, represents 
what Tawil refers to as a “cultural corruption, rather than any form of racial pollution” (102). 
This suggests the tension between bio-logic and cultural logic as not only referring to 
overlapping modes of identification, but as clashing in their confusion with one another. In this 
confusion one realizes the conflict between Jemison’s whiteness persistent in retellings of her 
story and the Seneca identity expressed in her narrative, in which the ideological foundations of 
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white womanhood Tawil describes are evacuated. In a closer reading of Jemison’s narrative, one 
finds that cultural logic does trump bio-logic. 
One of its most significant divergences from the majority of women’s captivity narratives 
(and the rhetoric of racially/sexually “pure” white womanhood one would expect to find there) is 
Jemison’s relation to Indian men. Having been adopted into a Seneca community, Jemison 
expresses no need for protection from Indian men (though she does describe the white male 
military as a threat). Jemison’s is not a story of violation or degradation at the hands of Indians, 
as even the circumstances of her arranged marriage end in what she only describes as a loving 
relationship. Still, even as she recounts the virtues of her first husband, Jemison must account for 
their interracial relationship as a potential problem for her Anglo-American readers.  She tells us,  
Yet, Sheninjee was an Indian. The idea of spending my days with him, at first seemed 
perfectly irreconcilable to my feelings: but his good nature, generosity, tenderness, and 
friendship towards me, soon gained my affection; and, strange as it may seem, I loved 
him!—To me he was ever kind in sickness, and always treated me with gentleness; in 
fact, he was an agreeable husband, and a comfortable companion.  We lived happily 
together till the time of our final separation, which happened two or three years after our 
marriage. (82) 
 
Jemison makes no further reference to the union of a white woman and an Indian man as a 
problem in her narrative, but this marriage seems to solidify Jemison’s sense of belonging with 
the Seneca. Significantly, Mary Jemison describes her feelings for Sheninjee as those of love. 
Resisting the racial proscriptions that would deny an Indian man ever to be “an agreeable 
husband, and a comfortable companion” to a white woman, Jemison’s narrative provides an 
unusual – though not completely unheard of – account of a successful “interracial” marriage.  
 Jemison’s account of her first husband is emphatic in her assertion of Sheninjee’s 
especial kindness to her.
26
 Lydia Maria Child presents a similar version of a particularly kind 
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Indian husband to his white wife in Hobomok, published the same year as Seaver’s first edition 
of Jemison’s narrative. Though Child presents Hobomok as the epitome of the “noble savage” 
type and he is universally described as showing an almost idealizing reverence for Mary Conant, 
she decides to marry him only because her “true” love, Charles Brown (a white suitor rejected by 
Mary’s father because of his radical religious beliefs), is believed to have been killed at sea. 
Thus, her marriage to the Indian occurs as a last resort of sorts when Mary, now in a state of 
depression, has come to regard Hobomok as the only being left to love her. While she marries 
Hobomok because of his love for her, rather than hers for him, Mary eventually comes to have 
genuine affection for her husband. His Indianness does not prevent him from being a good 
husband, and Mary eventually comes to describe Hobomok as “almost like an Englishman” in 
his suitability as a companion.
27
 Still, their happiness is not meant to be, and when Charles 
Brown returns, alive(!), Hobomok graciously steps aside, divorcing Mary and “disappearing” to 
the west so that she and Charles can be together.   
 While Hobomok does not leave Mary Conant completely unrecoverable to her former 
community as a result of her first marriage, her divorce and the ultimate disappearance of the 
titular character suggests that this marriage (despite the story’s suggestion of its inevitability) 
                                                                                                                                                             
kindness of her second husband on the occasion of his death, relating that “During the term of nearly fifty years that 
I lived with him, I received, according to Indian customs, all the kindness and attention that was my due as his wife. 
– Although war was his trade from his youth till old age and decrepitude stopt [sic] his career, he uniformly treated 
me with tenderness, and never offered an insult.” (129). She also describes Hiokatoo’s capacity for sympathy as he 
is “exasperated at the sight of so much inhumanity” and protects a Nanticoke woman who has been physically 
abused by her “white” husband (110). The history of Hiakatoo’s career as a warrior is followed by a note in which 
Seaver tells his reader that this information derives not from Mary Jemison’s account, but from George Jemison – 
the self-proclaimed white “cousin” of Mary who, as we later read, cheats her out of a great deal of property and 
whom the Seneca woman ceases to believe has any real relation to her. This place in the narrative most clearly 
distinguishes Jemison’s narration from Seaver’s. In later editions, Hiokatoo’s “fierce” nature is further highlighted 
with illustrations and additional supposedly biographical information as Jemison’s narrative is re-edited in ways that 
blatantly attempt to justify colonial expansion and genocide. Namias discusses these and other relevant additions in 
her introduction, (36-39). 
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does not fit with the “natural” ontology of white womanhood. That is, Mary and Hobomok’s 
union was not meant to be. Mary Jemison’s emphasis on feeling in her account of her marriage 
to Sheninjee marks a possibility that the frontier romance continually forecloses – the possibility 
of a white woman’s romantic/sexual desire for an Indian man, one that even Child’s relatively 
progressive novel refuses to allow.  
 Despite Hobomok’s unwaveringly “noble” nature, to the other characters in Mary 
Conant’s small Salem community, her marriage is rendered (with too-familiar rhetoric) worse 
than death. Her father, upon hearing news that his presumably-dead daughter is living and 
married to Hobomok exclaims, “I could more readily have covered her sweet face with the clods 
than bear this” (132). In effect, her marriage to Hobomok amounts to a social suicide for Mary. 
After her marriage, she considers herself lost to her biological family and the white community 
and degraded in their (and her own) view. While religious difference was the sole objection Mr. 
Conant had for Mary’s first choice of husband, her non-Christian marriage – a marriage that is 
also marked as intercultural, if not “interracial” – appears a far worse transgression. Religion also 
seems to mask an implied sexual objection with Mr. Conant’s concern about Mary’s choice “to 
lie in the bosom of a savage and mingle her prayers with a heathen” (133). The “prayers” that the 
couple mingles result in the birth of a son.    
The reproduction of kind, and even loving, Indian men in characters such as Uncas, 
Oneco, and Hobomok still deny the suitability of these characters as husbands to white women in 
the frontier romance. We would be mistaken in regarding objections to such marriages as solely 
concerned with maintaining either the racial or cultural “purity” of white women, however. As 
Peggy Pascoe and others have argued, white anxieties about interracial marriage in the United 
States were deeply invested in the retention of “white privilege” regarding the inheritance of 
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property. While laws prohibiting “interracial” marriage were inextricable from issues of gender 
and sexuality, (with many laws dealing specifically with demarking the racial groups with whom 
white women could not legally marry), “marriage between white men and Indian women was … 
intimately linked to American land settlement” and therefore often recognized by legislators.28 
As U.S. v. Rogers suggests, the perceived difference between the potential for white women and 
white men to become Indians, might also be characterized as a greater governmental interest in 
the identification of potential citizens (white men) than in noncitizens (women and Indians).  
If, as Pascoe holds, marriage was used “to confirm the land and property rights of White 
husbands,” marriages between Indian men and white women – two already legally 
disenfranchised groups when it came to property rights – do not figure heavily in the literature on 
“miscegenation” law in the United States.29 Namias identifies  concerns regarding Indians and 
land that were prevalent during the early part of the century as coming to bear upon these 
depictions of relations between white women and Indian men, explaining the racist justifications 
for Indian removal – “Certainly beastly men did not deserve to keep American land” – as 
paralleling anxieties about sexual relations between whites and Indians.
30
 This parallel risks 
figuring white women as potential “property,” as well – that sexual property which “beastly” 
men also do not deserve to “possess.” 
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This figuring, however, posits early republican gender hierarchies that did not necessarily 
apply to white adoptees into Indian communities. As G. Peter Jemison (a descendant of Mary 
Jemison) reminds us, “Adoption in the 18th century meant something more than an Indian name; 
it included rights and responsibilities which Seneca women inherited at birth, for we are a 
matrilineal society.”31 It is through her Seneca identification that Mary Jemison acquires the land 
on which she will live with her family following the Revolutionary War, until her old age. 
Through the 1797 Treaty of Big Tree (by which the Senecas sold all land east of the Genesee 
River), Jemison was formally granted a land grant on Gardow Flats, the land she had harvested 
with African American men during the Sullivan Campaign. Though this claim was opposed by 
Red Jacket, a prominent member of the Seneca community, this land claim helped to further 
establish Jemison’s identity as an Indian woman. However, as Namais tells us, Jemison, 
Hiokatoo, and her children are by this time positioned both geographically and metaphorically 
“between the encroaching white world and the beleaguered Indian one.”32 In 1816, white 
neighbors convinced Jemison to petition for U.S. citizenship in order to gain legal title to this 
land.  
The necessity of holding title to an Indian land claim becomes clear with the 1823 
Supreme Court case, Johnson v. M’Intosh, involving a single plot of land in Illinois, sold both by 
the Piankshaw Indians and under a grant from the United States. The case was concerned with 
distinguishing “possession” from “ownership” of land, questioning “the power of Indians to give, 
and of private individuals to receive, a title which can be sustained in the courts of this 
country.”33 After Jemison was granted citizenship in New York State in 1817, she continued to 
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live at Gardow Flats with some of her children, and with the title to her land, was able to give or 
sell portions of it to some of her white neighbors.
34
 By gaining title to her land, Jemison’s 
dealings became more secure than were she to remain a non-titled possessor, but she does not 
have complete control over these legal dealings, which are from this point forward facilitated by 
white male agents.   
According to her narrative, when Mary Jemison meets George Jemison, a man claiming 
to be a cousin biologically related to her through her white father, she allows him to use some of 
her land and he moves his family there. With the help of one of Jemison’s white neighbors and 
due to Jemison’s own inability to read English, this alleged “cousin” then succeeds in swindling 
Jemison out of over four hundred acres in an agreement by which she had meant to give him 
only forty. Namias appropriately notes the significance of a white man’s scheming Jemison out 
of her land as representing another way in which she is marked as an Indian woman, as attempts 
to strip Jemison of her culturally-defined native identity are also accompanied by the eventual 
loss of most of her land.
 35
 Later, in 1831, (and according to Christopher Castiglia, because she 
has now become “uncomfortable among the growing numbers of white settlers in the region,”) 
Jemison sold the remaining plots at Gardow Flats and moved with her daughters to the Seneca’s 
Buffalo Creek Reservation, where she died in 1833.
36
 The circumstances of Jemison’s 
relationship to the land on which she lives and works are particular to her position a “white 
women among the Seneca,” i.e., a woman whose land ownership is dependent upon both her 
position as a woman in a matrilineal society, as well as her position as a “white woman” whose 
                                                 
34
 It is interesting that Mary Jemison signs treaties – as a Seneca signatory – with the Federal government or other 
land dealers after she becomes a United States citizen – a century before the Indian Citizen Act. This is another way 
in which her mode of identification becomes necessarily transcultural as she negotiates her position within the 
Seneca community and with relation to the United States government. 
35
See  Namias’ White Captives, 186. 
36
 Castiglia, Bound and Determined, 36. 
 41 
 
marriages were with Indian men – men who do not have the same claims upon a wife (or her 
property) that white men would have under United States laws of coverture.   
Namias acknowledges that “along with the will to take over Indian lands there appears to 
have been a covert anxiety that Indian men could indeed serve as attractive and companionate 
sexual partners.”37 These concerns about property and sex are not easily separated when 
questions of legitimacy and inheritance are taken into consideration. If the retention of Jemison’s 
biological whiteness represents her Indianness as “cultural corruption, rather than any form of 
racial pollution” as Tawil would hold, what of the kinship relations that are formed through her 
marriages – particularly, the “racially-mixed” children she bears? Claims of Mary Jemison’s 
whiteness persist as a biological claim, but her narrative refuses a major trajectory of cultural 
whiteness, the traces of which are quite visible in the frontier romance: republican motherhood. 
My final section will treat Mary Jemison’s role as a mother and the ways her narrative, despite 
its persistent claims to Jemison’s whiteness, resists rhetorics of white republican motherhood and 
domesticity in her relation to her racially-mixed children. Just as Jemison’s dealings with land 
mark her position as “transcultural,” her domestic life is represented as involving “interracial” 
kinship relations.   
 
“White” (Republican) Motherhood and the “Savage” (in the) House; or, “Mary Jemison’s 
Cabin” 
 
As Namias, Castiglia, and others note, Jemison (like Faith Leslie) ultimately resists 
“white ‘protection’ or ‘rescue’” from her Indian community.38 Though shortly after her adoption, 
Jemison expresses a wish to be “liberated from the Indians and to be restored to my white friends 
and my country,” (80) she later refuses to return to the white settler community when given the 
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opportunity. Following the Seven Years’ War, when the British government was actively 
attempting to recover white captives from the Indians to return them to white society, Jemison 
decided not to leave her Indian family, feeling that her familial ties to them were stronger than 
any biological ties she might have to whites elsewhere. Because bounties were offered as reward 
for redeeming captive whites, Jemison recounts the danger of her being forcibly “liberated” 
despite both her decision to remain with the Seneca and the decision of the council chiefs that 
“as it was my choice to stay, I might live amongst them quietly and undisturbed” (93). As a 
young widow following the death of her first husband, Jemison recounts the particular danger 
she encounters from a Dutchman who wishes to redeem her even against her will. While early in 
her narrative, when her Indian sisters whisk her away from the company of white settlers who 
they believe will take their captive sister back to white society, Jemison expresses a dejection 
that “seemed like a second captivity,” (81) this later episode presents the possibility of yet 
another captivity.  
Jemison positions herself as a fugitive of sorts in this account: “I was fully determined 
not to be redeemed at that time, especially with his assistance, I carefully watched his 
movements in order to avoid falling into his hands . . . He gave up the chase, and returned: but I, 
fearing that he might be lying in wait for me, stayed three days and three nights in an old cabin at 
Gardow, and then went back trembling at every step for fear of being apprehended” (93). This 
position of fugitivity – hiding in a cabin at Gardow, by now a familiar place in Jemison’s 
narrative – repositions Jemison from the white captive in the earlier captivity plot to a position 
not unlike that of the two self-emancipated “negro” men she meets in 1779. Essentially, she 
hides in this cabin from a white man who threatens to capture and sell her away from her family 
– a far cry from the “liberty” she is supposedly offered by this transaction of “redemption.” The 
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safety of this cabin also echoes the shelter Jemison and her children received in the “interracial” 
space of the fugitives’ cabin. The irony of her position here – as one who is redeemable (or 
saleable?) because she is white – grates against the danger of her previous position – as one 
subject to starvation and exposure to the elements in a white men’s campaign against the Indians 
(among whom, for this shared danger, Jemison must be counted).    
As Jemison’s brother weighs in on the matter of her redemption, however, she is 
reinvested with traces of white womanhood that are recognizable in both the captivity narrative 
and the frontier romance. Entering into a quarrel with an elder of the tribe as to whether or not 
Jemison will be redeemed, she recounts that “my brother frankly told him that sooner than I 
should be taken by force, he would kill me with his own hands!” (93). Were this scene set in one 
of the earlier pages that constitute the captivity narrative portion of the text, we would easily read 
Kau-jises-ta-ge-au more as one of the savage figures in John Vanderlyn’s 1804 painting The 
Death of Jane McCrea than as a figure of brotherly protection. Jemison’s account of her 
affection for, and received from, her brother makes this a more complex scene, though. 
Remembering his especial “kindness . . . natural mildness of temper, and warmth and tenderness 
of affection,” she states, “If he had taken my life at the time when the avarice of the old King 
inclined him to procure my emancipation, it would have been done with a pure heart and from 
good motives” (120). When read in the tradition of the frontier romance, this brotherly sentiment 
is strikingly familiar, as the death of a female relation is presented as preferable to the 
degradation she might suffer when forcibly taken by an enemy. Had a brother of Cora Munro 
uttered these words, they would surely have been read as the chivalric last resort to protect white 
feminine honor. Admittedly, such a death, even at her brother’s hand, does not appeal to 
Jemison, but as she is reunited with her brother, her kinship ties with her Indian family are 
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reinforced. Though she tells of other white captives assisted to liberty (some by her own mother) 
this information is immediately followed by the occasion of Jemison’s second marriage, to 
Hiokatoo, and the names of her children.   
Perhaps the most compelling reason Jemison gives for remaining with the Seneca is her 
fear of how her children might be treated in white society, even by her biological relatives. 
Following the Revolutionary War, when her brother again offers her the opportunity to return to 
white society (though the Chiefs wish her now-grown son, Thomas, to remain) she explains:  
[A]nother, more powerful, if possible [reason for remaining, apart from not wanting to 
leave Thomas] was, that I had got a large family of Indian children, that I must take with 
me; and that if I should be so fortunate as to find my relatives, they would despise them, 
if not myself; and treat us as enemies; or, at least with a degree of cold indifference, 
which I thought I could not endure. Accordingly, after I had duly considered the matter, I 
told my brother that it was my choice to stay and spend the remainder of my days with 
my Indian friends, and live with my family as I had heretofore done. (119-120) 
 
Significantly, Jemison expresses no similar fears about raising her half-white children among the 
Seneca. There is a conspicuous absence of dualism in Mary Jemison’s narrative when she 
discusses her white and her Indian families: she explains her feelings of adoptive kinship in 
terms of blood relations and she names her “Indian children” after her blood relatives who have 
been murdered by the Shawnees, obscuring the supposed racial lines of separation between those 
she identifies as kin. 
In an apocryphal (though possible) story in which a younger Jemison actually does 
attempt to re-enter white society with her four-year-old son following the death of her first 
husband, she is given the ultimatum of abandoning her “half-Indian child,” after which she 
instead chooses to re-join the Seneca and re-marry.
39
 In a tradition in which the cultural logic of 
adoption would render one family, Jemison’s choice exposes the bio-logic of blood quantum as 
restrictive for determining kinship relations. The difference between these contrasting receptions 
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of Jemison’s children is representative of the difference between using bio-logic or cultural logic 
in recognizing kin. Karen Oakes points to this difference in her discussion of the 
unidirectionality of (biological) ethnicity, as “a European American woman could become a 
Seneca, but a Seneca woman, even a physically white Seneca woman, could never ‘become’ 
European American. Nor, for that matter, could her ‘Indian’ children.”40 By this logic, the 
boundary between the white and Indian in the early republic is not only culturally, but 
biologically-construed, figured as “racial” difference, according to the laws of hypodescent. 
Through this positioning of Jemison’s as a “white” mother of “Indian” children, the intertwined 
nature of these two logics for figuring the role of the white woman becomes clearer.  
 Tawil’s claim that Jemison retains not only a biological but a cultural whiteness in her 
narrative holds that “her racial difference from her own children ultimately obstructs the 
formation of an Anglo-American household. The story of Jemison’s family [particularly, the 
conflict – and eventual fratricide – between her sons] thus becomes an object lesson in the 
incommensurability of whiteness and Indianness defined as two essentially different forms of 
subjectivity.”41 Jemison’s narrative does not, however, suggest that the “Indianness” of her sons 
is the ultimate cause of her inability to prevent their tragic deaths. Neither does it suggest that 
Jemison “fails” as a mother because of either her “cultural” or “racial difference” from her 
children. As her account of her sons’ murders tell us, Jemison has sufficient motherly affection 
for her children, but insufficient influence over them to keep them from the graver influences of 
alcohol to which she attributes each of their deaths. In examining this part of Jemison’s narrative, 
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what she refers to as “the use of ardent spirits amongst the Indians” and attributes to the 
influences of white society (84) ought not be conflated with “Indianness” – read as either cultural 
or racial.  
 Though Mary Jemison’s whiteness is construed as “essential and permanent,” it is not 
(sufficiently) transferrable (either as racial or cultural whiteness) to her “Indian” children. These 
children are not only culturally Seneca, but “racially” “Indian,” despite the “white blood” (or, 
arguably, “white culture”) of their mother. The difference in how the bio-logic of racial 
hypodescent would categorize the races of “the white woman” and her “Indian children” 
prevents Jemison from carrying out the role of the (white) republican mother. If, as Linda Kerber 
holds, “the model republican woman was a mother” – and particularly, a mother of sons, she was 
a mother of white sons (i.e., future republican citizens), and not the Seneca children that Mary 
Jemison raises, children who might be figured as potential enemies (or, at the very least, 
“foreigners”) by Jemison’s biological relatives. 42   
Child’s novel compensates for this problem of “interracial” motherhood through the 
complete assimilation of Mary Conant and Hobomok’s son into Anglo-American culture. Raised 
by his mother and Charles Brown after his biological father’s departure, we read in the novel’s 
conclusion that Charles Hobomok Conant is fully incorporated into the white society of this 
nuclear family and educated at Cambridge in England. Moreover, “his father was seldom spoken 
of; and by degrees his Indian appellation was silently omitted” (150). Retaining only the names, 
religion, and culture of his white parents, the “Indian” child becomes, in effect, white, despite 
any biological claims to “mixed” race. Though many white Americans regarded African 
Americans as “beyond the reach of mixture” (as Thomas Jefferson famously claimed), the belief 
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that Indians could – and ought – be assimilated into white society was rather common in the 
early republic.
43
 Charles Hobomok’s ability to “become” white (i.e., that his rearing and 
education develop as if he were “fully” biologically white), also allow the retention of his 
mother’s (cultural) whiteness. An ultimately redeemable heroine, and potential prototype for the 
white republican mother, Mary Conant, at the very least, reproduces the culturally-white family. 
Unlike Jemison, Mary Conant is therefore able to contribute to the (future) reproduction 
of the nation, both by reproducing a (culturally) white male child and by producing the domestic 
space of the (culturally-white) home. In effect, Hobomok is a precursor to what Lydia Fisher 
calls antebellum “domestication narratives,” as its ending sufficiently contributes to the project 
of nation-building that Fisher describes by expelling the “savage” elements of both the child and 
the woman from the home.
44
 The child this Mary raises will produce descendants who Child’s 
readers can easily imagine constituting the early republic. Jemison’s narrative, on the other hand, 
tells not only of her “mixed-blooded” children, but places special emphasis on the violent deaths 
of her sons, (Thomas and Jesse are murdered by their brother John, who is later murdered, as 
well) while telling surprisingly little of the kin who survive her (Jemison’s three surviving 
daughters and thirty-nine grandchildren.)  
 Hobomok offers an early narrative of “domestication” in the two senses that Amy 
Kaplan discusses in her dual understanding of the “domestic” as referring to both the nuclear 
family home and the imperially-expanding American nation. In this understanding, the figure of 
the white woman becomes essential for maintaining boundaries between the domestic and the 
foreign, understood as boundaries of racial, as well as cultural difference. Mary Conant 
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successfully maintains these boundaries as she is divorced from Hobomok and her son is 
incorporated into white colonial society. Jemison, though, narrates a “white woman” who 
continually refuses to maintain such boundaries of race, culture, or nation. The relationship 
between Jemison and the two African American men for whom she harvests corn is a domestic 
relation as well as a relation of exchanged labor: Jemison, unable to build a home for herself and 
her children before the arrival of what was a historically harsh winter, remains with them in their 
cabin until she can build a home for herself and her children. She relates that “deprived of a 
house, and without the means of building one in season, after I had finished my husking, and 
having found from the short acquaintance which I had had with the negroes, that they were kind 
and friendly, I concluded, at their request, to take up my residence with them for a while in their 
cabin, till I should be able to provide a hut for myself” (105-106). Not only do we see the irony 
that Jemison does not need protection from the Indians, but that she and her children live for a 
time in the same cabin as two black men explodes the trope of the vulnerable white woman in 
her narrative and reinscribes the bounds of domesticity around a decidedly “interracial” space.  
While most writers who discuss Jemison pay little attention to this period of her 
narrative, the significance of these events is duly noted by G. Peter Jemison, in his epilogue to 
Rayna M. Gangi’s 1996 novelization of Mary Jemison’s story. I quote G. Peter Jemison at 
length, as his comments most appropriately address the significance of this part of Mary 
Jemison’s story. He writes, 
Mary survived the terrible winter of 1779-80 because of two escaped slaves and their 
generosity. She and her five children were given refuge in the home of these two African-
Americans, within Seneca territory, beyond the reach of the American Army and its path 
of total destruction. The irony of African slaves believing they are protecting a white 
woman from the Senecas, when it is the American Army that she is fleeing, could not 
have been imagined by a Hollywood writer.
45
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Mary Jemison’s inability – or perhaps her refusal – to keep “foreign” or “savage” (i.e., non-
white) elements outside the home might result in too-easily designating this episode as just 
another “failure” of (white republican) mothering. On the other hand, the winter of 1779-80 
presents an extraordinary example of the domestic virtue by which Jemison is so closely 
characterized in Seaver’s introduction, and one which he categorically associates with her 
whiteness – hospitality.    
 Seaver writes, “Although her bosom companion was an ancient Indian warrior, and 
notwithstanding her children and associates were all Indians, yet it was found that she possessed 
an uncommon share of hospitality, and that her friendship was well worth courting and 
preserving” (54). Seemingly, Jemison’s whiteness is that which allows her the capacity for this 
exceptional virtue of domesticity – a capacity that Seaver implies might have otherwise been 
inhibited by her familiar and familial associations with Indians. While Seaver tells us that “Many 
still live to commemorate her benevolence towards them when prisoners during the war, and to 
ascribe their deliverance to the mediation of ‘The White Woman,’” the narrative that follows 
does not mark such hospitality as an expressly “white” – or “woman’s” quality (54). It does, 
however, resemble the hospitality she receives in the cabin of the two self-emancipated men who 
help shelter and sustain her and her children. We read further in Seaver’s introduction that “Her 
house was the stranger’s home; from her table the hungry were refreshed . . . She was the 
protectress of the homeless fugitive, and made welcome the weary wanderer” (54). Once a 
“stranger” among the Indians, and given a home; and made a “homeless fugitive,” and a “weary 
wanderer” by the Continental Army before being taken into an African American domestic space 
in which she and her children could be supported, this brand of hospitality is not merely a “white 
                                                                                                                                                             
Larsen’s novelizations of Mary Jemison’s life. See Gangi, 71-80 and Deborah Larsen, The White, (New York: 
Random House, 2002), 152-161, 165. My epigraphs come from these two novels.  
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woman’s” virtue, but the empathetic result of Jemison’s experience with people who are willing 
to grant hospitality across “racial” lines. 
 Just as Jemison’s hospitality, too, is granted across lines of “race” or “culture,” so is her 
sympathy, the characteristically “feminine” quality that becomes most prominent in United 
States women’s fiction of the antebellum period, but which has clear roots in both the captivity 
narrative and the frontier romance. While the lessons Jemison’s narrative gives us from her 
biological mother are mostly imperatives to retain her language and religion, her Seneca mother 
directs her children in sympathy, here presented as a feminine quality of feeling. When one of 
Jemison’s sisters wants to bring her to watch the public execution of prisoners, their mother 
chides her biological daughter, warning against taking Jemison to see a scene that might deepen 
her sadness at losing her biological family. Here Jemison’s mother, though Seneca, serves as a 
fitting example of feminine sympathy more typically attributed to white women – the same 
sympathy for the “stranger” that Seaver holds as exceptional in Jemison, and (though implicitly) 
attributes to her capacity as a white woman. 
 As in the narrative’s separation of Jemison’s relationship with Hiokatoo from his career 
as a warrior, this scene with Jemison’s “Indian mother” removes war from the women’s realm.  
Their mother argues, “Our task is quite easy at home, and our business needs our attention. With 
war we have nothing to do: our husbands and brothers are proud to defend us, and their hearts 
beat with ardor to meet our proud foes. Oh! Stay then, my daughter; let our warriors alone 
perform on their victims the customs of war!” (92). War is clearly designated as masculine here. 
Further, Jemison tells us that “This speech of our mother had the desired effect; we stayed at 
home and attended to domestic concerns” ( 92). This dichotomy between men’s “customs of 
war” and women’s “domestic concerns” resembles the familiar instruction of “separate spheres,” 
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but with the danger of engagement in war being attributed not to maleness, but Indianness, as in 
Seaver’s discussion of Hiokatoo. In the scene with Jemison’s mother and sister, as in the episode 
with her brother, Jemison’s Seneca kinship relations seem at the surface to reinforce familiar 
rhetorics of (white) womanhood even though their narrative origins are in Indian kinship 
relations. Attributing Jemison’s qualities to the bio-logic of her position as “the white woman,” 
then, denies these more complex kinship relations at play in her narrative.  If Jemison learns 
something of hospitality and sympathy from the two African American men with whom she and 
her children share a home, or from her Seneca mother who is so mindful of her sensitivity, these 
lessons in virtue cannot simply be attributed to the “cultural whiteness” that Tawil argues she 
retains. Rather, the “Anglo-American household” that Jemison fails/refuses to produce seems to 
result not from a cultural difference from her own children, but from her cultural resemblance to 
the Seneca community to which both she and her family belong.  
 Mary Jemison constructs her home through her family and her proximity to them. At 
the time of her captivity, Jemison regarded herself as “without a home to go to, even if I could be 
liberated” because of the loss of her family (70). Later, on the occasion of her adoption, she is 
“provided with a home” (78) and her understanding of the very concept “home” ultimately 
comes to encompass the family relations she has formed, as she explains, “with them was my 
home; my family was there” (83). This home also has as its referent a geographically-located 
domestic space, most easily located in the space of Gardow Flats in Jemison’s narrative. Even as 
she leaves the cabin of the African American men, she takes up this space as her home for most 
of the rest of her life: “As that land became my own in a few years, by virtue of a deed from the 
Chiefs of the Six Nations, I have lived there from that to the present time” (106). On this land, 
Jemison hid in another cabin from the Dutchman who would separate her from her family, and it 
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is part of this land that George Jemison stole from her, having already obtained much help from 
Jemison on the pretense that he was a cousin related to her by her white relatives. The land at 
Gardow is where Jemison and her daughters farmed to feed their family, where she became 
known to her neighbors as “the White Woman,” and what she ultimately had to leave to live out 
her remaining days at the Buffalo Creek Reservation as the frontier of Jemison’s narrative 
became more heavily-populated by white settlers. Jemison’s relation to this frontier which 
remains, for her, a domestic rather than a foreign space, reflects her relations to her Indian 
family. Accordingly, her narrative presents hers as a position of cultural belonging that is not 
contained by the bio-logic of her racial construction.  
 Mary Jemison’s enduring appellation as “the White Woman of the Genesee” signifies 
the complications inherent in the meeting of Western and non-Western kinship systems on the 
early republican frontier. As can be seen in the prioritization of Western bio-logic in both federal 
Indian law and the frontier romance, this logic proves insufficient for explaining modes of 
identification that correspond with non-biological kinship relations. A more sophisticated 
understanding Jemison’s identification as Indian – deriving from her cultural relations to her 
Indian family members – recognizes the capacity of a cultural logic of kinship to transcend racial 
difference. This transcendence is evidence of the constructed nature of race, and can be read 
through the symbiosis of racial and national formation in the frontier novels discussed here. 
Jemison’s prioritization of cultural modes of belonging signifies not only the prioritization of 
bio-logic in continually representing her as “the White Woman,” but illuminates the limitations 
of this logic. The failure to recognize these limitations results in a failure to recognize the 
importance of kinship relations for figuring identity – an importance that becomes apparent in a 
closer examination of Cooper’s, Sedgwick’s and Child’s novels. Mary Jemison’s cabin – the one 
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she shares with the two African American men, or where she hides from the Dutchman set on 
redeeming her, or that in which she and her Seneca family reside during their years at Gardow – 
serves as a space for more appropriately refiguring “the White Woman” within the “interracial” 
kinship relations and domestic spaces of Jemison’s narrative. The chapter that follows further 
examines the “interracial” kinship relations formed through sexual kinship – and accompanying 
national anxieties about the “mingling” of race in certain domestic relations – in antebellum 
literary culture. 
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Chapter Two 
Blackface Desdemona; or, the White Woman “Begrimed” 
 
 
I'll have some proof. Her name, that was as fresh  
As Dian's visage, is now begrimed and black  
As mine own face. If there be cords, or knives,  
Poison, or fire, or suffocating streams,  
I'll not endure it. Would I were satisfied! 
 
            William Shakespeare, Othello, Act III, Scene 3, lines 386-390 
 
 
My name is Desdemona. The word, Desdemona, means misery. It means 
ill-fated. It means doomed. 
 
           Toni Morrison, Desdemona 
 
 
 
In the last act of Shakespeare’s play, Othello laments that Desdemona’s “name that was 
as fresh/As Dian’s visage, is now begrimed and black/As mine own face.”46 Othello counts 
Desdemona’s supposed infidelity as that which “begrimes” her, but the metaphor of comparison 
with his own complexion was undoubtedly significant for nineteenth-century interpreters of the 
play who would read Americanized racial blackness in Othello’s “complexion.” John Quincy 
Adams, in his reading of the play, wrote that “the great moral lesson of the tragedy of Othello, is 
that black and white blood cannot be intermingled in marriage without a gross outrage upon the 
law of Nature; and that, in such violations, Nature will vindicate her laws.”47 For readers or 
audiences who, like Adams, would regard the interracial marriage plot as an inherent problem, 
Desdemona is “begrimed” not by this false charge of adultery, but by the very fact of her 
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 William Shakespeare, Othello, 5.3.386-388. Further references to Othello will be given parenthetically in the text. 
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 See John Quincy Adams’ discussion in “Misconceptions of Shakespeare Upon the Stage,” Notes and Comments 
upon Certain Plays and Actors of Shakespeare, with Criticism and Correspondence, ed. James Henry Hackett, 3
rd
 
ed. (1836; reprint. New York: Carelton, 1864), 224.   James H. Dormon, Jr. takes Adams’ reading of the play as 
evidence of the common understanding of Othello as an “anti-miscegenation play” in the nineteenth-century United 
States.  See his discussion in Theater in the Antebellum South, 1815-1861 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1967), 276-277.  
 55 
 
marriage to Othello – a marriage that would have been prohibited by many of the states in which 
Othello was performed throughout the nineteenth- and early-twentieth centuries. 
Unsurprisingly, nineteenth-century American productions of Othello played upon 
racialized readings of Othello’s blackness, with the titular role most often performed by a white 
actor in some form of blackface. These blackface renditions, like other blackface performance, 
perpetuated derogatory stereotypes of African Americans. They also illustrated popular white 
anxieties regarding racial transfer in the literal “begriming” of the initially “white” Desdemona. 
Audience accounts convey what might be expected: by the end of the play, Othello’s “blacking” 
makeup had inevitably rubbed off onto Desdemona’s “white” face and clothes. In Junius Brutus 
Booth’s performances of Othello, William Winter recounts that “on one occasion, having no 
black stockings, he blackened his legs as well as his face and hands, and thereby, in the course of 
the performance, soiled the white dress of the fair Desdemona.”48  
Another assessment of the habitual performance of Othello in blackface notes blacking 
makeup’s “many disadvantages: particularly in coming off inconveniently and being transferable 
from hand to hand; oftentimes they were seen to touch nothing they did not soil; let it be 
Desdemona’s dress or even her cheek, or the handkerchief with which, in moments of 
forgetfulness, in the whirlwind of their passion they dabbed their brows.”49 It is in this context of 
the literal transfer of Othello’s blackness to Desdemona – and in the metaphor of its potential for 
racial/sexual “begriming” – that Othello and Desdemona so easily became central literary tropes 
for discourses of interracial heterosexuality in the United States. Simply put, Desdemona’s 
“begriming” literalizes white racist anxieties about interracial sex.   
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 William Winter, “Shakespeare on the Stage: Fourth Paper: Othello,” The Century Magazine Vol. 82, ed. Richard 
Watson Gilder (May to October, 1911): 512.   
49
 “Othello’s Costume,” Once a Week, Vol. II (June-December, 1866) London: Bradbury, Evans, & Co., 1866.  
(September 8, 1866): 274. 
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While most nineteenth-century discussions of white womanhood – like that of Mary 
Jemison – insist upon white women’s biological, unchangeable whiteness, when white women 
are figured in interracial sexual relations, the stakes of whiteness’ supposed permanency 
changes. The “begriming” of Desdemona illustrates how the rhetorical whiteness of white 
women was, in nineteenth-century discourses, imagined to be threatened by sexual encounters 
with African American men in particular. This literal image of the possible transfer of race is 
paradoxical in its reliance upon essentialized notions of racial difference, while simultaneously 
enacting racist ideology that reveals race’s construction. I use the example of Desdemona here in 
order to examine how nineteenth-century beliefs about interracial sex came to bear on 
understandings of white womanhood.
50
 
Because racial hierarchies of the pre- and post-Civil War nineteenth-century are 
dependent upon the preservation of imagined biological racial difference, “interracial” sexual 
relations like those contained in the cultural tropes of Othello and Desdemona pose a threat to the 
hegemonic white culture. Such depictions and the accompanying social and legal restrictions on 
such relations are informed by assumptions not only about blackness or even the “interracial” 
figure of the “tragic mulatto/a,” but also by how the figure of the “white woman” is constructed 
around and within these images of “interracial” heterosexuality. Assumptions surrounding the 
figure of the “white woman” inform nineteenth-century depictions of interracial sexual mixture, 
which in turn contribute to the construction of white womanhood. Accounts of nineteenth-
century performances of Othello, personal narratives of interracial marriages, writings promoting 
interracial mixture, and “anti-amalgamation” or “anti-miscegenation” literature all work to figure 
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 For a discussion of the various, and sometimes contradictory, uses of Desdemona as an icon of (white) 
womanhood, see Edward Kahn, “Desdemona and the Role of Women in the Antebellum North,” Theater Journal 
60.2 (May 2008): 235-255. 
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interracial sexual relations in the American  imagination, placing the figure of the white woman 
at the center of white anxieties about racial integration and intermixture.   
These anxieties belong to the realm of “sexual kinship,” the relation by which non-
biological kinship relations might be established (regardless of legal marital status) and by which 
some interracial kinship ties are created. The heterosexual relation on which I focus (because of 
its prominence in nineteenth-century American discourses of race and sexuality) is a relation of 
kinship, in its potential to create interracial biological family. The possibility of the literal 
transfer of race – from black and brown men to white women – underlies white anxieties about 
interracial sex.  This essay examines the ideologies by which interracial heterosexual relations 
have the potential to racially refigure white women participants. The literary notion of “figuring” 
emphasizes the way race works in these narratives to position characters in their respective 
narrative genres – genres which have the potential to change as their characters are re-racialized 
and thereby “figure” differently for their respective stories.   
This chapter is invested, primarily, in nineteenth-century depictions of and reactions to 
interracial sex, and particularly the hyper-visible relation between black men and white 
women.
51
  The first of these discussions examines such refigurations of white femininity which 
evoke literal and rhetorical un-whitenings – moves by which whiteness is evacuated, and 
sometimes replaced with differently-raced content – revealing the constructed nature of white 
womanhood in the mid-nineteenth century American imagination. I focus here on the dominant 
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representation of interracial sexual kinship in the images of Othello and Desdemona. In this 
discussion I note the prevalence of this couple in the nineteenth-century imagination and 
examine how Desdemona is understood to be “blackened” both in metaphors of the interraciality 
of sexual kinship and – more literally – on the American  blackface minstrel stage.  
First, I will discuss how nineteenth-century American tropes of white womanhood are 
dependent upon assumptions about the transfer of (biologically construed) race via heterosexual 
sex. Next, I examine nineteenth-century American notions of Desdemona’s whiteness, via John 
Quincy Adams’ readings of her interracial heterosexuality as effectively re-racing Desdemona. 
Moving to a discussion of mid- to late-century minstrel stagings of Othello, I read two plays in 
which Desdemona’s whiteness is literally refigured in blackface performance. I conclude with a 
brief discussion of Toni Morrison’s play, Desdemona, and its accompanying potential for re-
thinking Desdemona’s interracial kinship ties beyond her relation to Othello.    
 
“Tupping your White Ewe”: the White Woman and Sexual Kinship 
The figure of the white woman in an interracial sexual relation is located at the 
intersection of slavery, abolitionism, and racial mixture. Images of white women are often 
dependent upon their assumed sexual and racial “purity.” This notion of purity, however, is 
constructed against the backdrop of depictions of interracial sex, particularly in the hyper-visible 
relation between black men and white women symbolized by Othello and Desdemona.
52
 The 
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visibility of this relation was not unthinkable in the nineteenth century.  On the contrary, it was 
reiterated to the point of obsession in the national psyche. Nineteenth-century American  
iterations of Othello emphatically and deliberately demonize the image of the black male, 
figuring him as a perpetual threat not only to white women, but also to racial definition of white 
“purity” and, therefore, to the American racial hegemony itself.  Documents from Edward 
William Clay’s 1839 caricatures of racial mixture to David Croly’s 1864 hoax pamphlet, 
“Miscegenation: the theory of the blending of the races, applied to the American white man and 
Negro,” demonstrate that racial mixture was widely-viewed as a threat to whiteness and, 
especially, to white womanhood.
53
  This is remarkably clear in Josiah Nott’s warning of 
“probable extermination of the two races if the Whites and Blacks are allowed to intermarry,” 
which regarded racial mixture as threatening the very existence of white people.
54
  Women are 
particularly implicated in this threat of extermination, as the burden of literally reproducing 
whiteness lies in the impetus to bear white children.  
In addition to placing white women at the center of national concerns about the 
reproduction of whiteness, another result of these depictions of interracial sexual relations is that 
the reality of physical and psychological threats to black bodies in the enslavement and lynching 
of black men is masked in the literary figuring of the “white woman” trope. Further, the 
incendiary, though no less emphatic, effect of this imagining is the erasure of black women from 
the equation of interracial sexual kinship – particularly in their victimization by white men (often 
men who are also their enslavers), figured here only as the chivalric protectors of white 
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womanhood. Positing white women only as would-be victims of interracial sexual violence also 
renders moot the fact of voluntary interracial sexual relations between black men and white 
women, evacuating these white women’s sexual decisions, nonwhite kinship ties, and sometimes 
even marital legitimacy from interracial couplings. 
Assumptions about race, gender, and sexuality position the literary and cultural figure of 
the “white woman” as particularly vulnerable to racial marking through interracial heterosexual 
sex. Women are subject to the potential of a physical record of their interracial sexual 
experiences, as susceptible to impregnation and the possibility of bearing visibly-racially-mixed 
children. In addition to this material evidence of racial mixture, however, the “white woman” is 
also susceptible to forms of social racial marking. Interracial sexual relations threaten claims to 
normative models of white femininity, placing these women in domestic relations that are 
incongruous with national models of family and citizenship. This discussion of interracial sexual 
relations addresses the contradictions between the literary representations discussed and 
assumptions about the figure of the “white woman” at work behind popular discussions of 
interracial heterosexuality. 
Because women are susceptible to bearing visibly-racially-mixed children, theories of 
race and heterosexuality applied to interracial sexual relations can be viewed as a kind of 
interracial sexual kinship. In the sexual kinship relation (sometimes – but not necessarily – also a 
relation of legal marriage), the couple is joined in kinship through their actual or potential 
progeny. In popular nineteenth-century American constructions, heterosexuality denotes the 
racial-marking by which race is understood to be transferred from black men (who “have” and 
“give” race) to white women (who “receive” it). In order to understand the imagined transfer of 
race in this ideology, one must regard this transfer not as metaphorical but literal, located in the 
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transfer of semen, understood as the origin of shared kin as well as a potential origin for 
biologically-construed notions of race.    
When race is viewed in the biological terms upon which nineteenth-century 
understandings are dependent, the position of “interracial” motherhood involves literally 
containing – perhaps a form of embodying – the racial Other. As parents are believed to transfer 
race to their children in imagined quantities of “black” or “white” “blood,” the women who 
might bear these children also receive the “content” of race through heterosexual sex.  A 1799 
study by Benjamin Rush evidences such anxieties regarding the literal transfer of race through 
sexual relations.  He describes “a white woman in North Carolina not only acquired a dark color, 
but several of the features of a negro, by marrying and living with a black husband.  A similar 
instance of a change in the color and features of a woman in Bucks county in Pennsylvania has 
been observed and from a similar cause. In both of these cases, the women bore children by their 
black husbands.”55  Rush’s scientific supposition about the blackness of skin calls us to take 
seriously beliefs about race that would today seem archaic.  I don’t, of course, mean to validate 
Rush’s theories of scientific racism here, but only to offer this as an example, showing that white 
anxieties about the possible transfer of race were seriously-held (however misguided) beliefs.   
Rush’s argument construes race (i.e., blackness) as contagion – and sexually-transmitted 
contagion at that.  In Rush’s presentation of white women who have become black as a result of 
sex and reproduction with black men, we can see the transfer of race from Othello to Desdemona 
as not only metaphorical, but literal, as pointing to the materiality of race.  Race becomes, in 
Rush’s scenario, something contained in the offspring of these interracial couples.  Through the 
acts of conceiving and carrying a child who is understood to be differently-raced from 
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themselves, these white women incorporate the racial Other into their own bodies.  If the white 
woman is capable of “receiving” and “containing” race in this way, she becomes racially 
malleable, in a sense.  That is, she can become Other, herself, as her proximity to (and perhaps, 
her inextricability from) the blackness embodied in her child (or potential children) renders her 
own whiteness precarious.  In the context of this understanding of racial transfer, Othello and 
Desdemona’s final scene becomes an easily-adopted metaphor for the “dangers” of racial 
mixture.   
American renditions of Othello are mired in the long history of performing Othello in 
blackface.  Although there were all-African-American productions of Othello in the nineteenth-
century, and some “integrated” productions in which an American Indian played the title role, 
and although the role of Othello was played in England by Afro-British actors such as Ira 
Aldridge, Othello was not played by a black man with an accompanying white cast in the United 
States until Paul Robeson’s groundbreaking – and controversial – performance the 1940s.   It 
seems more than likely that this history of performing the role of Othello in blackface and the 
popularity of blackface minstrelsy contributed to the popularity of this play in nineteenth-century 
America, and its themes of interracial romance makes it clear why the couple becomes such a 
central literary and cultural trope.
 56
  Othello and Desdemona appeared as icons, literally in the 
background of depictions of integration and amalgamation, such as Edward William Clay’s 1839 
“The Fruits of Amalgamation,” reiterated throughout American literary culture in a relation that 
conspicuously masks other interracial relations – especially, the rape of enslaved women by their 
enslavers. (See Figures 4 and 5) 
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Figure 4: Edward William Clay, “The Fruits of Amalgamation,” 1839 
American Antiquarian Society  
 
 
 
Figure 5: “Othello & Desdemona,” Detail of Edward W. Clay, “The Fruits of Amalgamation”  
American Antiquarian Society 
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Thus, the black man/white woman relation becomes a hypervisible national image 
through which race and heterosexuality are most often theorized.  It is worth noting that the 
theorization of this instance of interracial sexuality appears alongside a nationally-inflected white 
male patriarchy that, though absent in these depictions, is implied.  As the intended viewer for 
most representations of interracial sexual relations, the white male is positioned as the would-be 
protector of white women from black men, who are presented as simultaneous threat to both 
white feminine virtue and the (white supremacist) American nation.  One example of its 
prominence can be seen in an 1864 political pamphlet denouncing interracial marriage, “What 
Miscegenation is!, and what we are to Expect, now that Mr. Lincoln is Elected President.” (See 
Figure 6) The image of Othello and Desdemona underlay the theorization of race in this 
caricatured couple meant to represent “miscegenation” as undesirable.  
 
 
Figure 6: L. Seaman, “What Miscegenation is, and what we are to Expect, now that Mr. Lincoln 
is Elected President,” (New York: Waller and Willetts [1865?]) 
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A more explicit representation of Othello and Desdemona appears in “The Modern 
Othello,” a newspaper cartoon from 1863 in which Othello is played by “the Everlastin’ Darkey” 
and Desdemona by “Columbia,” who he is in the process of smothering with a newspaper. (See 
Figure 7) It would be impossible to see the “visage” of this fiend-like Othello anywhere other 
than in this murderous act. Here the nation is identified as, and is meant to identify with, the 
image of Desdemona/Columbia. As this representation of Shakespeare’s tragic couple suggests, 
discourses of “miscegenation” became inextricable from suggestions of a national threat by the 
mid-1860s. 
 
 
Figure 7: “The Modern Othello,” 1863 
American Antiquarian Society 
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Given the poignancy of images such as these, it is unsurprising that most academic 
discussions of Othello and race in America have focused on theatrical portrayals of Othello 
himself. Although Shakespeare’s tragedy seems to have been generally regarded as an “anti-
miscegenation” play by many early nineteenth-century American audiences, the ultimate tragedy 
of the play did not compensate for the centrality of the interracial marriage plot for some who 
viewed its content as offensive.
 57
 Accordingly, there has been much ado about exactly “how 
black” Othello should be in its performance. Various arguments were made among nineteenth-
century American theatergoers, in particular, that Othello should not be cast as “black,” but as a 
lighter-skinned “tawny” Moor; or conversely, that Othello’s blackness is central to the content of 
the play and its tragic ending.
58
  
For nineteenth-century American audiences, the question of “how black” Othello ought 
to be depicted becomes a contentious debate for theater critics. John Quincy Adams serves as 
one example of a nineteenth-century American participant in this debate, arguing that Othello’s 
blackness is essential to the plot of the play. Whether interracial romance was intended as a 
central theme for Othello became the central debate surrounding arguments as to the degree of 
Othello’s blackness.59 James Dorman, for example, discusses the history of Othello appearing in 
blackface in the antebellum period, noting that “by the end of the ante bellum [sic] period, 
Othello had to be played as near-white, or not at all” in the South.60  
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 The predominance of popular sentiment against interracial sexual relations in the nineteenth-century United 
States, rather than rendering Othello’s popularity inexplicable, suggest that the play was not generally viewed as 
supporting interracial marriage or sexual relations, but that Shakespeare’s play was tragic, in part, as a result of this 
“unnatural” relation. I discuss this further below, with regard to John Quincy Adams’ reading of the play as racial 
tragedy. 
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 Ania Loomba recounts the critical history that attempts to distinguish whether Othello ought be understood as  
“more or less ‘African’/black than ‘Turkish’/Muslim” in Shakespeare, Race,and Colonialism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 92.  
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 See John Quincy Adams’ discussion in “Misconceptions of Shakespeare Upon the Stage,” 217-228. 
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 See James A.  Dorman, Theater in the Antebellum South, 1815-1861 (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1967), 277. 
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Further, lines with racial connotations were sometimes excised from the text in American 
productions. Some omissions center around Iago’s early attempt to horrify Brabantio with the 
image of Othello and Desdemona having sex: “Even now, now, very now, an old black ram/Is 
tupping your white ewe;” “you’ll have your daughter cover’d with a Barbary horse;” and “Your 
daughter and the Moor are now . . . making the beast with two backs.” (1.1.88-89, 110-111, 115-
117).
61
  The nineteenth-century whitening of Othello in American  productions suggests the 
tension between American audiences’ fascination with the coupling of sexual and racial themes, 
and their investment in biological and social rhetorics of racism that render interracial marriage 
as “unnatural.”  
 
Racial Marking; or, Desdemona “Begrimed and Black as Mine Own Face”  
Historically, Othello’s blackness – an image that has garnered more attention from 
literary and theater critics than Desdemona’s contrasting whiteness – has taken various forms 
(the differences between which should be noted): Othello’s racially-caricatured appearance in 
nineteenth-century blackface performances and, rather recently, Sir Laurence Olivier’s (arguably 
unwatchable) 1965 film performance; in nineteenth-century European productions in which 
Othello was sometimes played by Afro-British or African actors and Paul Robeson’s 
groundbreaking New York performance in 1943; and in Patrick Stewart’s 1997 performance of 
Othello in a “photonegative” casting in which Stewart, happily, did not appear in blackface, and 
all other parts were played by black actors.
 62
 (See Figure 8)  
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connect the racialized imagery of the play to notions of “the sexuality of beasts and the bestiality of sex.” See 
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program notes for the fall 1997 production at the Washington Shakespeare Theater. For more on the casting and 
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Figure 8:Patrick Stewart as Othello and Patrice Johnson as Desdemona 
The Shakespeare Theater, Washington D.C., 1997, 
<http://www.thepsn.org/psn/playtitle.asp?playid=19> 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
further discussion of this production, see Denise Albanese, “Black and White, and Dread All Over: The Shakespeare 
Theater’s “Photonegative” Othello and the Body of Desdemona,” in A Feminist Companion to Shakespeare, ed. 
Dympna Callaghan, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 226-247. 
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In this last image, I am less interested in Stewart as a white(washed) Othello, or even 
with this production’s insistence on maintaining racial dualism as essential to the performance, 
than I am with the portrayal of Desdemona as black.  Moreover, what does it mean to render 
Desdemona “black”? This question is broached, if not answered, on the nineteenth-century 
American stage.  From the images of Desdemona reproduced here, it should be clear that the 
“blackness” presented by white actors in blackface and that represented by black actors is 
emphatically not the same. My discussion of Desdemona as “begrimed” (that is, in blackface or 
as “blackened”) must acknowledge this difference, the nature of which I will elaborate below. 
To think of Desdemona as (figuratively or literally) “black,” necessitates thinking about 
how, particularly in the nineteenth-century American context, Othello inflects upon actual 
African American  or Afro-British women who, though not represented here, are implied, or 
alluded to, in the blackening of Desdemona.
63
 One might find, as Toni Morrison discusses, an 
“Africanist presence” behind Desdemona, in this suggestion of black womanhood.64 The 
rac(ial)ist figuring of Desdemona’s whiteness as sexually “pure” is accompanied by the 
implication of black womanhood as “impure,” or “begrimed” in their implied sexual availability. 
Desdemona’s begriming is a besmirching of character that we might attribute more to the 
perception of Desdemona than her actual character – just as the racist positioning of black 
women as over-sexualized, and therefore subject to sexual violation is dependent upon racist 
ideologies rather than the nature or practices of black women, themselves.   
Accompanying nineteenth-century discussions of Othello’s blackness is a discussion of 
Desdemona’s “whiteness,” and this racial designation is, of course, strongly encoded with 
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notions of genteel femininity and sexual and racial “purity.” As Iago tells Barbantio that “Even 
now, now, very now, an old black ram/Is tupping your white ewe,” (Shakespeare 1.1. 90-91) the 
urgency of the repetition places Othello, the “old black ram,” as the active “tupper,” if you will, 
while hiding Desdemona’s agency in the sentence’s predicate. In the animalization of Othello in 
this early scene and in Brabantio’s accusations of his having “enchanted” Desdemona with “foul 
charms,” (1.2.63,73) Desdemona’s supposedly “unnatural” love for him is explained. This image 
of Othello as a sexual/racial threat to a potentially innocent white woman victim contributed to 
the horror of racist audiences and to arguments for Othello being played “less black,” or at the 
very least, by a “white” actor in blackface, as the layering of this racial performance served to 
buffer the implications of actual “miscegenation.”      
This simple dualism of threat and victim is not the only popular reading of Othello, of 
course, even in the nineteenth century. Some of the most striking commentary on the character of 
Desdemona might be represented by the writings of John Quincy Adams, then a former United 
States President.
65
 Adams’ “Misconceptions of Shakespeare on the Stage” published in New 
England Magazine in 1835 and “The Character of Desdemona” in American  Monthly Magazine 
in 1836 (both republished in James Hackett’s Notes and Comments Upon Certain Plays and 
Actors of Shakespeare in 1863) align themselves emphatically with the camp that holds Othello’s 
blackness as essential to Shakespeare’s plot. I’ll repeat Adams’ assessment of the play’s racial 
drama: “the great moral lesson of the tragedy of Othello, is that black and white blood cannot be 
intermingled in marriage without a gross outrage upon the law of Nature; and that, in such 
violations, Nature will vindicate her laws.”66  
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Supreme Court case in 1841. 
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 Adams, “Misconceptions of Shakespeare Upon the Stage,” 224.  
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In this discussion, Adams does not simply conflate Othello’s blackness with his tragic 
jealousy and rage, nor does he designate Desdemona as a mere passive victim of interracial 
violence. Instead, paying attention to the moments in which one might view Desdemona as most 
empowered, he turns to her “elopement from her father’s house” and “clandestine marriage,” 
claiming that she “made the first advances” in their relationship by giving undue attention to 
Othello’s “braggart story” and that her defense of Cassio, too, is inappropriate, as “it is not for 
female delicacy to extenuate the crimes of drunkenness and bloodshed, even when performing 
the appropriate office of raising the soul-subduing voice for mercy.”67 Desdemona’s sexuality, 
Adams holds, is “indelicate.” 
Importantly, Adams’ fiercest critique of Desdemona focuses on her agency in choosing to 
marry Othello. He acknowledges Desdemona’s passion, though marks it as “unnatural, solely 
and exclusively because of [Othello’s] color” and argues that, while not false to her husband, 
“she has been false to the purity and delicacy of her sex and condition when she married him.”68 
Desdemona’s transgression, according to Adams, is not merely her elopement (she cannot be 
compared to Juliet or Miranda, who he writes are driven by “pure love”) but Desdemona’s 
“unnatural passion; it cannot be named with delicacy” and her death, he argues, are a result of 
thus being “deficient in delicacy.”69 In this racist reading, Desdemona’s alleged “unnatural” 
preference for a black man marks her name and her character by this relation. Mirror editor and 
writer, George Pope Morris attaches this preference to the “New York Desdemonas,” white 
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women theatergoers who he worries may become enamored of other blackface characters, Jim 
Crow and Gumbo Cuff.
70
 
As Tilden Edelstein notes, “Only by seeing Desdemona as wanton and the play as a 
lesson against racial intermarriage could Adams accept the credibility of even a bleached Othello 
and a Desdemona who betrays her race and class.”71 From this particular emphasis on racial 
difference – that is to say, the importance of race in the heterosexual sexual relation – at stake in 
this play is the relationship between Desdemona’s racial depiction and her interracial sexual 
kinship with Othello. These are located both in her sexual passion for Othello and the kinship of 
their legal marriage and juxtaposed with her racialized difference to Othello in nineteenth-
century readings of the play.  
As these discussions of Desdemona have it, the effects of interracial marriage come most 
emphatically to bear on white women who engage in them. Rice’s Otello makes this point as it 
reads the interracial romance plot as inextricable from the story.
72
 T.D Rice’s Otello is clearly 
distinguished from the others, both through his unique minstrel dialect (mockingly parodied by 
Iago) and by various characters’ continual references to his “black” appearance and use of the 
epithet “nigger” to describe him. Otello’s difference from Desdemona, despite their marriage, is 
also emphasized, as Rice presents their union as the play’s central problem. The chorus predicts, 
in the second scene, that “For if a black shall wed a white,/And afterwards go free,/In a very 
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pretty pickle then/Our daughters soon will be.”73 This “pickle” stems from Desdemona’s 
infatuation with Othello in Shakespeare’s original, as she “wished/That heaven had made her 
such a man,” suggesting simultaneously that Desdemona both wished that such a man as Othello 
was made for her and wishes she was such a man, herself (1.3.164-165). Rice retains this wish in 
his version, casting it in its racialized terms, as Otello recounts that “Desdemona cocked her 
ear/and wish Heaben hab made/Her sich a nigger” (120). This sentiment quickly shifts, as Otello 
continues, “My story being done,/She only wished I had a son” (120). Thus Rice directly 
addresses the question of Desdemona’s sexual passion for Otello. Answering a commonly-
debated question surrounding the play – whether the couple’s marriage is ever consummated – 
Rice gives Otello and Desdemona a son in his play.
74
 
One can easily see how the question of sexual union might be of interest to a nineteenth-
century audience preoccupied with the play’s interracial romance plot, and Rice answers this 
unequivocally, placing the evidence of consummation on stage in the figure of Otello and 
Desdemona’s child. Remarkably, this child has no lines, and serves no real purpose in the plot of 
Rice’s adaptation, other than to provide proof of this consummation. When, exactly, the child is 
conceived is unclear in Rice’s play, as neither this character’s age nor how much time has passed 
since the couple’s wedding is specified. W.T. Lhamon gives one possibility, however: as 
Desdemona recounts having swooned from hearing a shocking tale of Otello’s, she comes to 
“sitting on his knee” and rises up “Greatful,” that is, pregnant (123). Further, the moral of her 
                                                 
73
 T. D. Rice, Otello, A Burlesque Opera, 117.  Further references to Otello: A Burlesque Opera will be given 
parenthetically in the text. 
74
 Celia Daileader discusses the debate surrounding the consummation of Desdemona and Othello’s marriage at 
length in her chapter on “Offstage Sex and Female Desire” in Eroticism on the Renaissance Stage Transcendence, 
Desire, and the Limits of the Visible (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 24-49. See also Stephen 
Greenblatt’s discussion of “the unrepresented consummations of unrepresented marriages” in Shakespearian 
Negotiations The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance England (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988), 89. 
 74 
 
story, “Never sit on young men’s knees” is given despite Desdemona’s marriage, “though I got a 
husband by it,” and Desdemona’s pregnancy partially explains the couple’s hurry to wed.75  
Whether the couple has had intercourse before or only after their marriage is irrelevant, 
however, to the racist, “anti-miscegenation” reading of the play. The presence of the son is 
enough to hint at the taboo of interracial sex. The child is listed in the stage directions to the 
1853 manuscript simply as “child,” each time accompanying Desdemona. Listed as “Young 
Otello” in an 1852 playbill and alternately, in an 1846 playbill, as “Master Lorenzo Otello (eldest 
son of Otello and that there may be no partiality, nature has colored him half and half),” the 
child’s racial mixture (which here seems to literally draw the line of race down the center of his 
body), proves his paternity, linking Desdemona to Otello through his presence.
76
 This extraneous 
character thereby stands in as evidence of the racial “begriming” of Desdemona, as the child’s 
presence represents the sexual “transfer” of race from Otello to Desdemona, who has borne this 
racially-mixed child.   
While Otello and Desdemona’s child here does not fully embody racial mixture, but 
maintains the separation of races even in his person, audiences saw here a character other than 
Otello depicted in blackface on stage, and this character is conceived as a result of Desdemona’s 
participation in interracial sex. As Rice’s chorus argues in the play’s final scene, “If his wife hab 
but been black,/Instead of white, all had been right.”77 Perhaps; but then this would be a very 
different play. Rice’s presentation of Desdemona’s racially-mixed offspring hints at her literal 
embodiment of the racial Other in pregnancy. If Desdemona is able to contain blackness in this 
way, the chorus’ suggestion of a black Desdemona is not unthinkable. While Rice did not go so 
                                                 
75
 For Lhamon’s argument for this as a possible moment of conception, see Rice, Otello, A Burlesque Opera, 175, 
note 29. 
76
 See Rice, Otello, A Burlesque Opera, 176, note 37 and Lhamon’s introduction, xxi, note to Figure 1. 
77
 T.D. Rice, Otello, 158. 
 
 75 
 
far as to produce a black Desdemona in his play, other minstrel adaptations of Othello did. 
Rather, like both traditional and minstrel theatrical performances in the nineteenth-century 
United States exhibited blackface Othellos, these minstrel productions presented blackface 
Desdemonas. I turn to these particular depictions of Desdemona in the next section. 
 
Blackface Desdemona 
Taking even further liberties with Othello on the American minstrel stage, the paradigm 
of black-white/male-female dualism was sometimes complicated by the possibility of characters 
other than Othello – including Desdemona – appearing in blackface. This discussion of minstrel 
performances of Othello will focus on two specific texts: Othello; A Burlesque, As Performed By 
Griffin & Christy’s Minstrels. At Their Opera House, New York, 1866 and the anonymously-
penned Desdemonum, An Ethiopian Burlesque, in Three Scenes, published by the Happy Hours 
Company in 1874 (though both plays were probably performed earlier than these dates) – two 
productions that extended blackface performance beyond the title role. In the absence of images 
from minstrel productions of Othello, specifically, the image of Rollin Howard, opposite G. W. 
H. Griffin, also in blackface, reminds us of the significant difference between representing a 
“black Desdemona” (as we see in the image of Patrice Johnson, playing opposite Patrick 
Stewart) and a “blackface Desdemona,” (in the depiction of Howard’s “nigger wench” stock 
character). (See Figure 9)  In the latter example, we see a character that might better be viewed 
as “begrimed” than “black,” with this “begriming” evidencing the rhetorics of white racism 
employed in these depictions.    
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Figure 9: Rollin Howard (“wench”) and George W. H. Griffin, c. 1855 
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Similarly, the English illustration of Othello’s final scene from “Treager’s Black Jokes” 
series shows a caricatured version of Desdemona, in which she appears black.  (See Figure 10) 
Here Desdemona does not appear as an actual black woman, but – as in the minstrel stock 
character of the “nigger wench” and in most nineteenth-century depictions of black people – as a 
caricature of one. Just as this production is clearly not interested in any realistic representation of 
an African American woman in this figure, neither are racist readings of the original play 
interested in realistic representations of the white woman.  
 
 
 
Figure 10: William Summers, “Othello Act 5 Scene 2” Tregear’s Black Jokes. G. S. Tregear.  
London: c1828-1832.   
Folger Shakespeare Library 
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To read a racial-sexual “begriming” in Desdemona’s relations to Othello is to view a 
caricatured representation of white womanhood in the figure of a “white” Desdemona. Reading 
Desdemona as a woman whose sexual purity is inextricable from an understanding of her 
whiteness (even a whiteness that is impermanent, capable of “begriming” by her proximity to a 
black man) demands similar assumptions about the relation between race and sexuality required 
for a reading of black womanhood as sexually promiscuous or as sexually “available” in the 
absence of her legal status as a person. The representation of Desdemona as a “nigger wench” 
caricature reveals the transferability of these similarly racist views of black and white 
womanhood. Simply phrased, both the black and the white caricature originate from the same set 
of assumptions about race, gender and sexuality. 
In Griffin and Christy’s 1866 production, Desdemona was played by George Christy, 
who was well-known for portraying the kind of “nigger wench” character we see here 
represented by Howard. I am ultimately interested in exploring the rhetoric of Desdemona’s 
whiteness still perpetuated in this image, and what becomes of it as it is transformed within the 
medium of blackface minstrelsy. The first question for these blackface renditions of Desdemona 
might be: what do we make of Desdemona – and her supposed whiteness – when she appears in 
blackface? Unsurprisingly, contemporary commentary on minstrel shows has not been as 
carefully recorded and handed down as commentary on traditional or “high” theatrical 
productions, such as Adams’ musings on Shakespeare’s original play. Nevertheless, reading the 
extant manuscripts of these blackface minstrel renditions of Othello opens up new ways of 
reading Desdemona’s race, which is visually represented within the complex rhetorics of the 
blackface minstrel performance. 
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Griffin and Christy’s burlesque of Othello draws upon a practice more common in post-
Civil War minstrelsy, the depiction of white-ethnics in blackface.
78
 In this production, Iago is 
coded as Irish (singing an air entitled “Ireland the Place Is” in the third scene) and adopting an 
Irish accent in the textual rendition (dropped Gs: darlin’, amazin’). Brabantio is represented as 
German, his dialogue also marked by a distinct accent (my becomes “mine,” with becomes 
“mit,” think becomes “tink,” etc.).79 Interestingly enough, however, neither Othello’s nor 
Desdemona’s speech is marked by dialect in this text; their dialogue appears in standard English 
which in some ways appears as the most “Shakespearean” of the play, much of which is written 
in rhymed iambic pentameter (sometimes spoken, sometimes sung). Strikingly, Desdemona’s 
accent does not resemble her father’s, but Othello’s. If marked language is any indication of 
racial or ethnic designation (and in the minstrel tradition, we see that it often is), Othello and 
Desdemona are aligned here. Or, if we are to take the marked speech of Iago and Brabantio as 
designating national or geographic associations, both Othello and Desdemona “belong” in the 
American South: their early love-duet is sung to the tune of “Dixie,” as the happy couple plan 
their future life together “Away, away, &c.” presumably in Dixieland, as the song goes.80  
Although the fundamental nature of blackface performance often compels scholars to 
focus on visual rather than linguistic or aural representations of race, Desdemona and Othello’s 
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shared blackface appearance in the play is reinforced by this additional linguistic resemblance. 
This resemblance indicates an alignment of these characters that audiences would have easily 
perceived, (if only in its difference from standard depictions, on stage and in illustrations, of 
Desdemona’s difference from Othello).81 A correlation between dialect (here indicating 
something more akin to geographical origin than race), visual resemblance, and the marital 
kinship ties of Othello and Desdemona are implied in this production, in a way that standard 
presentations of Othello deny. That is to say, this play aligns Desdemona with Othello in a way 
that even John Quincy Adams would have been unable to deny. 
Despite these complications of linguistic and visual representation, – and perhaps even 
surprisingly so – the interracial romance plot is still central to this version of Othello. Here we 
might ask: what possibilities does blackface foreclose for Desdemona in this plot? Or, what 
might blackface allow that her whiteness does not? The end of the Dixie tune marks a potential 
point of racial difference, as Desdemona sings “I’ll love you dearly all my life,/Although you are 
a nigger” but the discourse of racial/sexual degradation in amalgamation that is so often read into 
Shakespeare’s text is largely absent from this version of the story (71). Though Othello is 
consistently depicted in racist terms, what is missing is any contrasting description of 
Desdemona. Specifically, the dualistic black-white imagery has been evacuated: there is no 
“white ewe” to Othello’s “black ram” in this play. A significant textual difference is the final 
scene, which includes Desdemona’s death, only, with Othello never realizing that Iago’s 
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suggestions of her infidelity were false. The burlesque depicts only the uxoricide, or wife 
murder, omitting Othello’s accompanying suicide.  
The absence of any remorse for Desdemona’s murder in this play recalls Adams’ 
particularly unsympathetic reading of Desdemona’s death, in which we see the full extent of his 
fear of interracial heterosexuality. Adams writes, “This character [Desdemona] takes from us so 
much of the sympathetic interest in her sufferings, that when Othello smothers her in bed, the 
terror and the pity subside immediately into the sentiment that she has her just deserts.”82 It is 
impossible, of course, to imagine how close Adams’ sentiment might have been to that of Griffin 
and Christy’s audiences, but this play’s changed ending, with the unpunished murder of 
Desdemona, suggests a refusal to sympathize with the heroine akin to that in Adams’ essay. 
Leaving Desdemona’s faithfulness to Othello unrevealed de-emphasizes her virtue in marital 
fidelity, while retaining only the sexual desire with which Adams is so uncomfortable.   
The 1874 acting edition of Desdemonum differs most evidently from the Griffin & 
Christy show in its language. There are no white-ethnic coded characters, and the entire cast 
(here portraying the roles of Desdemonum, Oteller, Iagum, Brabantium, etc.) speak in a similarly 
inflected minstrel dialect, all deriving from the town of “Wennice.” While not distinguishing 
Othello and Desdemona’s dialect as unique to themselves, this version resists what Rice’s Otello 
fairly accomplishes – the linguistic segregation of Otello from all other characters. Though the 
dialect of Desdemonum is definitely a racialized one, the absence of this linguistic difference 
between Othello and the other characters has an equalizing effect.  
Despite this shared dialect and the shared blackface appearance, however, blackness 
signifies racial difference in the play. In Desdemonum’s first duet with Oteller, our attention is 
turned directly to the medium of blackface performance, itself.  She proclaims “since burnt-cork 
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am de fashion, I’ll not be behind –/I’ll see Oteller’s wisage in his highfautin’ mind.”83 What does 
it mean, then, for Desdemonum to “put on” the “fashion” of burnt-cork? The text suggests 
Oteller’s blackness is undesirable, as Brabantio argues Oteller has “bewitched her, dat’s de 
matter; come de Hoodoo on de gal./ He’s played de black art on her” to explain Desdemonum’s 
attraction (65).  Later, he asks if Desdemonum truly owes her faith “To dat Jamaica nig? Why, 
gal you’re blind.”  To which she replies again, “I see de feller’s wisage in his mind;/Beauty’s but 
skin deep anyhow you know” (65). This trivialization of appearance cannot, however, be taken at 
face value in the context of blackface performance, where appearance always signifies. 
In the absence of casting directions, the text of the play still gives evidence of 
Desdemonum’s blackness, “put on” in “burnt-cork . . . fashion,” or otherwise.84 If Desdemona’s 
affection for Othello’s “wisage” is merely “fashionable,” what does this say, then, of her sexual 
desire? Is it the same “unnatural passion” that Adams suggests in his account of her indelicacy?  
But, how “delicate” could a minstrel-version of Desdemona have possibly been? Desdemonum 
falls closely in line with the other characters of the play, all of whom seem to have been meant as 
comical, but a more serious commentary on race might be read in these blackface minstrel 
renditions.  
Joyce Green MacDonald argues that in this play, “a minstrel in drag playing 
Shakespeare’s heroine firmly muzzles the sexual and cross-racial horrors incited by 
Shakespeare’s climax.”85 As Oteller tells Desdemonum upon their elopement, “De hour am 
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propitious –come, my darling flame!/Dey say dat in de dark, al cullers am de same” (63). This 
reference to the dark’s homogenization of color immediately preceding the couple’s embrace (an 
embrace that had to evoke a popular cultural image of Othello and Desdemona, even for those 
who had not seen the original Shakespearean play) at first seems to be just a slightly-bawdy joke 
(evoking much less-vivid images of interracial sex than the original text). But read in light of 
Desdemona’s transformation into Desdemonum (a figure already “begrimed” at the play’s 
opening), it offers a more complex commentary on amalgamation and a critique of racial 
dualism.  
Kenneth Gross refers to “a bizarrely democratizing quality to the minstrel show” in its 
trivialization of race as “fashion,” able to be donned by any number of characters.86 This gesture 
toward the theatricality of “putting on” race by putting on blacking makeup reveals the play’s 
construction of race, even in the original Shakespearean script. When played in blackface even in 
these “straight” productions, Othello’s blackness is always already constructed and artificial, 
rather than natural or essential, and as such, it is transferable to any of the other characters. 
Likewise, Desdemona’s face is, in these productions of blackened Othellos, always in danger of 
becoming “begrimed and black” through her contact with him. This reveals as much about the 
whiteness of Desdemona as about the blackness of a minstrelized Othello. Just as 
Desdemonum’s blackness is “put on,” so is the construction of whiteness with which writers like 
Adams read Desdemona.  
   
                                                                                                                                                             
In addition to the homogenization of race, then, we have a homogenization of gender in the blackface productions, 
which is simply over-layered with performances of race and gender.  As Dympna Callaghan notes, “if Othello was a 
white man, so was Desdemona.”  See her discussion in “‘Othello was a white man’: properties of race on 
Shakespeare’s stage” in Alternative Shakespeares Vol. 2 ed. Terence Hawkes (London: Routledge, 1996), 192-215.  
An all-female production of Othello, by the Los Angeles Women's Shakespeare Company in March of 2008, raises 
questions about how we might differently understand the play when gender (but not race) is re-cast. 
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Beyond Sexual Kinship 
More recently, Toni Morrison’s 2011 play, Desdemona, offers a uniquely complex re-
thinking of Desdemona and her whiteness.
87
  As Desdemona tells her audience, “I am not the 
meaning of a name I did not choose,” we are forced to acknowledge the complexity of race and 
gender that usual readings of the play do not afford when Desdemona is over-simplified by 
conventional tropes of white womanhood.  If Desdemona is not bound to the meaning of this 
name, we might also reevaluate that name’s being “begrimed and black.”  Morrison’s play takes 
up Shakespeare’s brief mention that Desdemona was raised by an African nurse, and centers 
itself on an evolving dialogue between the two women. In the original Shakespeare, Desdemona 
recalls her nursemaid at the end of the penultimate act: 
My mother had a maid called Barbara; 
She was in love; and he she lov’d proved mad, 
And did forsake her; she had a song of ‘Willow,’ 
An old thing ‘twas, but it expressed her fortune, 
And she died singing it; that song to-night 
Will not go from my mind; I have much to do 
But to go hang my head all at one side, 
And sing it like poor Barbara. (4.3.26-33) 
 
Desdemona proceeds to sing Barbara’s “song of ‘Willow,’” foreshadowing her own death as she 
is mirrored by the dead African woman. By taking up this parallel, Morrison conceives of a 
potential conversation between the two women, in the afterlife. 
Morrison’s revision juxtaposes Desdemona’s retelling of the stories Othello told her 
during their courtship with the stories that Barbara (who becomes “Barbary” in Morrison’s play) 
told Desdemona during her childhood.  An announcement for the play’s premiere explains 
Desdemona’s enchantment with Othello through her familiarity with Barbara/Barbary (and 
hence, Africa): “Othello wooed Desdemona with stories of his adventures. Raised by an African, 
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Desdemona felt familiar and confident with Othello. The night of her own death, she sings the 
song Barbary sang at the moment of hers.”88 Desdemona’s connection to Africa therefore 
precedes her relationship to Othello.  We might surmise that Desdemona fell in love with Othello 
because, as Morrison’s play reveals, “Desdemona was brought up by an African maid who told 
her African stories.”89  In this rendering, Desdemona does not first enter into interracial kinship 
through Othello, but through this maternal figure, in a relation that has the potential to transcend 
the tropic relation between the black “mammy” and white child, as the play’s end progresses 
toward a dialectic between the two women.  Barbaray (played by singer/song-writer Rokia 
Traoré) is, indeed, given “equal staging—and equal voice—with Desdemona” in this play. 90  
Thus, Desdemona asserts its own potential for a transracial feminism that is not only absent but 
unthinkable in either Shakespeare’s original or the nineteenth-century American blackface 
renditions.  
Morrison opens up a space for the women of this play to function independently of 
Shakespeare’s male characters, and thereby Desdemona is able to re-create herself beyond the 
boundaries in which the normative model of white womanhood would inscribe her.  In the play’s 
most striking moment, Barbary’s voice rings emphatic as a strength to be reckoned with, and 
Desdemona is brought to recognize that the kinship she longs for with Barbary is foreclosed by 
the elder woman’s enslavement.  This moment focuses on the iconic relation between black 
women and the white children they raise as “mammies,” a relationship to which I will return in 
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the fourth chapter.  The fact of this conversation, and its recognition of the power relations at 
stake between these two women – Desdemona’s recognition of Barbary’s oppression, and 
Barbary’s good faith judgment that Desdemona does not mean to further contribute to that 
oppression – sparks a potential for understanding between the two women.  Desdemona imagines 
her own connection to the elder woman, who has become a source of strength, and in her refusal 
to take part in the white male patriarchy of the original play, its violence, and as Morrison and 
Peter Sellers, the director, suggest, its typical flatness of characters.  As Morrison’s play 
progresses toward a dialogue between Desdemona and Barbary, it acknowledges past wrongs 
and abuses of Barbary, but plants seeds of hope in the character of Desdemona, leaving viewers 
with the open possibility for a viable relation of interracial kinship between the two women.  
In a small way, the representation of a blackface Desdemona – like Morrison’s cultural 
Africanization of Desdemona through her approaching kinship with Barbary – critiques the 
standardization of blackface in legitimate theatrical productions of Othello.  The “begrimed” 
Desdemona of the minstrel plays appears much as the “begrimed” Othello – neither an accurate 
representation of racial “whiteness” nor of “blackness,” but an indication of how race is 
constructed in these nineteenth-century representations.  Particularly, the “begrimed” 
Desdemona displays blackness as transferrable and (feminine) whiteness as precarious, as white 
women may be racially-marked by their interracial sexuality.  In this way, the versions of 
Desdemona presented in these minstrel plays evade the rhetorics of white womanhood and 
“miscegenation” that nineteenth-century American audiences would read into the play.   
Charles Browning’s painting “Blackface” indicates how this medium of representation 
does not afford Desdemona the “delicacy” that John Quincy Adams would demand from the 
white womanhood of her more-serious counterpart. (See Figure 11)  As Morrison’s play 
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indicates, however, the rhetorical “blackening” of Desdemona need not present as ridiculous, but 
might instead speak to the very serious need to re-figure Desdemona’s whiteness – and her 
relation to blackness – in Shakespeare’s play.  These representations of “blackface Desdemona” 
in the nineteenth-century American social/cultural imaginary offer a different rhetoric of white 
womanhood: one in which Desdemona’s “whiteness” cannot be so neatly contrasted with 
Othello’s “blackness,” and in which the very bounds of “white” and “black” become both 
malleable and traversable within the realm of racial performance.    
 
 
 
Figure 11: Charles Browning, “Blackface,” 2005, oil on canvas, 30” x 24” 
<http://www.foundrysite.com/browning/> 
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My next chapter will continue this conversation about white womanhood in sexual 
kinship with African American men, by reading William Allen’s narrative of his engagement and 
marriage to Mary King.  Allen’s text, by representing the various genres in which King’s 
whiteness is read by their contemporaries, extends this conversation about representing white 
womanhood to the placement of the “white woman” in various genres.  By paying attention to 
how this figure is read with the various expectations of different literary genres, we can better 
understand how the racialization of “whitening” or “blackening” are linked to practices of 
reading.  
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Chapter Three 
“Almost Eliza”: Genre, Racialization, and Reading Mary King as a Mixed-Race Heroine 
 
  
 Your flight is a flight for freedom, and I can almost call you Eliza. 
                         
                         John Porter, letter to Mary King, March 27
th
, 1853 
                         Reprinted in William Allen’s The American Prejudice Against Color, 1853 
 
 The proposed marriage of William G. Allen, the “Coloured Professor” of the New York 
Central College at McGrawville, and Mary King, the white daughter of abolitionists, was a 
popular controversy in Upstate New York in 1853.
 91
 The couple’s engagement incited letters of 
family disapproval, newspaper commentary, and mob violence leading to their forced (though 
temporary) separation. According to Allen’s personal narrative of their engagement and marriage 
in The American Prejudice Against Color (1853), the couple met when he was openly received 
as a guest in the Kings’ abolitionist home and he and Mary’s relationship developed at the 
racially-integrated, co-educational school where Allen taught and King was a student. Allen 
recounts that King’s father and sister originally supported the couple’s engagement, but that Mr. 
King changed his opinion under pressure from his wife (Mary’s stepmother) and sons, all 
Christian abolitionists who nevertheless vehemently opposed “amalgamation.”92  
 As can be seen from my discussion in chapter one, discourses against amalgamation reach 
back into the early Republic, and have literary roots in characters like James Fenimore Cooper’s 
Cora Munro, and other “tragic mulatta” characters, destined to die in their respective texts.  
While more radical writers such as Lydia Maria Child wrote in support of interracial marriage, 
texts such as Edward William Clay’s 1830s illustrations depicting “amalgamation,” Josiah Nott’s 
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“scientific” discussions of “hybrid” people as an “unnatural” or “contaminated” population 
because of their potentially inter-species conception and supposed eventual inability to 
propagate, and the nineteenth-century interpretations and revisions of Othello discussed in the 
previous chapter illustrate the extent to which overtly racist anti-amalgamationist rhetoric had 
become prevalent by the mid-nineteenth century. The debate that coined the term 
“miscegenation” during the 1864 Lincoln reelection campaign clearly brings this discourse into 
the realm of political campaigning, and “anti-amalgamation” literature became more highly 
visible following the Civil War, most emphatically in plantation nostalgia fiction, a genre whose 
popularity extended well into the twentieth century.   
 While King and Allen were visiting with friends in Fulton, New York on Sunday, January 
30, 1853, a white-supremacist mob descended upon the couple, threatening Allen with physical 
violence unless he immediately left town and forcibly escorting King to her parents’ home. This 
mob (a group of white men) framed their interference as the benevolent “rescue” of a white 
“damsel” from the supposedly-undesirable fate of interracial marriage. Following this separation, 
Allen and King eventually managed to correspond (at first under the surveillance of King’s 
family and then through third parties) and ultimately eloped. They were married in New York 
City on March 30, 1853 and soon emigrated to England, never returning to the United States. 
 In a letter written to King during the week before she and Allen were married, the 
couple’s friend, John Porter, wrote, “Your flight is a flight for freedom, and I can almost call you 
Eliza,” referencing the well-known mixed-race heroine of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin (87). Porter’s evocation of abolitionist literature is intriguing not only because it refuses to 
perform the more obvious slippage of relegating prejudice against the African American Allen (a 
man who was born to a free mixed-race woman and was never enslaved) to the discourse of 
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slavery, but because it chooses the white woman as its subject and re-figures her in one of 
abolitionism’s most popular tropes of enslavement, the mixed-race heroine. 93 Not merely an 
equation of all race-related persecution with slavery, Porter’s comparison of Mary King to 
Stowe’s Eliza displaces the racist rhetoric of the couple’s forced separation, which rendered King 
a “damsel” in need of the white male “protection” that the mob purported to give her. Instead, 
Porter’s “reading” of Mary King’s position places her in the abolitionist literary tradition, where 
her and Allen’s story reads as a narrative of African American fugitivity rather than white 
captivity. Moreover, Porter’s characterization of King as “almost . . . Eliza” emphasizes a close 
generic proximity to the figure of the mixed-race heroine, recognizing the interracial allegiance 
of King and Allen’s proposed kinship, and a re-racialization of the figure of the white woman 
along lines of her participation in interracial sexual relations and reproduction.
 94
 
Like Desdemona, Mary King exhibits a sentiment incompatible with dominant 
imaginings of white womanhood – her sexual desire for the male racial Other, a desire which 
implies the breakdown of imagined biological racial barriers in its potential to produce racially-
mixed children.  In her refiguring, Mary King’s white womanhood is re-positioned against (and 
in opposition to) white maleness.  As in Mary Jemison’s struggle to protect and feed her children 
during General Sullivan’s 1779 “scorched earth” campaign, most white men in Allen’s narrative 
become Mary King’s adversaries – her captors, silencers, and oppressors, rather than her would-
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be protectors.  By refiguring Mary King as “an Eliza” – a mixed-race literary figure who is both 
aligned with the enslaved, and able to garner white sympathy – we can better gauge the content 
of King’s “whiteness,” an ideological construction that she resists despite public attempts to 
preserve the biologically and emotionally-conceived notions of white womanhood to which she 
is attached.   
This chapter takes up John Porter’s comparison of Mary King and Eliza Harris and reads 
King as the mixed-race heroine of Allen’s narrative. In the private and public discourse 
surrounding William Allen’s engagement and marriage to Mary King, I will examine themes of 
“amalgamation” and fugitivity in order to discuss how Mary King is figured according to 
different generic constructions of racialized womanhood in the two primary versions of the story 
Allen reproduces – his own version, and that in support of the racist mob that separated the 
couple. First, I discuss the racist rhetorics by which Mary King is read in the tradition of what I 
call “anti-amalgamation” literature – a sub-genre of the body of writing that emerges in response 
to abolitionist literature, which has its roots in the American captivity narrative. Understanding 
how Mary King functions generically in these versions of her and Allen’s story helps us to 
understand accounts of King’s ostensible “rescue” from interracial marriage. That is, the writing 
and rewriting of the Allen-King relationship demonstrate how the racialization of characters 
within specific literary genres structures how living people are “read” according to similar 
processes of racialization. 
 Reading Allen’s narrative, I go on to illustrate how Mary King functions more closely to 
the mixed-race heroine of abolitionist literature than the “damsel” of the captivity narrative. By 
refiguring Mary King in the terms by which an abolitionist reader compares her to the a mixed-
race literary figure who is both aligned with the enslaved and able to garner white sympathy, we 
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can better gauge the content of King’s “whiteness,” an ideological construction that she resists 
despite public attempts to preserve the notions of white womanhood to which the captivity-
narrative version of her story attaches her. Lastly, I turn to William Allen’s 1852 commentary on 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin in Frederick Douglass’ Paper and the significance of Allen’s own focus on 
Stowe’s character Cassy rather than Eliza. I read Porter’s construction of King as “almost Eliza” 
alongside the logic by which Cassy becomes a memorable figure in Allen’s reading. By reading 
Allen and King’s story in relation to those of Stowe’s “quadroon” heroines, Eliza and Cassy, it is 
possible to escape the underpinnings of the moderate – racial separatist – brand of abolitionism 
with which Stowe’s novel concludes. When we take seriously the idea of King functioning in the 
generic role of the mixed-race heroine, we are open to the more radical possibilities of Allen’s 
narrative.   
Additionally, paying attention to the abolitionist rhetoric in Allen’s narrative shows how 
William Allen, John Porter, and Mary King appropriate the concept of fugitivity for the cause 
against racial prejudice, rather than enslavement. While enslavement may very well have been a 
more hideous national problem than racial prejudice, the fact that racial prejudice cannot be 
legislated away – and could not even be erased through civil war – presents racism as the more 
insidious national problem. Allen’s focus on “prejudice” acknowledges this problem as more 
fundamental than enslavement by hinting that even the abolition of slavery will not correct the 
“American prejudice against color.” While abolitionist discourse subsumes the condition of free 
African Americans in the nineteenth-century United States, Allen’s narrative appropriation of 
abolitionist rhetoric re-purposes abolitionist literature towards a more-radical, antiracist cause. In 
effect, reading Mary King as a mixed-race heroine challenges popular assumptions about white 
womanhood, illustrates how racializing this character becomes a practice of reading her story, 
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and thereby challenges us to read characters across lines of race and genre, opening up new 
possibilities for understanding nineteenth-century texts.   
 
The “Mary Rescue”: Mary King and Anti-Amalgamation Literature 
  Mary King and William Allen’s marriage was not illegal in New York State in 1853.95 
Nevertheless, the absence of laws preventing the marriage of white and black people did not 
ensure that such marriages would be accepted equally by white northerners. Allen’s personal 
narrative acknowledges what writers such as Harriet Wilson and Frank Webb also depict in their 
narratives of mid-century race relations: the fact of northern racism.
96
 The title of Allen’s 
narrative, The American Prejudice Against Color: An Authentic Narrative, Showing How Easily 
the Nation Got into An Uproar, is clear to emphasize racism, rather than slavery, as its central 
problem. In The American Prejudice Against Color, Allen both tells his own version of the 
events surrounding his and King’s engagement and marriage and reproduces various newspaper 
accounts written in opposition to their marriage and even in support of the mob that threatened 
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them. By this juxtaposition, the narrative reveals popular anxieties surrounding interracial 
marriage, or “amalgamation” in the nineteenth century, but further speaks to questions about 
how race works generically in the various retellings of the Allen-King story.  
Reading these generic differences shows how the figure of the “white woman” is 
positioned at the center of white racial anxieties. My focus on the figure of the white woman in 
the Allen-King story seeks to acknowledge the significance of this positioning, while also 
acknowledging (and hopefully not reinforcing) problems that arise as a result of such focus on 
the figure of the white woman: the false assumption that the category “white women” can be 
easily determined; the non-representative universalizing of the “white woman” as a central, 
national figure; and the potential masking of “non-white” women and their struggles.  
Figuring Mary King as an embodiment of popular ideologies about white womanhood, 
most popular accounts of her story paint her as an innocent “victim” of an alleged racial “threat” 
posed by Allen. The nature of white violence in response to this supposed threat is implied, 
though not explicitly stated as Allen invokes the “various tourturings and mutilations of person . 
. . too shocking to be named in the pages of this book,” which he was intended to endure only if 
he and King had already been married at the mob’s arrival.97 I would like to posit the mob and its 
supporters’ response to Allen and King as an attempt to write their story in light of an assumed 
positioning of characters. In effect, this writing (or rewriting) attempts to situate Allen and King 
generically, within a distinct narrative framework.  This framework is accompanied by a series of 
assumptions about how the characters resemble recognizable tropes and expectations that they 
will function in predictable ways, thus anticipating how the story’s plot will progress. 
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 Edward Clay’s illustration of “Female Intrepidity” depicts a typical narrative of the 
supposed relation between white women and black men. (See Figure 12) The text below the 
image explains the situation clearly enough:  
On Monday night, April 1st, 1839 about 12 o’clock, in Greenwich Township, New 
Jersey, a black fellow belonging to General Williamson, broke open the door of Mr. 
Jacob Williamson’s house, during his absence, with the intention of violating the person 
of his wife, but Mrs. Williamson, with great presence of mind, seized a fowling piece, 
which was fortunately loaded, and shot him dead on the spot. 
 
The threat/victim relation is demarked along black/white and male/female lines in this scenario, 
and the underlying sexual threat is accompanied by the imperative to protect the white woman 
from interracial sex – figured only as sexual violation – at all costs.  
 
 
 
Figure 12: Edward Williams Clay, “Female Intrepidity”  
[New York]: Printed by I. Childs, 160 1/2 Fulton St. New York, [c1839] 
American Antiquarian Society 
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The image, itself, is reminiscent of the 1773 frontispiece to the Narrative of the 
Sufferings, Captivity, and Removes of Mrs. Mary Rowlandson, in which Mary Rowlandson holds 
a gun to ward off Indian intruders.  (See Figure 13) The threat of the male racial Other – a threat 
that carefully positions the figure of the white woman – is at the center of both the captivity 
narrative and the genre we might call “anti-amalgamation literature.”98 Developing from a 
literary genre in which the racial Other is posed as somehow dangerous to normative models of 
whiteness, anti-amalgamation literature characteristically emphasizes its central threat as that 
“fate worse than death”: interracial sex.  
 
 
Figure 13: Title page, A Narrative of the Captivity, Sufferings, and Removes of Mrs. Mary 
Rowlandson (Boston: John Boyle’s Printing Office, 1773) 
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 What I am calling “anti-amalgamation literature” is also closely connected to a broader, overlapping genre of anti-
abolition literature. I will discuss these connections further below. 
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These genres’ similar positioning of the white woman at the center of their narratives, 
and their similar structuring of her kinship relations along lines of racial allegiance develop her 
as a figure in need of white male protection from non-white men. In this, the absence of the 
white man in Clay’s image does not mean that his rhetorical presence is not implied: Mr. 
Williamson, in his relation to the white woman (a legal relation, as well as a social one), is 
evoked as his wife’s would-be protector, even though he does not appear in the image and is 
quickly glossed over in the narrative description.
99
 The captivity narrative makes particular 
assumptions about the white woman. Perhaps most characteristic is the assumption that her 
familial and sexual allegiances are with white men, rather than non-white men. Therefore, this 
genre has particular difficulty placing stories about women for whom this is not the case. 
Discussions of Mary Jemison illustrate the difficulty of categorizing a white woman who does 
not meet the sexual/racial expectations of the captivity narrative.
100
  
“Anti-amalgamation” literature, of course, depends upon similar assumptions about racial 
allegiance. The anti-amalgamation genre with which white racists describe the King-Allen 
engagement does not require King’s acknowledgement of her alleged captivity, as the threat of 
the male racial Other is stipulated, even though evidence of this threat does not appear in Allen’s 
account. Significantly, there is no account of Mary King confirming this narrative of a 
threatening interracial encounter. The mob’s characterization of King’s part in her proposed 
marriage to Allen not only reveals white anxiety about “amalgamation,” but also defines the 
quickness with which the mob would explain King’s actions, even at the risk of denying her all 
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agency as a victim. Conceived as either an opponent to or a passive agent in the proposed 
interracial marriage, the mob assumes Mary King to be either 1) complicit in their action by 
sharing the mob’s racial anxieties and having rejected Allen’s unwelcome proposal, or 2) an 
impressionable youth, corrupted by the teachings of her abolitionist family and/or her integrated 
college, and therefore unfit to make decisions regarding her marriage. Both cases assume that 
Mary King is in need of white male protection. Providing this “protection” is the mob’s primary 
pretended purpose.   
Newspaper accounts refer to the mob event as “The Fulton Rescue Case,” “Another 
Rescue,” and “The Mary Rescue” (75, 63, 62) emphasizing the supposed threat that Allen poses 
and the necessity of rescuing King, while also making a blatant mockery of the local abolitionist 
movement.
101
 The narrative in which Mary King is figured as a “damsel” in need of “rescue” 
shows how the structures of kinship at work in this genre would position the white woman in 
kinship with white men because of assumed ties of consanguinity and, because of the assumed 
absence of such ties, in an adversarial relationship with non-white men. When relations between 
black men and white women are the focus, however, mere “captivity” is no longer at the center 
of this story, but is replaced by the explicitly sexual threat that black men supposedly pose.  
Closely related to and overlapping with the genre of “anti-abolition” literature, “anti-
amalgamation” literature depends upon the construction of both black male sexuality and white 
female racism. Visual texts such as Edward William Clay’s “Female Intrepidity,” as well as his 
“amalgamation” images of the same year [The Fruits of Amalgamation, An Amalgamation Waltz 
and Practical Amalgamation (The Wedding) and (Musical Soireé)] illustrate the extent of overtly 
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  These references are also meant to satirize the “Jerry Rescue” of October 1, 1851. During the anti-slavery 
Liberty Party Convention in Syracuse, NY, a group of local  abolitionists and activists in the Underground Railroad 
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racist anti-amalgamationist rhetoric in such texts. The “miscegenation” debate during the 1864 
election campaign clearly brings this discourse into the realm of political campaigning, and 
“anti-amalgamation” literature becomes more highly visible following the Civil War, as one 
facet of plantation nostalgia fiction.
102
   
Abolitionist attention to amalgamation tended to focus on the sexual exploitation and 
rape of enslaved women, citing amalgamation as another of the particular evils of the “peculiar 
institution” of slavery.  This can be seen in popular texts such as Richard Hildreth’s The White 
Slave, Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and William Wells Brown’s Clotel.  The genre of “anti-
amalgamation” literature, in contrast, focuses most heavily on the supposed “threat” of sexual 
relations between black men and white women.  Such texts imagine the black man’s sexuality as 
explicitly directed at the white woman, whom he supposedly prefers to women of other races.
103
 
Determining the black man as a “threat” to both white women, individually, and to an imagined 
white racial preservation, generally, is often at the center of these discussions.
104
  
The similarities between captivity narrative and “anti-amalgamation” literature and the 
trajectory from one genre to the other are apparent in the rhetoric of the captivity genre in these 
racist counter-narratives of King and Allen. By focusing the story around a basic assumption 
about King, (i.e., that she does not desire Allen, or at the very least, that marrying him is not in 
her best interests) these accounts foreclose other genres in which we might read their story, 
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particularly the genres through which Allen, King, and their abolitionist friends recount their 
narrative. The conflicting discourses of “rescue” and “imprisonment” surrounding King are 
evidently at odds in Allen’s narrative, as he positions anti-amalgamationist narratives against his 
own version of his and King’s story. 
 
 “Almost Eliza”: Mary King as a Mixed-Race Heroine  
Foreclosing an “anti-amalgamationist” reading of the white woman, Mary King’s letters 
never suggest Allen as a threat or that her relationship with him is anything but voluntary. The 
disingenuousness of the supposed purpose of her “rescue” is evident in King’s own accounts, as 
these assumptions are, of course, inconsistent with her eventual marriage to Allen and departure 
from her white family in the United States. The narrative Allen provides is of a different genre – 
and its heroine of a different kind – than the one implied in the story of mob action or the 
accompanying newspaper rhetoric of her “rescue.” Allen gives King’s voice a prominent place in 
his narrative, reproducing excerpts of King’s personal letters, which emphasize the imprisonment 
to which she is subjected by her so-called “protectors.”  
These respective positionings of Mary King indicate two separate and competing genres 
in which the white woman might function in the Allen-King story: the anti-amalgamationist 
literature of newspaper accounts and the body of abolitionist literature from which Allen is 
drawing and which contextualizes his narrative. The figure of Mary King functions differently in 
each of these genres. While in the former she appears as a white woman in need of white male 
protection from black men, in the latter she functions in the role of the mixed-race heroine.  Elise 
Lemire’s discussion of whiteness as a position of sexual/racial desire is useful here, as she 
explains “whites” as a group constructed around having “certain tastes.”  Lemire argues that 
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“whiteness is an identity people can only claim if they have certain sexual race preferences.”105 
Considering this racialization of sexual desire, King and Allen’s engagement and the potential 
for interracial kinship relations that their desire implies suggest that we might read King as 
differently racialized here than when she is associated with more familiar tropes of white 
womanhood. 
When we bracket the prominent model of white femininity (the “damsel” in need of 
white male “rescue”) presented in the racist newspaper accounts and view it against her own 
letters, Mary King can be seen as actively struggling against white male domination in seeking 
marriage freedom (ironically, in a state in which interracial marriage was not illegal.) A closer 
examination of alternative representations of King illuminates how she works against the 
periodical press’ representation of her as adhering to popular nineteenth-century tropes of white 
womanhood – particularly that of the white woman who desires sexual racial segregation.  
Further, this racist version of white womanhood is not figured as making a mere choice of sexual 
relations here, but as regarding this version of non-normative, interracial sexuality as a threat.  
Accordingly, the article “Another Rescue,” which Allen cites as appearing in the February 1st 
edition of the anti-abolitionist Syracuse Star, registers this alleged “threat” as King is thrice 
referred to as “the damsel.”106  In Allen’s representations, however, we find a character more 
proximate to the mixed-race heroine of abolitionist fiction than to the white “damsel” of anti-
amalgamation rhetoric.  King’s proximity to non-white kin (i.e., her intended marriage to Allen, 
which also implies the possibility of their future mixed-race children) distances her from the 
normative model of white womanhood contained in the captivity or “anti-amalgamationist” 
genres.  
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While reading King as a more normative white heroine suggests the privilege of 
whiteness in the supposed protection of white womanhood, the reality of her story is that the 
alleged “protection” of the white mob actually endangers both herself and her potential kin. This 
turns any assumption about the permanence of white privilege on its head, exposing how King is 
not fixed within, but can be removed from this category of protected white womanhood.
107
 By 
reading King’s imprisonment at the hands of white men, her fugitivity in a society that seeks to 
(legally or otherwise) disallow interracial marriage, and her own declared interracial desire for 
Allen, we read a character who might better be compared with the “quadroons” of Harriet 
Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin (published the year before the Allen-King controversy) 
than with the dominant, racist ideal.
108
 It is with these models of alternatively-raced and 
racialized womanhood, found most explicitly in the genre of abolitionist literature that we might 
best contextualize Allen’s narrative.  
Discourses of abolition and amalgamation were tightly linked by the 1850s: because the 
two words were often conflated in pro-slavery rhetoric, some abolitionists found it necessary to 
promote “anti-amalgamationist” beliefs, while others (including Allen, himself) argued that 
interracial marriage freedom was a necessary condition for rather than simply a result of legal 
racial equality.
109
 As a counter to the “threat” of racial equality that abolitionism supposedly 
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proposed, terming the mob’s actions a “rescue” both mocked abolitionist efforts to help self-
emancipated people (especially following the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, which required them to 
assist in their re-enslavement) and defined the agency of the white womanhood in which Mary 
King was inscribed in these accounts. The assumption that King requires white men to “rescue” 
her from Allen, a black man, would align her with both racism and anti-abolitionism. Her own 
contrasting account of “imprisonment” aligns her with anti-racism, abolitionism, and – 
importantly – the enslaved and the enslavable.  
What the “anti-amalgamationist” genre fails to imagine is the possibility of the white 
woman as non-racist –most explicitly figured here as the possibility of her interracial sexual 
desire and kinship relations. Even where they foreclose the possibility of such desire, abolitionist 
texts such as Uncle Tom’s Cabin demand that their (assumedly white) readers extend sympathy 
to characters who are not (legally, even if visually) white.
110
 Further, in abolitionist literature we 
find the mixed-race heroine more prominently-figured, even, than the (here abolitionist) ideal of 
white womanhood.
111
 Mixed-race characters’ relation to race and their embodiment of racial 
dualism are at the center of these popular stories. The mixed-race heroine in abolitionist 
literature often appears in the role of the “tragic mulatta,” whose tragedy lies not only with her 
inability to articulate or reconcile visual/legal/social racial identity, but with her position of 
precariousness or vulnerability. The “tragic mulatta” narrative differs most evidently from the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Reader, ed. Carolyn L. Karcher (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 262-266. William Lloyd Garrison also 
supports interracial marriage in articles appearing in The Liberator on “The Marriage Law,” appearing May 7 and 
21, 1831. 
110
 For example, in the account of Mrs. Bird, the Senator’s wife, Stowe asks the reader directly to think of their own 
children as they contemplate the flight of Eliza and her son, Harry. See Chapter IX , In Which it Appears That a 
Senator is But a Man . A common critique of Stowe’s “whitewashed” sympathetic depiction of mixed-race (and 
visually-white) characters to garner abolitionist sympathy (as was a common trope in abolitionist writing) can be 
seen in James Baldwin’s well-known piece, “Everybody’s Protest Novel” (in Notes of a Native Son, 1955).  
111
 This is true, to some extent, in Uncle Tom’s Cabin, where Eliza’s story spans a greater length of the novel than 
does that of Little Eva. The prioritization of mixed-race heroines is more emphatically the case in texts such as 
Lydia Maria Child’s “The Quadroons” (1842) and Romance of the Republic (1867), and William Wells Brown’s 
Clotel (1853). 
 105 
 
captivity narrative because their heroines, though figured in many ways “like” the white women 
of captivity narratives, cannot be “rescued” by white men. If these women can be “rescued” at all 
in such narratives, this “rescue” is dependent on their own efforts, rather than on those of white 
men, who are generally depicted either as adversaries or as generally ineffectual in their efforts 
to assist the efforts of mixed-race women characters.
112
 Whatever biological or rhetorical 
whiteness such characters may possess seldom translates to the structures of kinship with white 
men that would allow for their protection. White males in this genre usually do not acknowledge 
their kinship with mixed-race people; and even if they do, this kinship is legally illegitimate, 
rendering even well-intentioned white men powerless to protect mixed-race women from 
enslavement and all the dangers to which enslavement subjects them. Further, because the 
mixed-race heroine’s self-identification is often aligned with blackness rather than whiteness, the 
precariousness they experience also extends to their (actual or potential) children. 
I want to suggest that Mary King, as she is articulated in Allen’s account and in his 
reproduction of her correspondence, exhibits characteristics less indicative of the models of 
white womanhood available in places such as the captivity narrative and anti-abolition/anti-
amalgamation literatures, and more like those found in the mixed-race heroine of abolitionist 
literary discourse. At the heart of this resemblance is the similarity of these characters’ fugitive 
positions. Like the mixed-race heroine, Mary King is positioned as precarious with relation to the 
white men who are better understood as her captors and adversaries than her rescuers. Her sexual 
desire for Allen and their future of shared domesticity in marriage places her in relations of 
interracial kinship (both to him and to their future children) rather than within the bounds of 
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normalized white American domesticity. Both King’s adversarial relation to white men and her 
kinship with non-white people work to figure her fugitivity – a fugitivity that aligns her with 
non-white and enslaved people via her relation to her white family and to the American nation.   
 By blaming Mary King’s abolitionist upbringing or education by “her Amalgamation-
preaching parents” for her “inappropriate” marriage choice, as the newspaper account of 
“Another Rescue” described events (American Prejudice 64), the common conflation of 
abolitionism (the Kings were, in fact, abolitionists) and amalgamation becomes apparent: 
Abolitionism is a slippery slope, and the emancipation of enslaved blacks will inevitably lead to 
other, even more radical, forms of equality. As Karen Woods Weierman notes: “the proslavery 
press dubbed abolitionists ‘amalgamationists,’ equating support for emancipation with the 
endorsement of intermarriage. Actual intermarriages also tested the commitment of abolitionists 
to racial equality” (102). Similar to Elise Lemire’s idea of race as dependent upon sexual racial 
“preference,” this association posits race as an alignment with a particular political ideology. The 
underlying implication of the conflation of racial ideology and embodiment is that a political 
position could rhetorically re-race a person. In part, the conflation of physical and ideological 
racialization aligns whiteness with white supremacy and blackness with a spectrum of political 
positions that include racial egalitarianism. Still, these two concepts of race – as sexual racial 
preference and as political affiliation – are connected. 
 For example, charges that the Republican party, in its leanings toward abolitionism, also 
supported more radical views on “amalgamation” sparked a heated debate during the season 
leading to the 1864 presidential election. These public discussions, and literary frauds, lead to the 
coining of the word “miscegenation” in the anonymously-published pamphlet by David 
Goodman Croly and George Wakeman, Miscegenation: The Theory of the Blending of the Races, 
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Applied to the American White Man and Negro (1863) and texts such as L. Seaman’s “What 
Miscegenation is!, and what we are to Expect, now that Mr. Lincoln is Elected President” 
(1865?). They also caused Lincoln, himself, to denounce claims that he supports interracial 
marriage, (as he also denounced any support for the right of blacks to vote or serve on juries). 
Lincoln most famously declared his belief in a “natural” aversion to interracial marriage among 
whites in an 1857 speech remarking on “that counterfeit logic which concludes that, because I do 
not want a black woman for a slave that I must necessarily want her for a wife.” Lincoln 
continues, “I need not have her for either.  I can just leave her alone. In some respects she is 
certainly not my equal.”113 Democrats’ insinuation that Abraham Lincoln was a “black 
Republican” conflated the political position in support of abolition with the charge of supporting 
amalgamation by suggesting Lincoln’s abolitionism also implied a preference for African 
American women.
114
  
 More interesting for Allen’s narrative are the connections between abolitionism and 
amalgamation evident in the abolitionist rhetoric that he employs, and in the characteristically 
abolitionist sympathy that Allen and King evoke from their few supporters. In Allen’s 
presentation, the relation between amalgamation and abolition appears in terms of a shared 
potential for persecution or “fugitivity”– the precarious position, or “impermanence” of the 
enslaved, which points to the perpetual possibility of they (or their loved ones) being uprooted 
and relays the fugitive position of the self-emancipated following the Fugitive Slave Act. For 
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King and Allen, this fugitivity appears in the threat that the larger white community poses for the 
couple, even when not formally threatened by law. I mean to suggest here a sense of the word 
“fugitive” similar to what Stephen Knadler uses to “designate the counter hegemonic cultural 
work of influential people of color who, like Frederick Douglass in his own fugitive slave 
narrative, sought to intervene in whiteness’s multiple racial formations by reevaluating its 
heterogeneous meaning.”115 In this sense, we might regard the fugitivity of white characters such 
as Mary King as inflecting another meaning of whiteness – one that is not definite or stable, but 
which is positioned in precarious proximity to blackness and therefore sympathetic to the 
racially-fugitive position of the enslavable.  
 This proximity is why both John Porter and his wife, Sarah, use the language of 
abolitionism to describe the King family’s endeavors to prevent the couple’s marriage, calling to 
mind the enslavement of African Americans as Mary King’s escape from her family is coupled 
with the rhetoric of futitivity. Sarah Porter, having knowledge of their intended elopement and 
emigration, writes to Mary King, “Now, dear Sister, farewell, and as you depart from this 
boasted ‘land of liberty and equal rights,’ and go among strangers, that you may, indeed, enjoy 
liberty, be not despondent, but cheerful, ever remembering the message of your angel mother” 
(89). We might surmise that this message of King’s deceased mother was one of abolitionism – 
even, perhaps, a radical brand of abolitionism that preached racial equality, that rare antiracism 
which would endorse King and Allen’s marriage.116 In this context, King’s imprisonment 
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becomes fugitivity as she and Allen make plans to elope. No longer believing that their marriage 
is supportable in the United States, the couple – like some of the nation’s most prominent self-
emancipated people following the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act – emigrated to England.  
 There is a difference between the legal racial marking by which “women who crossed the 
color line became black in terms of their legal status,” and the re-racialization of Mary King 
within the genre of the mixed-race heroine.
 117
  Still, both constructions of white womanhood are 
governed by structures of kinship which orient white women who would marry non-white men 
and bear mixed-race children. As Porter reads Mary King in the tradition of the mixed-race 
heroine, he not only reveals King’s purported “protectors” as impinging upon her personal 
freedom, but also as threatening her future, racially “mixed,” family. When King’s potential 
family is taken into account, this reading reveals her changed relationship to the nation and an 
understanding of familial bonds akin to those who are enslaved or enslavable: because of this 
marriage choice, King considers herself, like the fugitive, unwelcome in the United States. As 
she writes of her and Allen’s homelessness as they are about to emigrate, King casts herself in 
abolitionist language, as her marriage choice has made her an outsider to the nation of their birth: 
“I feel that I have no home but in the heart of the one I love, and no country until I reach one 
where the cruel and crushing hand of Republican America can no longer tear me from you” (89-
90). Not only can she no longer align herself with “Republican America” in this regard, but she 
also regards the nation, like the white mob, as a threat to her chosen kinship ties.   
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 If we did not know these words to be Mary King’s, they could just as easily be those of 
Eliza Harris, writing to her husband, George. The coupling of “home” and “country” in King’s 
letter sounds not unlike the image of domestic happiness Eliza dreams of while at the Quaker 
Settlement, where “She dreamed of a beautiful country, – a land, it seemed, to her of rest . . . and 
there, in a house which kind voices told her was a home, she saw her boy playing, a free and 
happy child” (UTC 121). Eliza awakes to find herself (temporarily) safe in the home of the 
Quakers, “her child . . . calmly sleeping by her side,” and “her husband sobbing by her pillow” 
(UTC 121).  Her dream suggests that this “beautiful country” where she and her family can find 
“a home” is not the United States, as her later flight to Canada confirms. Though Stowe’s 
narration of Eliza and George Harris’ emigration becomes a rather patriarchal account once they 
are reunited (“what a blessing it is for a man to feel that his wife and child belong to him!”), with 
Stowe attributing the larger voice to George’s political ruminations rather than Eliza’s thoughts 
for the remainder of the novel, the image of Eliza as both a fugitive and a mother remain in the 
foreground of Uncle Tom’s Cabin (UTC 161). A significant fact is that it was not Eliza herself 
but her son, Harry, who had been sold. The image not only of an enslaved woman, but of a 
mother to an enslaved child therefore becomes the definitive conveyer of literary abolitionist 
sentiment. I will return to Mary King’s relation to this facet of the mixed-race heroine in my final 
section. 
 
“The story of the Quadroon girl” 
 When William Allen reads the mixed-race heroine, it is not the popular image of Eliza 
that sparks his interest. Rather, his reading of Uncle Tom’s Cabin focuses on Cassy, the 
“quadroon” woman whose more radical place in the text is often overshadowed by popular focus 
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on Eliza. While Porter reads Mary King as somehow more like Eliza than the normative model 
of white womanhood, Allen shows how we might also read King in the tradition of Cassy. As 
Allen relates his impression of the recently-published Uncle Tom’s Cabin in a May 1852 letter to 
Frederick Douglass’ Paper, he writes, “The story of the Quadroon girl, second book, thirty-
fourth chapter, exceeds anything that I have ever read, in all that is soul-searching and thrilling.” 
It is with Cassy that Allen seems to best identify, as he holds Tom as having “too much piety” 
and offers a familiar critique of the colonization chapter describing the ultimate fate of Eliza and 
George Harris. Allen writes, “I believe, as you do, that it is not light the slaveholder wants, but 
fire, and he ought to have it. I do not advocate revenge, but simply, resistance to tyrants, if it 
need be, to the death.”118 Nobody responds to the tyranny of slavery with so much “fire” as 
Cassy, whose ghostly revenge on Simon Legree is unequalled in the novel. It makes sense that, 
though seemingly forgotten by moderate abolitionist whites, Cassy would be a memorable 
character for radical abolitionists. Although Cassy is described as being visibly white as Eliza, 
her vehement – often violent – opposition to her and her children’s enslavement presents her as a 
more dangerous figure than Eliza. Though Eliza’s resistance is characterized by a bravery that is 
inspired by motherly affection and which continually places herself in danger, Cassy is not 
averse to harming her white enslavers (be it physically or psychologically), if necessary.   
Although Cassy’s story offers a familiar, generic narrative of the “tragic” mixed-race 
heroine, she nonetheless defies this literary trope (as Eliza also does), in part because she does 
not die at the end of her narrative, but instead escapes her final master and is later reunited with 
her living children. In this, Cassy seems ahead of her time. She simultaneously evokes more 
radical abolitionist texts than Stowe’s, such as Richard Hildreth’s The Slave: or Memoirs of 
Archy Moore (1836) and anticipates post-war narratives of race and reunion, such as Lydia 
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Maria Child’s Romance of the Republic (1867), and Frances Ellen Watkins Harper’s Minnie’s 
Sacrifice  (1869) and Iola Leroy; or, Shadows Uplifted (1892).
 119
 Despite Cassy’s radical 
presence in the text, Leslie Fiedler argues that Cassy’s story “fades from the mind even after we 
have just read Uncle Tom” and Carolyn Vellenga Berman adds that Cassy often goes 
unmentioned in both early reviews of the novel and in the recent history Stowe scholarship.
120
 
Writing on Uncle Tom’s Cabin has closely attended to the debates that surrounded the text’s 
reception in 1852 and 1853 – a debate that, though inflected by various positions of gender, 
nation, region, class, and race, has often prioritized the white, middle-class abolitionist 
readership with which Stowe’s writing is usually associated.  Although contemporary and critical 
African-Americanist perspectives on Stowe have garnered more attention in recent scholarship, 
discussions of these perspectives often center around critiques of Stowe’s views on colonization 
or her stereotypical depictions of black characters.  
A more radical employment of Stowe’s mixed-race characters and construction of 
sentiment emerges, however, when we more closely examine the complexities of non-white 
readerly responses to Stowe’s novel. As Martin Delaney argued of Stowe, “she knows nothing 
about us, the free colored people of the United States.”121 However, these “free colored” people 
were among Stowe’s earliest readers. The significance of Cassy in Allen’s reading of Stowe, 
then, may lie in his readerly position as a free, northern, racially-mixed man; a radical 
abolitionist; an anti-colonizationist; an integrationist; and an “amalgamationist.” When this 
position of readership is taken into account, it is just as unsurprising that Allen finds Cassy’s 
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story particularly striking as it is that the increasingly-popular discussion of Stowe’s novel finds 
its way into Allen’s narrative. While a more moderate abolitionist readership may readily allow 
Eliza’s story to subsume Cassy’s, it makes sense that Stowe’s African American readers – 
especially those who readily critiqued the colonizationist ending of her novel – might also recall 
the single character who enacts a ghostly revenge on Simon Legree, the embodiment of the 
larger slave system in which “Uncle Tom” shows ultimately invest the entirety of that system 
and all its evils. My attention to Allen’s emphasis on Cassy suggests that it matters whether any 
single reader of Stowe more closely identifies with George Harris, Cassy, or even Topsy, rather 
than with the Shelbys, the Birds, or Aunt Ophelia. Critics of abolitionist literature, in particular, 
ought take the possibility of such readerly positions into account. 
 The structure in which Mary King resembles the generic trope of Stowe’s Eliza can be 
explained by the same structure by which Cassy would become a memorable figure in white 
readings of Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Both matters have to do with the relation of race to reading 
practices. By this I do not mean that these practices are dependent upon the race of the reader, 
but refer to the practices by which race, itself, is read. William Allen’s interest in Cassy seems 
exceptional when read next to the predominantly white readerly responses to the novel, i.e., it 
can be contrasted against the failure of white readers to identify with Cassy, or with assumptions 
that mixed-race characters would be better able to garner white sympathy than black ones, 
particularly if they support colonization. John Porter’s suggestion of identifying Mary King with 
Eliza Harris points to a different readerly response, and the possibility for cross-racial 
identification with Stowe’s enslaved characters.  
By reading Allen and King’s story in relation to those of Stowe’s “quadroon” heroines, 
Eliza and Cassy, we escape the underpinnings of the “moderate,” persistently racial separatist 
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brand of abolitionism with which Stowe’s novel concludes for the more “radical” readings that 
characters such as Eliza and Cassy have to offer Stowe’s readers. As Porter’s letter and Allen’s 
emphasis suggest, the possibilities for interracial identification go beyond the simple equation 
that white identification or sympathy depends upon the Other’s proximity to whiteness (either in 
visual description, education, or ability to be assimilated in some version of American 
nationalism). Both King’s rejection of white male patriarchy and her articulation of interracial 
kinship here foster that kind of identification, and better inform any reading of Allen’s narrative.   
Despite the fact that she is never in danger of actual legal enslavement, Mary King is 
forcibly confined in the attempt to separate her from Allen. King declares her devotion to her 
fiancé and distress at the prevention of their marriage, twice calling herself a “prisoner” held 
captive and under surveillance by family members who would prevent her marriage (77). King’s 
narrative of imprisonment also informs us that she has been deemed a transgressor against the 
white racist society that holds her, and is therefore in need of either punishment or pardon. The 
“Committee” that first approaches Allen and King upon the mob’s arrival escorts King to her 
father’s house, and addresses her in these terms. Allen recounts that one member of the group 
“advised her also to go around among the ladies of the village, and consult with them, and 
assured her that he would be glad to see her at his house.” Allen tells us that the “tone” of this 
speech is what evokes King’s indignation: “The speaker evidently thought the young lady would 
receive it all as a mark of gracious favor, and as assuring her that though she had been ‘hand and 
glove’ with a coloured man, he would nevertheless condescend to overlook it” (59).  
 The mob’s suggestion that King would either welcome or require the “gracious” pardon 
of white racists for her racial/sexual transgression is countered with King’s indignation, her 
continued profession of love for Allen, and her ultimate state of fugitivity. She and Allen 
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eventually leave the United States to avoid racial persecution – at a time when other African 
Americans figure as fugitive slaves, either avoiding captivity in the North or, when possible, 
escaping to Canada or Europe where they do not face the very real risk of re-enslavement. 
King’s response refuses the mob’s placement of her as either a captive “damsel” or a repentant 
transgressor of white racist codes, but insists that these white captors or pardoners are her 
personal adversaries. 
 The matter of rejecting the white racism that these accounts would foist upon her is truly 
personal for King and to ascribe these views to her is to significantly change her story. While the 
“prejudice against color” that is primarily directed at Allen is willing to “pardon” King, it does 
so only at the expense of recasting her in racist terms: as a racial-purist “damsel,” rather than a 
race-traitor. “The Fulton Rescue Case” article evokes a letter of response to the Syracuse Journal 
from Mary King’s brother, William S. King, in which he “describes Miss King as repulsing 
[Allen] with her abhorrence of the idea of amalgamation” (74). In this account, King (very 
cordially) thrice rejects Allen’s repeated proposals of marriage, as her brother attests that “she 
had always expressed her abhorrence of the idea of amalgamation” (75). In a weak attempt to 
support this claim, Allen also receives – and rejects the validity of – a letter (written not in Mary 
King’s hand, but in her sister’s, as she is allegedly too ill to write) breaking off the engagement. 
 We see here that assumptions of King’s capacity for loving Allen become a question of 
the capacity for interracial sexual desire that her would-be “rescuers” attribute to her. That is, 
white racist assumptions about King and Allen’s relationship predicate the impossibility of her 
sexual desire for him while admitting his desire for her and reframing it negatively, against her 
supposed inability to reciprocate that desire. A surprising letter to King’s father from Thomas 
Knowland, a Mississippi slaveholder whom Allen calls a “specimen of Southern chivalry,” asks 
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permission to correspond with Mary King. Like the “rescue” mob, Knowland regards King as 
having “escaped” from an “ignominious connection” with Allen. Further, he tells Mr. King, 
“Your daughter [is] – innocent, as I must in charity presume – because deluded and deranged by 
the false teachings of the abolition Institute at McGrawville” (86). Echoing Shakespeare’s 
Brabantio, who claims that Othello must have used some kind of “magic” to sway Desdemona’s 
emotions (1.2.65), Knowland is unwilling to assume that King could reasonably desire marriage 
to a black man, but insists that she must have been “deluded and deranged” – brainwashed by 
abolitionists (who “must” also be amalgamationists).     
 This version of events does not square with the rest of Allen’s narrative, of course. Allen 
makes it clear that his feelings toward King had always been “fully reciprocated” (43) and 
reproduces letters in which King assures him of her continued love and devotion during their 
separation (76-77, 90). Reading the first letter he receives from King following their separation, 
Allen attests to his fiancée’s devotion, writing that “Miss King, – though she could be persecuted 
– could not be crushed” (77). He further recalls the emotional difficulty King must have endured, 
his ever deeper feelings for her “after she had passed through that fiery furnace of affliction,” 
and calls her continuance of their engagement “a moral heroism” (79). King’s continued 
devotion to Allen is framed by placing her in this precarious, fugitive position – that of both 
estrangement from the white community and susceptibility to physical danger from it – a 
position which Porter’s comparison likens to the state of people who are in danger of legal 
enslavement.   
 Like the Harrises and Cassy’s family, Allen and King eventually decide to emigrate from 
the United States in order to secure their own safety – and the safety of their future family. 
King’s position becomes more precarious still when read in light of the possibility of her 
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motherhood. The fact that interracial sexual desire can lead to the literal embodiment of racial 
mixture places the white woman involved in interracial sexual relations in a precarious position: 
her sexual encounter may result in the literal (re)production of the racial “Other,” as the children 
she bears from such encounters will not be designated “white” like herself. The potential for 
bearing racially mixed – that is, legally black – children adds another dimension to King’s 
fugitivity.
122
 
 Extending her fugitivity to the non-white children that she would later bear, Cassy’s 
motherhood – and especially, the infanticide of her last child because she is unwilling to see it 
suffer in slavery – is particularly poignant. Keeping in mind Stowe’s appeals to white mothers to 
compare enslaved children to their own, King is in the particular position of a white woman 
whose children are not necessarily safe from potential enslavement, as the Fugitive Slave Act 
poses a threat even to free-born African-Americans, and as the ideology of hypodescent would 
have it,  partial-whiteness is negligible. Harriet Jacobs, in Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl 
(1861), challenges the ability of white mothers to fully sympathize with the plight of the 
enslaved mother and her experience of reunion with her children as she asks, “O reader, can you 
imagine my joy? No, you cannot, unless you have been a slave mother.” 123 This text reminds us 
of the difference – a difference that cannot be over-emphasized – between Mary King’s position 
and that of women who are, themselves, enslaved. My next chapter will deal explicitly with the 
condition of enslaved mothers and matters of interracial kinship with regard to explicitly-
racialized maternity. 
                                                 
122Barbara J. Fields cites the concept of “interracial” motherhood in her discussion of the absurdity of biologically-
construed race, referring to “the well-known anomaly of American racial convention that considers a white woman 
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following chapter.  
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York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001), 135.   
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Apart from the extreme threat of the enslavement of free African Americans, King and 
Allen’s mixed-race family is unwanted in their white community, as a Western New York paper 
announcing their marriage makes explicit when it comments, sarcastically, “It is well they should 
emigrate, to show admiring foreigners the beauties of abolitionism” (81-82).  King comes to 
articulate her own fugitivity with relation to the white community in her letters. Though initially 
offered “protection” and possible “pardon” from the white mob, in a letter written just before her 
elopement, King speaks not only to estrangement from the white community, but to the danger 
of physical violence to herself: “should the public or my friends ever see fit to lay their 
commands upon me again, they will find that although they have but a weak, defenseless woman 
to contend with, still, that woman is one who will never passively yield her rights. They may mob 
me; yea, they may kill me; but they shall never crush me” (90). In this defiance of the threat of 
white male violence, King displays something resembling the “fire” that Allen attributes to 
Cassy. However, we would do well to note that King has not yet experienced the feelings of 
being “crushed” that Cassy has when we first encounter her in Stowe’s novel as a woman who 
has been enslaved, sexually coerced if not forcibly raped, separated from her living children, and 
who has committed infanticide to save another child from the horrors of enslavement that she has 
determined unbearable. Mary King is not simply like an enslaved mixed-race woman, but rather 
practices of reading race liken her to enslaved mixed-race women in popular fiction. This 
process reveals how her “interracial” kinship ties to William Allen (and their potential children) 
bring racialized and genre-based reading practices to bear on Mary King’s whiteness.    
Rethinking Mary King’s generic function in Allen’s narrative allows us to understand 
John Porter’s reframing of the “white woman” as he compares King with Stowe’s Eliza. 
Although the familiar characterizations of white femininity evidenced in literary genres such as 
 119 
 
the captivity narrative, anti-abolitionist writing, and anti-amgalgamation writing are central to 
understanding how nineteenth-century literary texts challenge Western notions of race and 
racialization, King is not best understood through these literary tropes. I am thinking especially 
of abolitionist literature’s ubiquitous depictions of mixed-race characters (“tragic” and 
otherwise), which challenge the claims of racial essentialism central to political systems (systems 
that govern enslavement, marriage, citizenship, etc.) that are dependent upon the differentiation 
of “white” people from people who are not “white.” Allen’s narrative pastiche allows us to read 
King through different literary genres comparatively. If unraveling the imagined sexual threat of 
the black man and registering the real threat of white male patriarchy aligns King with Stowe’s 
mixed-race heroines rather than with the popular model of the white “damsel,” these generic 
characterizations indicate how racialization is, itself, a literary practice. 
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Chapter Four 
Mothers and Mammies: Reading Racialized Maternity   
 
 
Rear’d not beneath a parent’s eye, 
A stranger to each kindred tie, 
On who but thee can I rely, 
      My Mammy.     
M. Belson (Mary Elliot?), “My Mammy” 
Grateful Tributes; or Recollections of Infancy, 1819 
 
 
In her 1872 poem, “The Black Princess,” Sarah Piatt describes a Southern woman’s 
nostalgic reminiscence of her mammy.  Fixing this figure in an idealized childhood, the poem 
reads, initially, as glorifying the mammy’s apparent grace and beauty. 
Court lace nor jewels had she seen: 
 She wore a precious smile, so rare 
  That at her side the whitest queen 
   Were dark – her darkness was so fair. 
  
  Nothing of loveliest loveliness 
 This strange, sad Princess seemed to lack; 
  Majestic with her calm distress 
   She was, and beautiful, though black. 
 
However, the poem’s evaluation of the “Princess’s” “lovely” appearance accompanies what is 
revealed as rather backhanded praise, dependent upon negatively-racialized descriptions of 
blackness.  As we read that “her darkness was so fair” and she was “beautiful, though black,” it 
becomes apparent that blackness functions here only in negative terms, with these compliments 
given not in praise of black beauty, but only in spite of this woman’s black skin.  Resembling the 
black/white imagery of William Blake’s poem “The Little Black Boy,” “The Black Princess,” 
gives its readers a familiar impression of a black person’s honorary and obligatory “whitening” 
in heaven. 
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More interestingly, in the poem’s last lines, we read not only the adult speaker’s qualified 
reverence for this figure, but also her belief in the genuine nature of her mammy’s love for the 
white child she has raised.  So great does this speaker suppose her mammy’s love was for the 
white child that it extends even from death, as the “black princess” longs for that child even from 
the place of her eternal reward in heaven: 
And in her Father’s house beyond, 
      They gave her beauty, robe, and crown: 
  On me, I think, far, faint and fond, 
      Her eyes to-day look, yearning, down.
124
 
 
What we read in these last lines is an astoundingly myopic image of black womanhood, which is 
unlikely to resemble the lived experiences of real women’s servitude.  It may well be the case 
that Piatt’s speaker really did love her mammy, and that her mammy loved her.  Nevertheless, 
however deep we might understand the affections between a “black mammy” continually 
“yearning” for the white child even while “in her Father’s house beyond” her condition of 
earthly enslavement, the inherent violence of slavery and the power relations implicit in black 
feminine domestic servitude mark the mammy-child relationship as always suspect in its 
inability to be completely and equally reciprocal.  
Although the word “mammy” originally seemed to function rather innocently as a 
diminutive of “mother,” by the nineteenth century it had come to designate a relationship 
explicitly other than biological motherhood, applied to wet-nurses or foster-mothers.  Most 
prominently, the Oxford English Dictionary acknowledges the particularly racialized figure of 
the mammy in the United States, referring explicitly to its common usage from the nineteenth 
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century through the twenty-first as “a black woman with responsibility for the care of white 
children.”125  While this definition acknowledges the position of black women as servants in 
white homes, the history of black women’s enslavement in the American South further 
complicates this figure.  In their glorification of white children’s relations with black women, 
popular depictions of the mammy, like Piatt’s, often refuse to acknowledge existing racial power 
structures by which these women were either enslaved or employed by white families.  Referring 
to a tenor not dissimilar from Piatt’s poem, Sterling Brown calls Thomas Nelson Page’s 
idealization of the mammy as a regional and national figure “honest if child-like,” adding that “I 
am sure that he loved his mammy to death.”126  In this, Brown recognizes that depictions of the 
mammy often mask the racialized violence to which black women were often subjected.  In this 
masking, the figure of the mammy has been perpetuated well beyond the antebellum period, 
functioning to promote national regional and racial reconciliation, as well as post-bellum white 
supremacy.
127
 Because of her unique position as the caretaker of children, the mammy is 
embedded in a set of complex power relations, in which the power structure between adult and 
child or enslaved and (current or future) enslaver cannot be easily explained. 
 As an iconic figure of American literature and culture, the visual image of the black 
mammy is most commonly-associated with cultural figures from Aunt Chloe in Harriet Beecher 
Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin to Hattie McDaniel in the 1940 film, Gone With the Wind. (See 
Figures 14 and 15)  In this iconic visual image of portly, big-breasted, dark-skinned, smiling, de-
sexualized women, we see one of if not the single most hypervisible image of African American 
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womanhood.  The mammy becomes a stereotypically derogatory image in this hypervisibility, as 
its persistent presence tends to mask other versions and experiences of African American 
womanhood, including the realities of both the sexual exploitation of enslaved African American 
women and the history of their resistance to white supremacy.
128
  In addition, the figure of the 
mammy masks the lived experience of African American women as mothers – i.e., as women 
who, their respective relationships to their white charges aside, are not coerced or paid for the 
love and care they give to their own children.  Under this mask, the mammy’s biological children 
are more often figured as absented or neglected out of necessity for the mammy’s care of the 
white children who demand prioritization. 
 
Figure 14:Aunt Chloe and Mrs. Shelby, Engraving by Hammatt Billings  
Harriet Beecher Stowe, Uncle Tom’s Cabin (Boston: John P. Jewett, 1853) 
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Figure 15: Hattie McDaniel as Mammy in Gone With the Wind, 1939 
<http://www.gonemovies.com/www/drama/drama/GoneMammy1.asp> 
 
This chapter resists parsing the particular distinctions of racialized motherhood in order 
to examine slippages between the corresponding literary/cultural figures of the mother and the 
mammy, particularly in narratives which rearticulate motherhood or mammyhood when the 
racial definition or identification of these characters becomes unclear.  I will discuss how these 
slippages between mother and mammy relations are, themselves, informed by racial figurings 
which, when changed or changeable, make the racialized mother/mammy distinction itself, 
unclear.  Motherhood and mammyhood are racialized kinship relations in these texts.  That is, 
they are relationships in which either the kinship of (usually biological) motherhood or the 
assumed near-kinship of mammyhood are defined by racial identification and difference in the 
narratives discussed here.   
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As the familiar law of the Virginia colony tells us, “Partus sequitur ventrem. The child 
follows the condition of the mother.”129  This law speaks to how both enslavement and legal 
racial identification were formally dependent upon a child’s racial identification with her mother, 
regardless of the father’s race.  Moreover, it shows us how maternity becomes a force for 
racialization in nineteenth-century American literatures.  The dual workings of the figures of the 
mother and the mammy are manifest in the emphases of biological and non-biological kinship 
relations of mothering.  Kimberly Wallace-Sanders regards “the mammy’s characterization as 
biological and surrogate mother” in American cultural representations, within the context of a 
national, white patriarchy.
130
  This discussion will focus on figures of intertwined motherhood 
and mammyhood and the ways these figures construct the image of the mixed-race mother in 
relation to both notions of idealized white motherhood and the stereotype of the black mammy.  
In truth, while the mammy does not physically resemble models of white womanhood in these 
iconic imaginings, this figure does have some role in preserving whiteness through its 
reproduction.  The figure of the mammy as a happy and loyal caregiver to white children 
reproduces whiteness to the extent that she raises – and helps to racialize – white citizens who 
may later grow up to realize and act upon the racialized power structures that govern their 
relation to this maternal figure.   
Ultimately, examining problems of race and representation central to constructing the 
figure of the mammy indicates how this figure is more fluid than in usual renderings of the 
derogatory stereotype, both positioned against and able to perform notions of what is posited as 
an exclusively “white” motherhood.  As Thomas Nelson Page writes, “She [Mammy] was far 
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more than a servant.  She was a member of the family in high-standing and of unquestioned 
influence. She was her mistress’s coadjutress and her wise adviser, and where the children were 
concerned she was next to her in authority.”  Here Page suggests an idealized comparison – but, 
importantly, not an equation – of the mother’s and the mammy’s maternal roles.131  Drawing 
attention to the ties of race and kinship that drive stories about mothers and mothering and 
mammies and “mammying” illuminates both the complexities of race and racial mixture at work 
in these texts and the ways race remains dependent upon the particular articulation of kinship 
relations.   
The texts discussed in this chapter share a similar theme in their presentation of the 
combined or ambiguous figure of the mammy/mother as central for structuring both kinship 
relations and racial identification, but they treat these intersecting figures (and the extent and 
nature of their intersection) to different ends.  First I read Charles Chesnutt’s short story, “Her 
Virginia Mammy,” (1899) in order to introduce the categories of mother and mammy as not only 
interrelated, but overlapping in texts invested in a national history of both race-based 
enslavement and racial mixture.  Chesnutt’s revision of the plantation nostalgia image of the 
mammy illustrates how the distinctions between the racialized categories of mother and mammy 
are blurred by African American authors.  Next, I will explain how Roxy, the mammy/mother of 
Mark Twain’s Pudd’nhead Wilson (1894), challenges the barriers of kinship and racial relations 
as she shifts between performing both roles to the same child.  As a mother/mammy figure, 
Roxy’s mixed race reflects upon the ambiguity of her maternal relationships, challenging 
assumptions about biological motherhood.  
What these texts share, in their retrospective presentations of antebellum narratives, is 
their clear positioning against the sentimental celebrations of plantation life, as represented in the 
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novels of Thomas Nelson Page and Thomas Dixon, and in the poetry of Sarah Piatt – writers 
who tend to depict what has now become a stereotypically derogatory version of the “black 
mammy,” one rather similar to the image so adored in Chesnutt’s story.  Chesnutt does not 
simply reproduce this image however, but revises it in his narrative, and Twain similarly calls 
into question the very notions of racialization and biological maternity that figure his central 
character.  While Page is claiming that “no one can describe what the Mammy was, and only 
those can apprehend her who were rocked on her bed, fed at her table, were directed by her 
unsleeping eye, and led by her precept in the way of truth, justice, and humanity,” these authors 
are already complicating the figure of the mammy in texts which expose versions of this figure 
such as Page’s and Piatt’s as mere caricatures. 132    
 
Her Virginia Mother 
In Chesnutt’s “Her Virginia Mammy” the orphaned Clara Hohlfelder seeks familial roots 
beyond her adoptive parents, to whom she has never felt a sufficiently close bond. Chesnutt’s 
response to the popular genre of plantation nostalgia fiction shows that Clara finds especial 
comfort not only in the revelation of her biological connections to the “first families of Virginia,” 
but also in the emotional encounter with her own “Virginia Mammy” of the story’s title.133  
During the chance meeting that reveals the familial ties Clara had been hoping for, it is the 
“mammy” – Mrs. Harper – who provides the missing details of Clara’s parents’ lives, the 
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shipwreck by which they were separated, the supposed death of the lost child, and her own re-
enslavement, which kept her from immediately restoring Clara to her “people.” She tells Clara, 
“Yes, child, I was – your mammy. Upon my bosom you have rested; my breasts once gave you 
nourishment; my hands once ministered to you; my arms sheltered you, and my heart loved you 
and mourned you like a mother loves and mourns a firstborn.”134  These lines serve as the 
revelation of kinship for which Clara has been longing. 
While “their name and their blood” are all that Clara’s parents seem to have left her, the 
encounter with her “dear Virginia mammy” is sufficient to fill Clara’s yearning for the “kith or 
kin” she had previously thought herself without (94-95).  Despite the fact that Clara is left with 
no chance of ever reuniting with any of her biological kin, the meeting of mammy and child is 
framed clearly in terms of kinship rather than as a meeting between Clara and a mere former-
servant of her family.  Importantly, this kinship seems enough for Clara.  As the two women 
kiss, “One put into her embrace all of her new-found joy, the other all the suppressed feeling of 
the last half hour, which in turn embodied the unsatisfied yearning of many years” (93). The 
image Chesnutt provides is that of a mother and child, reunited. 
From these details, it is possible to gather\ something about the complexities of kinship in 
Clara’s nostalgic view of race-relations in the Old South – a South that never was, except in 
antebellum pro-slavery arguments of white patriarchal benevolence and the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth century plantation narratives that these arguments continued to inform. In Clara’s 
nostalgic imagination – an imagination that has evidently been informed by positive images of 
slavery in the antebellum South – the plantation system extends an umbrella of kinship to the 
enslaved people who interact closely with the families they serve. The fact that Clara recognizes 
                                                 
134
 Charles Chesnutt, “Her Virginia Mammy,” (1899) in The Northern Stories of Charles W. Chesnutt, Ed. Charles 
Duncan (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2004), 93.  Further references to this story will be given 
parenthetically in the text. 
 129 
 
her “Virginia mammy” as a sufficient kinship relation to fill the void left by an adopted mother 
(who she, herself, admits “could not have loved me better or cared for me more faithfully had I 
been her own child,” but to whom she has always felt “a subtle difference,”) reveals the 
significance of the idealized mammy relation (82).  
Although “mammy” had come to designate a relationship explicitly other than biological 
motherhood by the mid-nineteenth century, connotations of familiarity (often associated with 
childhood) are retained in the term.  This familiarity, confounded with childhood memories of 
love and care, remind us of the term’s historical use by children as an appellation of genuine 
affection.  As enslaved or employed women performed the duties of early childcare, (and for 
children whose affections to their primary caregivers might not yet have been imbued with the 
racism inherent to Southern plantation slavery,) the antebellum era presents the mammy-child 
relationship as one of close proximity to (or, at times, even closer than) the mother-child relation.   
The violence of slavery and the power relations implicit in black feminine domestic 
servitude, however, mark the mammy-child relationship as suspect, always imbued with the stain 
of racial hierarchy.  However deep we might understand the affections between “black mammy” 
and “white child,” American racial formation is founded on assumptions of racial essentialism 
that prevent any conflation of the duties of white biological kinship with relations between 
“white” masters and “black” slaves or servants, (regardless of any biological relations between 
them.)  That is, even as the term “mammy” suggested the false “family” of plantation slavery, it 
also denied any conflation of that relation with the clearly recognized familial obligations 
between white kinfolk. 
Clara does not doubt Mrs. Harper’s likening of the mammy to the biological mother, 
however, as she describes her care and love as maternal.  She regards her “mammy’s” 
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performance of these mothering acts as sincere enough to justify feelings of kinship between the 
respective “black” and “white” women.  In effect, the “mammy’s” performance of motherhood is 
able to produce a shared affect of kinship in a way that adoptive motherhood cannot in Clara’s 
view.  In this respect, it is important that Clara’s “Virginia Mammy” is not simply a servant of 
her family, but was, during Clara’s youth, enslaved by them.  A “familial” model of plantation 
slavery is therefore essential to Clara’s understanding of the mammy.  Mrs. Harper’s affection, in 
this light, is explained through popular assumptions about the patriarchal system of slavery by 
which slaves are interpolated under the guise of kinship relations that rendered enslaved people 
as “Uncle,” “Aunt,” or “Mammy.”  
Kimberly Wallace-Sanders describes the mammy figure of nineteenth-century American 
culture as “a mother who frequently displaces white mothers and has ambiguous relationships 
with her own children.”135  In the particular familiarity of the mammy relation, this figure is 
sometimes usurped the more distant white mother, rendering white women’s relationships with 
their own children equally “ambiguous.”  Clara embraces this displacement as she romanticizes 
the mammy-child relationship, interpreting the labor of the breasts that nourish, the hands that 
minister, and the arms that shelter as labors of love, rather than those of a hired or enslaved body.  
Clara accepts the affection of the woman she believes to have been her family’s “colored nurse” 
at face value: Never does it occur to her that the violence and white supremacy of Southern 
slavery might influence a black woman’s feelings toward her white charges, nor does she think 
about her mammy’s relationship with or obligations to her own biological children.   
The familial appellations of plantation slavery imply a false structure of kinship between 
enslaved people and the people who hold them enslaved, but they also subtly acknowledge a 
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system in which many enslaved people were biologically-related to their enslavers.  The 
presumably  inherent division between “mammy” and “mother” is therefore ironic in light of the 
biological ties that are known to have existed between masters and enslaved people under the 
system of plantation slavery.  In this respect, kinship appellations such as “Aunt” and “Mammy” 
subtly acknowledge a system that is distinctly unable to maintain the racial barriers on which its 
legality is based.
136
  In the case of “Her Virginia Mammy,” though, the intimate relationship 
between mammy and child approximates that of mother and child in Clara’s imaginings. Clara 
does not need an acknowledgement of blood relation to explain her connection to the older 
woman who she so closely resembles, but ironically – or perhaps, fittingly – the emotional 
encounter between Clara and Mrs. Harper is heightened by the fact she is revealed to be the real 
mother for whom Clara has been yearning.   
Everyone except Clara – the reader, Chesnutt’s narrator, Mrs. Harper, and Clara’s fiancé, 
Dr. Winthrop – recognize the family resemblance between the two women, though Mrs. Harper 
chooses not to reveal the secret that would re-figure Clara’s understanding of her own whiteness. 
Winthrop, too, remains silent rather than upset his fiancée’s fantasy, fully understanding her 
beliefs about the importance of inherited “name” and “blood,” while confirming that he does not 
care much about these himself.  These metaphors of race are symbols of Clara’s investment in 
white womanhood insofar as they serve for her as a sort of dowry – the only “property” that she 
brings to her marriage. They matter little, however, when Clara’s surname will be lost as she 
assumes her husband’s in marriage and as her racial genealogy is more likely to remain hidden 
because she is not even aware of her own passing.   
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Clara’s naïve assumption that Mrs. Harper was “the colored nurse” and not the wife and 
mother described in her story, speaks to Clara’s inability to escape essentialist notions of racial 
determination, despite her experience teaching “colored” dance pupils of various shades, some of 
whom “were undistinguishable from pure white” (85).  Because Clara’s mother, Mrs. Harper 
tells her, “also belonged to one of the first families of Virginia and in her veins flowed some of 
the best blood of the Old Dominion,” Clara assumes that her mother was white in the 
conventional, essentialist, and legal sense. Although Clara does not understand, Mrs. Harper 
alludes here to racial intermixture within these Southern “white” families in her claim, 
complicating not only Clara’s but her own race beyond black-white dualism (92).   
In light of the complications interracial kinship brings to a story about mammies and 
mothers, Chesnutt’s piece does more than just “ironize” blood, as Eric Sundquist suggests.137 It 
challenges the prioritization of biology for determining either race or kinship, complicating the 
ways in which both race and kinship are simultaneously enacted.  Mrs. Harper’s performance of 
the “mammy” role to her own biological daughter necessitates a racial performance, as well – 
one that perpetuates Clara’s nostalgic imagining of this figure.  One irony of this scene is that 
while this biological mother’s love is real, her participation in the racial stereotype of “mammy-
hood” simultaneously reinscribes her own race under essentialist terms.  As Mrs. Harper allows 
her daughter to “pass” for white (while not even acknowledging that she is doing so), she also 
allows her own maternal love for her biological child to be filtered through the lens of the 
apparent racial servitude of the mammy’s devotion.  What Chesnutt’s story so deftly shows us is 
how easy the slippage between “mother” and “mammy” might be when notions of race, itself, 
remain malleable.  
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Reading Roxy, the Mammy/Mother of Twain’s Pudd’nhead Wilson  
      
Mark Twain’s Pudd’nhead Wilson further emphasizes the racialization of (white) 
“mother” and (black) “mammy” tropes. 138  Through its heroine, Roxy, Twain’s text shows how 
this racialization itself is complicated by a racially-mixed woman who is able to simultaneously 
embody both roles.  Roxana, the white-looking, though enslaved mother of Valet de Chambre 
and mammy to Thomas à Becket Driscoll (more commonly referred to as “Roxy”)  is at the 
center of Pudd’nhead Wilson’s complex story. In Roxy, Twain re-figures the “tragic mulatta” 
trope, fashioning a character whose agency and tragedy work differently in the text than in 
earlier iterations of mixed-race womanhood.  
Wallace-Sanders correctly observes that “neither Roxy nor Mrs. Harper is a stereotypical 
mammy figure” and argues further that “both mammy characters fall into a uniquely hybrid 
stereotype, the mulatto mammy . . . a fascinating mixture of the two well-known stereotypes: the 
mammy and the tragic mulatto.”139  This hybrid category of the “mulatto mammy,” is not 
especially useful for discussing the complexities of kinship in Twain’s text, however, where 
notions of biological and legal kinship determine identification along dualistic lines of race. 
Roxy (like other late-century mixed-race figures such as Iola Leroy and their abolitionist heroine 
foremothers, Stowe’s Eliza Harris and William Wells Brown’s Clotel,) embodies the 
contradiction of a race-based system of slavery that does not reflect the realities of racial mixture 
and ambiguity which are, themselves, a direct result of the patriarchal plantation system.  
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Mark Twain ruminates on the contradiction of Roxy’s race throughout the narration of 
Pudd’nhead Wilson.  It is necessary to emphasize Twain’s narration of Roxy’s mixed race here 
because her equally-mixed racialized maternity is dependent upon this in the novel.  Though the 
essentialist beliefs of Twain’s characters are evident and unsurprising, Twain’s narrator seems 
unconvinced by conventional notions of how any amount of “black blood” serves to race Roxy 
or her child as “black.”  We read that Roxy’s child, “thirty-one parts white . . . too, was a slave, 
and by a fiction of law and custom a negro.”140  While Twain’s narrator does not seem entirely 
convinced that either Roxy or her child is really “a negro,” Twain’s plot depends upon the notion 
that there are both “negroes” and “whites,” though it may be argued that he paints racial 
difference not as essential, but as created through socially-constructed inequality.   
But in Pudd’nhead Wilson, Roxy’s mixed-race embodiment is not a simple tragedy in 
itself. The enslaved woman is mammy to one child and biological mother to another, nursing and 
rearing the child of her master alongside (or even instead of) her own. Moreover, two children 
Roxy tends are virtually identical, undistinguishable from one another by anyone other than 
Roxy, the person closest to them both. This unique knowledge of the children is what allows 
Roxy to switch the boys’ places, in the action that sparks the novel’s identity-driven plot. In this 
act of changing the boys’ identities, Roxy’s relation to them changes, as well. Her position, as 
mother to one child and mammy to the other is what enacts the boys’ changing identities. 
Initially, at least, it is through their respective relations to Roxy that each child assumes his 
identity as either white and free or black and enslaved.  
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The fact of these changes in identity challenge the notions of kinship through which 
racial identity and belonging are constructed and enacted.
141
  Twain’s emphasis on Roxy’s racial 
mixture causes Wallace-Sanders to read Roxy as belonging to the hybrid literary type of the 
“mulatto mammy” (17).  If characters such as Roxy and Mrs. Harper are hybrid figures, though, 
the most compelling evidence of this hybridity is their refusal of hybridity as an essentialized 
category in itself, as they enact their ability to move fluidly between the roles of mammy and 
mother.  Both Twain and Chesnutt “draw innovative parallels between passing over the color 
line and passing from mammy to mother,” but unlike Mrs. Harper’s, Roxy’s movement between 
kinship and racial relations is not unidirectional (73). Roxy’s movement between the roles of 
mother and mammy and the way she simultaneously performs and interpolates race through 
these roles call into question the prioritization of biology for determining both kinship and race.    
As a white-looking woman who might be able to “pass” were it not for the racially-
marked dialect of her speech, Roxy’s very existence calls into question antebellum beliefs about 
racial dualism and essentialism. Our first glimpse of Roxy easily dispatches with notions of 
“blackness” as visible.  We read that  
From Roxy’s manner of speech, a stranger would have expected her to be black, but she  
was not. Only one-sixteenth of her was black, and that sixteenth did not show.  She was 
of majestic form and stature, her attitudes were imposing and statuesque, and her gestures 
and movements distinguished by a noble and stately grace. Her complexion was very fair, 
with the rosy glow of vigorous health in the cheeks, her face was full of character and 
expression, her eyes were brown and liquid, and she had a heavy suit of fine soft hair 
which was also brown, but the fact was not apparent because her head was bound about 
with a checkered handkerchief and the hair was concealed under it. Her face was shapely, 
intelligent, and comely – even beautiful. (9)   
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Even if Roxy’s blackness is not visible, it is audible – or rather, legible in Twain’s text.  The 
dialect that marks Roxy’s speech sets her apart from other potentially “tragic” mixed-race 
heroines, most of whom display the “privilege” of “white” ancestry not only in their skin, but in 
their education.  Unlike Roxy, her predecessors (including Eliza, Clotel, and Iola) speak in 
standard English, a sign that, in the tradition of “moderate” abolitionism, they may be more 
immediately-suited for racial uplift than their uneducated or illiterate (and visibly “blacker”) 
counterparts.  Roxy’s speech is a continual reminder to the reader of her enslavement, and later, 
when she is freed, her social immobility. 
Roxy’s “one-sixteenth” of blackness, then, is visible not in her person but only in her 
performance of race.  Her “very fair” complexion, the “rosy glow of vigorous health” in her 
cheeks, and “fine soft hair” do not reveal assumed biological traits of “blackness,” nor do her 
“majestic form and stature,” “imposing and statuesque” attitudes, or “noble and stately grace” fit 
nineteenth-century notions of racialization.  On the contrary, her “shapely, intelligent, and 
comely – even beautiful” face are marks of whiteness that immediately set her apart from the by 
now well-established “mammy” stereotype of a homely, unsexed matron.142    
In addition to her appearance, Roxy’s performance of race is specifically coded as a 
relation to both legally white people and her fellow enslaved companions, as “She had an easy, 
independent carriage – when she was among her own caste – and a high and ‘sassy’ way, withal; 
but of course she was meek and humble enough where white people were” (9).  Roxy’s racial 
performance is not simply one of black subordination, however.  Her visible whiteness makes 
Roxy subject to the colorist prejudices by which she views herself in closer proximity to white 
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gentility than the darker-skinned enslaved people on the plantation.  The first conversation of 
hers we read gives both her race and her ideas about colorist hierarchies away, in part because 
her speech resembles that of other black characters.  While her and Jaspers’ dialect are similarly 
marked, Roxy’s rejection of Jaspers reveals that she ascribes to colorism, delineating racial 
hierarchies even among the mutually-enslaved.  The fact that Roxy’s “got sump’n better to do 
den ‘sociat’n wid niggers as black as [Jaspers] is” is later revealed in her supposed preference for 
a white mate, and one of high birth at that (8).  Barbara Chellis argues that Roxy “accepts the 
class structure as completely as any other white member of the Dawson’s Landing 
community.”143 This discussion merits more closely examining the extent to which Roxy, by 
virtue of her dual role as both mammy and mother, is alternately empowered and disempowered 
in her struggle against racial hierarchy.   
A large part of Roxy’s personal history is omitted as Twain fails to explain the conditions 
of the relationship between Roxy and Colonel Cecil Burleigh Essex, who Roxy claims is 
Chambers’ father.  Leslie Fiedler argues that “there seems no doubt that [Twain] thought of the 
union between Roxy and Essex as a kind of fall,” likening this union to that of James Fenimore 
Cooper’s Cora and Uncas. 144  Fiedler disregards the significance of both racial mixture and 
gender in this equation, however, as Cora’s whiteness is compromised in a way that Essex’s is 
not by an interracial union.  Here, as shown in the previous chapters, the white woman/nonwhite 
man relation does not work under the same set of social assumptions as that between a white 
man and a nonwhite woman.  The difference between these power relations, and the particular 
vulnerability of women who are not legally white makes Roxy’s position more clear.  As 
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Michael Rogin argues that “the white woman is missing from Pudd’nhead Wilson” in his 
discussion of miscegenation and violence, we can see this vulnerability as one important way in 
which Roxy cannot function as a white woman in the text.
145
  
What Fiedler acknowledges earlier in his discussion is the undeniable hierarchy of power 
implicit in this relationship between Roxy, an enslaved woman, and Essex, a white, male First 
Family Virginian “of formidable calibre” (5). Fiedler writes that “if the fathers of the South are 
Virginia gentlemen, the mothers are the Negro girls, casually or callously taken in the parody of 
love, which is all that is possible when one partner to a sexual union is not even given the status 
of a person.”146  If this is the case, as we realize it may be with Roxy, we ought take the pride 
with which she proclaims Essex as the father of her child in a different light. However we regard 
Roxy’s feelings toward Essex, the “parody of love” in Roxy’s claim is most heavily suggested by 
the fact that her apparent pride in her child’s paternity is far from a legal claim. Significantly, 
this revelation of paternity to her son does him no material good. Although she is visibly white, 
Roxy’s status as a slave also renders her child a slave – a person who is both socially and legally 
“fatherless.”147  As Hortense Spillers’ evacuation of kinship suggests, the child’s status as 
property has negated the paternal kinship relation. 
Further, while Chellis gives Roxy every amount of agency in her union with Essex, 
stating that “she had mingled her blood with the F.F.V.,” she also fails to acknowledge that 
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Roxy’s “blood” has already been “mingled” with whites, most likely under circumstances which 
imply the exploitation of enslaved, black women. Although the evidence of racial mixture is 
visible in Roxy’s person, her actions throughout the story play also with the relations of kinship 
that are so closely connected to ideas of race and identity.  By switching the assumedly “white” 
Thomas á Becket Driscoll and the “black” (though as visibly as “white” as both Tom and herself) 
Valet de Chambre, Roxy usurps family hierarchy and the racial essentialism by which one child 
is heir to his father’s estate and the other (though his father was also a “First Family Virginian”) 
can, at the whim of the other child’s father, be “sold down the river.”   
In the act of switching her master’s child for her own, Chellis argues that Roxy is “a 
reversal of a type, the kindly Negro mammy who loves and protects the white child . . . Instead, 
she enslaves the white child, putting him in a position to be sold down the river, depriving him of 
his freedom just as surely as the white man has deprived her of hers.”148  Alternately, Myra 
Jehlen absolves Roxy in a way, regarding the “maternal economy” of the text as dealing with the 
distribution (but not the production) of whiteness-as-property.
 149
  Both of these readings 
misconstrue, to some extent, Roxy’s agency within the system of enslavement.  Roxy can move 
around the players within this system, but she does not have the power to make any quantitative 
change to that game.  Moreover, her efforts are ultimately reversed – in true tragic form, 
concluding with just what our heroine attempted to prevent:  it is Roxy’s own biological son who 
is, in fact, “sold down the river” at the story’s conclusion.  In this reversal, we might view Roxy’s 
actions in light of their potential resistance to the hierarchy that makes the one child her master.  
In this respect, she certainly does work against the iconic trope of the mammy.  Rather than give 
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an ethical evaluation of how Roxy works with the system of plantation slavery, though, I would 
like to examine how Roxy’s unique place within that system – as both a mammy and a mother – 
allows her to work within it. 
As Roxy switches the almost-identical babies and we are spiraled into the racial-fiction 
Roxy has created, Twain presents notions of socially-constructed race against these assumptions 
of essentialism. Once she has exchanged the children’s places (simply by changing the one’s 
clothes with the other’s), we see her practice performing her corresponding mother and mammy 
roles with relation to them: 
She got up light-hearted and happy, and went to the cradles and spent what was left of 
that night “practicing.”  She would give her own child a light pat and say, humbly, “Lay 
still, Marse Tom,” then give the real Tom a pat and say with severity, “Lay still, 
Chambers! – does you want me to take sump’n to you?” 
As she progressed with her practice, she was surprised to see how steadily and surely the 
awe which had kept her tongue reverent and her manner humble toward her young master 
was transferring itself to her speech and manner toward the usurper, and how similarly 
handy she was becoming in transferring her motherly curtness of speech and 
peremptoriness of manner to the unlucky heir of the ancient house of Driscoll. (17) 
 
One child becomes “white” and the other “black,” in effect, because Roxy is able to place them – 
and herself – into these racialized relations.  Regarding the children’s physical likeness to one 
another, and thinking of race as, at least to a certain extent, a social construction, Roxy correctly 
surmises that becoming either “white” or “black” requires that each child learn the intricacies of 
performing race both with relation to one another and to their respective mammy/mother.
150
  
Because the boys are still only infants, Roxy easily teaches them to assume their newly assigned 
roles. 
This act that sparks the main plot of Pudd’nhead Wilson distinguishes Roxy from more 
typical representations of the mammy figure.  Regarding Roxy as Twain’s reversal or satire of 
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the mammy is appropriate if in this we can imagine that Roxy prioritizes the well-being of her 
own child over that of her master’s.  In this respect, Roxy rejects the role of the mammy for that 
of the mother by prioritizing her child over that of her master, though in an admittedly more-
complicated façade by which she must also perform the mammy relation to her own biological 
son.
151
  Importantly, the agency that Roxy is given here is a result not of her biological 
motherhood alone, or any privilege of her relative “whiteness,” but of her dual station as both 
mammy and mother.  She alone is in a position to switch the babies precisely because she is the 
only one who can tell the children apart.  The exchange of racial identities is therefore enacted 
only through the children’s respective kinship relations to herself, and as she enacts those 
relations she becomes the pivot of Tom’s and Chambers’ racial identification.  
Importantly, Roxy’s initial feelings of kinship toward her own son are what prompt her to 
enact the switch in the first place.  We see Roxy’s motherly pride in an early scene in which 
Pudd’nhead Wilson compliments both children in Roxy’s charge.  “They’re handsome little 
chaps.  One’s just as handsome as the other, too,” Wilson tells her.  She responds, “Bless yo’ 
soul, Misto Wilson, it’s pow’ful nice o’you to say dat, caze one of ‘em ain’t on’y a nigger. 
Mighty prime little nigger, I allays says, but dat’s caze it’s mine, o’course” (10).  Though Roxy 
feels motherly love for her biological son, she acknowledges the social hierarchy that would 
prevent others from such a comparison with the son of a respected white family and attributes 
her own preference as a result of her biological maternity alone.  Moreover, although Roxy is 
undoubtedly already familiar with the precariousness of slavery at the story’s opening, she is 
particularly alarmed when she comes to fully realize that her child is in as precarious a position 
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as herself: “Her child could grow up and be sold down the river!  The thought crazed her with 
horror” (16).   
Roxy’s baby-switching recalls both this horror and her earlier, abandoned, plan for saving 
her son: suicide and infanticide.  She initially tells Chambers, “Come along, honey, come along 
wid Mammy; we gwyne to jump in de river, den de troubles o’ dis worl’ is all over – dey don’t 
sell po’ niggers down de river over yonder” (16).  Only the case of Margaret Garner is necessary 
to illustrate that the option of infanticide is no mere plot device on Twain’s part, but reveals the 
actual consideration (particularly when the Christian promise of heaven is taken seriously) that 
enslaved people sometimes viewed death as better than enslavement.  To kill herself in order to 
send (and accompany) her child to heaven is the ultimate sacrifice for Roxy.  As James Grove 
calls Roxy, “a life force countering the sterility and irony surrounding her,” the maternal 
devotion of this scene may well be in mind.
 152
  While Chellis chastises Roxy’s actions as akin to 
that of her masters, Porter acknowledges that “the aggression unleashed  . . . by Roxana’s plot is 
driven out of control by the horror that provokes it.”153  Put simply, for Roxy’s situation, the 
choices are limited.  Enslaved mothers were often denied the ability to perform the protective 
duties of motherhood because of the system that often denied enslaved people both freedom of 
action and access to kin from whom they were likely to be separated by either sale or death.
154
   
The figure of the enslaved mother functions in opposition to the privileged and protected 
place afforded to white feminine motherhood.  Switching her own child with that of her master, 
Roxy collapses the mammy/mother dualism, as she not only moves between, but melds the two 
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roles in her relation to both Tom and Chambers.  She cannot change roles completely, as the 
reader is always aware of the “truth” of her maternal relations, but her actions in these roles still 
have enough effect to propel the plot of Twain’s novel. The agency Roxy is afforded by this 
collapse is short-lived, as she performs the role of mammy in relation to her own son.  While 
feelings of biological kinship drive Roxy to switch the babies, her behavior of both kinship and 
racial relations keeps the respective children in their places.  The boys grow up, and Roxy raises 
them in accordance with these new relations of race and kinship, with predictable results. Her 
son becomes the haughty young man who believes he will be the future master of the plantation, 
and the master’s child becomes a man who anticipates his own lifelong enslavement.  
The relationship between Roxy and her biological son is, until the revelation of his true 
identity, no longer a mother-child relation, but one of mammy and child/master.  Twain collapses 
the relation between mother and mammy in the text, though, as we read further about Roxy’s 
adoption of the role of mammy to her own child: “He was her darling, her master, and her deity, 
all in one, and in her worship of him she forgot who she was and what he had been” (21).  The 
narrative almost forgets this, too, as the problem of referring to the two boys presents a problem 
for the omniscient narrator whose reader is in on the secret, so to speak, but whose characters 
remain ignorant of Roxy’s switch. At the outset, Roxy’s performance as both mother and 
mammy in forming the children’s newly-raced roles is also enacted by Twain’s narrator, who 
acknowledges the problem in naming the children. This problem of naming is initially solved in 
chapter four, as the narrator declares “This history must henceforth accommodate itself to the 
change which Roxana has consummated, and call the real heir “Chambers” and the usurping 
little slave “Thomas à Becket” – shortening this latter name to “Tom,” for daily use, as the 
people about him did” (18-19). As “this history” correspondingly switches the boys’ names to 
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reflect their assumed roles rather than their original identities, Twain’s narrator is willing to 
maintain the performance of identity, just as Roxy does and the boys (who do not even realize 
that they are performing race) do. The switch is so convincing, then, that even the narration must 
acknowledge it – as, of course, must Roxy. What Roxy sacrifices in this reassignment of 
identities is any affective attachment she might elicit from her own son. While Roxy’s 
relationship with the young man now known as “Chambers” is seldom shown in Twain’s novel, 
we see her relationship with “Tom” degraded from one of child and mother to that of master and 
slave.  
In some of the story’s most disturbing scenes, we see the new-christened “Tom” beat 
Roxy – the woman who is really his biological mother. Ultimately, he sells her “down the river” 
just as she is enacting yet another motherly sacrifice by offering herself up to be sold (though she 
has legally gained her freedom by this point in the story) in order to preserve his white 
inheritance.  What might be most disturbing about these scenes is that they may not elicit the 
same horror from the reader were it not for our knowledge of Roxy’s biological relation to the 
grown man now known as “Tom.” Myra Jehlen presents this as a shift in the text, “where the 
injustice if racial inequality was first measured by the violation of Roxy’s natural motherhood, 
now inequality will be justified by the spectacle of the emancipated and empowered Tom’s 
unnatural sonhood.”155  This “unnatural sonhood” is reversed, however, as Roxy uses her 
knowledge of “Tom’s” true birth to extract the support that he  initially denies her.  If Roxy 
cannot get “Tom’s” support by appealing to his affection for his “mammy,” she will get it by 
blackmailing him with the truth that she is his biological mother.
156
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 Roxy’s position as mother might be viewed not simply as another imitation of the 
master, then, but as an enactment of maternity. As the white matrons are rather quickly dispensed 
with or pushed to the fringes of Twain’s story (we almost forget that Tom Driscoll’s Aunt Pratt 
is still alive, until she sends the telegram informing him of his uncle’s death), Roxy is doubly 
correct in stating that this “Tom” “hadn’t no mother but me in de whole worl’” (43).  Even in 
conversation with “Chambers” does Roxy prioritize her relationship with the other boy, invoking 
her position as Tom’s mammy, but without revealing to the man who believes himself to be her 
son the truth of his birth.  It is in this role as mammy, and not with the truth of her biological 
motherhood, that Roxy presents herself as someone who has a right to know the details of 
“Tom’s” business, asking “Was I his mother tell he was fifteen years old, or wusn’t I?” (39). 
However, when Roxy initially attempts to gain “Tom’s” sympathy by virtue of her position as 
mammy (though not as mother), she fails.  It is only after he recognizes her position as his own 
biological mother (simultaneously realizing the power she holds over him in the danger he faces 
were she to reveal that relation) that “Tom” submits to the role of a dutiful child.   
The confusing identities of the two boys, and their relation to Roxy, continues to present 
a problem for the narration’s representation of the text’s kinship relations, even after the 
convenient name changes the narration enacts. While still calling the real Chambers “Tom” even 
after he knows the fact of his birth, the text now refers to Roxy as “his mother” (45). 157  These 
two moves, (the naming and the kinship relation in “Tom” and “his mother”) should, logically, 
be mutually exclusive in the text.  The fact that they are not suggests the story’s 
acknowledgement of the conflation of the mother and mammy roles that Roxy enacts.  The 
excess of names and roles in the text is too much for the narration itself to support.  In this way, 
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Pudd’nhead Wilson represents the difficulty of dealing with the overabundance of names and 
identities and Roxy’s role as both mother and mammy.  As “Tom” continues to call Roxy by the 
more ambiguous appellation, “mammy,” rather than “Ma,” we see how Roxy’s biological 
motherhood, even when recognized, is never completely free from her role of mammy.  
Likewise, her role as the dutifully mammy to “Tom” is complicated by her knowledge that this 
child is not the progeny of her masters’ family, but her own biological son. 
The synchronous existence of “Tom” and “his mother” in the text is, on one level, an 
assertion of Roxy’s underlying motherhood.  As she is about to voluntarily allow herself be sold 
again into slavery for “Tom’s” benefit, she asserts that her motherhood is just as valid as a white 
woman’s.  She asks him, “Ain’t you my chile? Em does you know anything dad a mother won’t 
do for her chile?  Dey ain’t nothin’ a white mother won’t do for her chile.  Who made ‘em so?  
De Lord done it. En who made de niggers?  De Lord made ‘em. In de inside, mothers is all de 
same. De good Lord made ‘em so” (86).  Complicating this act of universal motherhood (“In de 
inside, mothers is all de same”) is the fact that, as Mark Patterson recognizes, “A ‘white’ mother 
. . . could not sell herself into slavery.”158  Roxy’s particular sacrifice, then, is reserved for the 
figure of the African American mother.  More than justifying the inclusion of black mothers in a 
realm of universal motherhood, her particular expression of maternity does not transcend Roxy’s 
legal blackness, but depends upon it.  
Patterson explains Roxy’s role as mammy – as “surrogate” or “adoptive” mother to 
“Tom” in a system that does not allow for “the equality of maternity.”159  The text, however, 
does not seem so sure of this division between Roxy’s maternal roles.  The narration’s switch in 
naming is itself confusing, emphasizing the precarious nature of these identifications, and calling 
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to the reader’s attention Roxy’s role in enacting these shifts through her own acknowledgement 
of kinship with the two children. From the complex and prominent relationship between “Tom” 
and Roxy, a reader might expect an equally complex parallel in Roxy’s relation to “Chambers,” 
the child who is really the child of her master, but is in the position of her own son.  The rather 
conspicuous disappearance and reappearance of “Chambers” is one of the text’s many oddities.  
By switching the babies, Roxy attempts to privilege her own son, while condemning her master’s 
heir to slavery, but whatever mother-child relationship that the new “Chambers” might have 
gained as a result of this switch seems to have been lost. As Roxy disinherits the original Tom 
Driscoll, she does so twice – by ultimately disinheriting the child who believes her to be his 
mother from that kinship relation, as well.  An extension of this discussion might take into 
account the presence (and absence) of “Chambers” in this story, in his partially-articulated 
kinship relations to both Roxy and “Tom,” as well as his final position as a “white” man who 
was raised as a slave, which becomes Twain’s revision of the familiar “tragic mulatto” trope, 
rendered more complex because Roxy, herself, does not fit neatly into this role. 
The story’s close turns to the science of individualism rather than that of race to restore 
the identities of Valet de Chambres and Thomas Driscoll.  In Pudd’nhead Wilson’s courtroom 
evidence of the children’s fingerprints, the question of racial identity becomes one of name and 
of individual identity, but importantly not one of race or kinship.  Neither man is proven to be 
“white” or “black” by this evidence, nor is Roxy’s maternity clearly identified. Rather, the 
altered fingerprint records, alone, indicate that a change has been made, and Roxy is identified 
not maternally but circumstantially – as the only person in a position to have made the switch.  
This science of fingerprinting stands in as a science of individual identity against popular 
theories of scientific racism by which “negroes” and other races are “proven” inferior to whites 
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throughout the mid-to-late nineteenth century.
160
  The scientific courtroom-drama ending of 
Pudd’nhead Wilson is essential; the detective story plot is no more separable from the racial 
melodrama of the story than are Twain’s (conjoined?) twins.161  And David “Pudd’nhead” 
Wilson is, after all, the titular character.
162
  Perhaps what makes the tale so tragic is how close 
Pudd’nhead (who must understand the implications of the justice he enacts) brings it to 
remaining a farce.
163
  Twain’s ambiguous ending leaves “Tom,” Roxy’s biological child, “sold 
down the river” as punishment for his crimes, and restores “Chambers” to his original position as 
white, slaveholding master.  “Tom’s” story proves equally tragic to that of “Chambers’s” 
inability to fit into either white or black society, as it falls short of condemning the system of 
Southern plantation slavery. 
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By centralizing Pudd’nhead Wilson as the person Twain’s tale is ostensibly “about,” 
Roxy and her role are shifted to the background of some (if not most) discussions of the novel.
164
 
James Cox notes the dual role of Roxy and “Pudd’nhead” Wilson in identifying “Tom,” as he 
emerges “almost as if they were his parents,” and also notes a somewhat fraternal relationship 
between Pudd’nhead and “Tom,” through their filial relation to Judge Driscoll.165 This reading 
assumes the necessity of a father, which Roxy’s child, of course, does not have. As Roxy is the 
person the text most clearly identifies as either child’s parent, we might rather imagine a fraternal 
relationship between Tom and Chambers, triangulated through their relationship to her, or as 
nineteenth-century topsy-turvy dolls.
166
   
Literary discussions of the twins, Angelo and Luigi, in Pudd’nhead Wilson generally 
have taken the author’s explanation of the “literary Caesarean operation” by which he has 
extracted the one tale from the other for granted (125). But what this backdrop of twins and 
twinning leaves in the text is a clear counter-relationship for Roxy’s nearly-twin boys. If we take 
seriously the claim that Those Extraordinary Twins is a metanarrative for Pudd’nhead Wilson, 
another version of national romance, the tale of racialized “twinning” does not result in anything 
resembling fraternity.
 167
  Although Wallace-Sanders notes that “they share a birthday and a 
mother, which, in effect, makes them twins,” this narrative of the interracial national family 
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(unlike that in Alcott’s “The Brothers”) can only be constructed triangularly – through Roxy, the 
mother/mammy (75).  Unlike positive literary renditions of African American motherhood, by 
Twain’s contemporaries Charles Chesnutt and Frances Ellen Watkins Harper, and perhaps 
reinforcing the stereotypical role of the mammy, Roxy does not have the means to create a truly 
loving kinship relation with her son, who seems to have been tainted by the system of plantation 
slavery that is painted as equally harmful to the characters of both masters and slaves.  
The story’s odd “restoration” of “Tom” to his “rightful” position as slave and the 
relegation of “Chambers” to the unhappy liminality reserved for racial ambiguity leaves no 
family for Roxy to preside over (much less a “polyglot” family of narratives of race and 
reunion). In Pudd’nhead Wilson’s tragic conclusion, essential (and legal) categories of race and 
kinship trump not only Roxy’s visible “whiteness,” but her enactment of maternity, as well, as 
Twain leaves her biological son – and hence her own motherhood – without a clear place in the 
conclusion of the novel.  The twinning of Tom and Chambers in much discussion of Pudd’nhead 
Wilson stems, in part, from this inability to place Roxy’s biological son.  His presence at the 
story’s close seems excessive, as he returns to the plot that had almost completely discarded him 
when Roxy made the change that relegated her future master to slavery.    
Roxy’s relation to this surrogate son also seems excessive, in the sense that is has been 
overdetermined.  Although we are to understand that the dutiful son, acknowledging his adopted 
relation to his Roxy despite the revelation of his biologically-construed whiteness, provided for 
her financially in her old age, we are left unsure about the nature of their relationship.  In part, 
Roxy is an inconvenient relation, the tie that relegated him to an upbringing of enslavement, but 
which cannot be cut nevertheless.  Most emphatically, we never view Roxy as a mammy to this 
grown man, though this relation most accurately describes the legality of their relation.  Nor can 
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we fully understand Roxy as this man’s mother, in a text that insists upon the prioritization of 
biological relations at its conclusion and which has chosen not to depict the details of their 
relationship.  Were it not for Roxy’s enslavement (on which the plot of the novel is, of course, 
dependent), we might be better able to parse these relationships.  In the case of Roxy as 
mammy/mother, we see how the enslavement of African American people becomes an excessive 
factor in determining their kinship relations.  My next chapter will focus on this excess content 
of enslaved kinship. 
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Chapter Five 
Kinfullness 
 
In John Anderson Collins’ 1855 poem, “The Slave-Mother,” a self-emancipated woman, 
upon being recaptured, refuses to acknowledge her infant in order to secure its freedom. If 
recognized to be hers, according to the distinctly-American law of genealogical – matriarchal – 
racialization, Partus sequitur ventrem; the child would follow the condition of the mother.
 168
 
This denial of kinship is presented as an act of profound maternal affection, then, since denying 
the mother-child relation renders the child free. In the poem we read that 
They bound her fast, but no reply 
      The torturing whip or hand-cuff wring; 
With one long, sad, despairing cry, 
      Her babe upon the ground she flung, 
And, as her heart were turned to stone, 
     With madness flashing from her eye, 
Refused the helpless one to own, 
       Or listen to its moaning cry.      
 
Fast driven on with curse and blow, 
No mercy hoping in her wo, 
One thought alone can give her rest, 
And soothe a mother’s aching breast; 
Better, her nature to deny, 
Than that loved child in slavery die.  
 
According to the poem, it is the unnatural despair created by slavery that causes the enslaved 
mother to best serve her child by denying her own maternal nature.  
The situation reveals the peculiar condition of the enslaved mother, whose relation to her 
children determines their status as slaves. When asked if the child is her own, she states, “I have 
no child! this stranger one/Belongs to freedom—not to me,” re-working legalized notions of 
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enslavement and belonging. The mother’s exceptional devotion to her child is ultimately repaid 
when a judge deems both the child and herself free, because the slave-catcher cannot prove 
ownership. The mother’s sacrificial refusal of kinship is not lost on the judge, however, as he 
proclaims, “This childless mother?—Let her go!” (11). The irony of the phrase “childless 
mother”  acknowledges the legal kinlessness of enslavement – the mother who cannot 
acknowledge a child because the child does not “belong” to her – as well as the voluntary state of 
“childlessness” that this woman assumes in the attempt to free her child.169   
However, the experience of the enslaved mother cannot be fully explained by the state of 
“kinlessness” that Hortense Spillers uses to describe the state of enslaved African American 
families.  When notions of “belonging” are manifest in the triumph of property over kinship, the 
poem’s “slave-mother” and child might be better characterized as an excess of kinship – 
kinfullness, rather than kinlessness. While Spillers uses kinlessness to articulate the denial of 
enslaved people from recognizing or participating fully in kinship relations, as kinlessness 
denotes a lessening or an evacuation of kin, kinfullness attends to the additional content of 
racialized kinship relations.  In the case of this poem, kinfullness does not indicate that the 
mother’s kinship is excessive, (just as kinlessness does not indicate an actual lack of biological 
kinfolk) but that her kinship has been filled with the excess content of inherited enslavement. 
Because the enslaved mother’s ironic position as a “childless mother” does not erase but 
reinscribes that kinship relation, her act of refusing to acknowledge that relation which would 
enslave her child is ultimately rewarded in the poem: both she and child are freed at the poem’s 
close, and are therefore able to experience the “natural” relation between mother and child, 
unencumbered by the excess juridical content of inherited enslavement.  
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The mother’s logic lies in her realization that her own kinship relation is the lynchpin that 
connects enslaved black bodies with the biological reproduction of slavery. Recognizing this 
does not merely render her kinship a burden – the enslaved woman is not merely disempowered 
here – but realizes her ability to free her child by refusing to recognize the maternal (i.e., legal) 
relation. Kinfullness stands as an alternative to kinlessness, addressing how the texts discussed 
deal with the relations of enslaved motherhood – a representation of racialized maternity that is 
abundant with various, sometimes conflicting, notions of kinship.  
The excess content of kinfullness shows that the enslaved woman cannot be a “childless 
mother” other than under the peculiar legal auspices of slavery. As in this poem, the most iconic 
figure of the enslaved black woman is also represented as a “childless mother” – a mammy, 
charged with the task of mothering the white, free children of the slaveholder, but with no legal 
parental claim to her own. The enslaved mother’s denial of maternity to her own child in the 
poem does not negate maternal affection, but refuses the legal reproduction of enslavement that 
has the potential to render the mother-child relation as a matter of material increase rather than a 
familial bond.
 170
  In Collins’ poem, black motherhood is perfected in the selfless relation to the 
black child – an admittedly problematic relation in which maternity is best enacted when it is 
denied. Despite its problems, this abolitionist text works against the idealized image of the black 
mammy who is not characterized by her relation to her own children, but rather, by her relation 
to white children.  
“Kinfullness” speaks to the concerns (or anxieties) that come to bear upon kinship 
choices: what kinship relations might be produced by sexual couplings, or created in domestic 
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spaces of family, and which kinship relations are recognized or denied in genealogies that also 
racialize.  This chapter therefore focuses on texts in which characters’ racial identifications affect 
how they construe kinship relations, and vice versa, extending previous chapters’ conversations 
about interracial sexual kinship to re-theorize the relationship between race and family.  First, I 
will examine more closely assumptions behind the concept of “interracial” desire, which, as has 
been shown in previous chapters, serves not only to racially-mark white women participants, but 
which is – in these heteronormative constructions – always implicated in the futurity of 
reproducing racially-mixed people.  Readings of Louisa May Alcott’s “M.L.” (1863) and Kate 
Chopin’s “Desireé’s Baby” (1893) treat the role of “interracial” sexual desire and desirability as 
contributing to a narrative of interracial heterosexuality, in which the concept of desire extends 
beyond its individual agents to notions of racially-reproductive futurity which have implications 
for a racialized national family.   
At stake in stories like these is the preservation of white womanhood, itself – both 
biologically and rhetorically conceived – in the threat of interracial sex creating racially-mixed 
children.  From this discussion of interracial desire, I turn to Frances Ellen Watkins Harper’s Iola 
Leroy, or Shadows Uplifted (1892) and its presentation of the mother as the central kinship 
relation by which racial identity is determined and embraced. While representing racially-mixed 
characters who choose to identify with black, enslaved, mothers rather than white, free, fathers, 
the text still – problematically – prioritizes biological kinship relations.  Last, I will discuss the 
emergent “New Maternal Negro” of Chesnutt’s The Marrow of Tradition (1901), which appeals 
to universal motherhood while still struggling with the familial and national drama of interracial 
kinship.  
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Matters of Taste?: “White” Women and the Futurity of Interracial Desire  
During the 1858 political campaign season, Democrats in Indiana played-up concerns 
that Republicans were “amalgamationists” in a demonstration involving young white women in 
white dresses carrying banners that read “Fathers, save us from nigger husbands!”171 Apart from 
the assumption that white women are universally desirable and therefore the potential objects of 
sexual desire for black men, this rhetoric also assumes that white women are not subjects capable 
of desiring black men, and therefore must be “saved” from interracial sexual encounters that 
were categorized definitively as rapes.  This understanding of white women designates 
whiteness, as Elise Lemire explains, as “an identity people can only claim if they have certain 
sexual race preferences.”172  A matter of sexual preference or “taste,” then, also works to 
racialize these subjects.  Both the “blackening” of Desdemona and the re-figuring of Mary King 
as a mixed-race heroine work against this notion of racialization, positioning the “white” women 
in these stories somehow “beyond the pale” of whiteness, as a result of their interracial sexual 
desire.  More simply put, this desire is set apart because it does not seek to preserve racial 
segregation, separation, or “purity.”   
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The beginning of this chapter deals with the questions that arise when we examine white 
women’s sexual desire as racialized.  What constitutes “interracial” desire?  What assumptions 
does a notion of racialized desire maintain?  What are its implications for desiring subjects?  And 
further, what are the implications of “interracial” desire for racial categories, themselves?  This 
concept of racially-located sexual desire I want to discuss is loaded.  For the majority of 
nineteenth-century texts, interracial sexual desire is always a heterosexual desire, oriented 
toward biological reproductive futurity.  It is therefore implicated in reproducing race (and 
reproducing the American nation), and the anxieties that surround “interracial” desire are not 
only about racial integration, but racial mixture in “amalgamated” bodies.  This overdetermined 
positioning of desire must be taken into account when examining white racist discourses against 
“amalgamation” and the limits of “pro-amalgamation” literatures if we are to fully understand 
the potential (or maybe the necessary) consequences of this desire: the reproduction of race.  
Nineteenth-century discussions of interracial sexual relations evidence contradictory 
assumptions about white feminine “nature” in their imaginings of white women’s capacity for 
interracial desire.  In their most visible form, these discussions attempt to deny the existence of 
voluntary sexual kinship relations, occluding the possibility of white feminine desire for the 
racial Other.  Differences in these assumptions about white feminine desire lie at the heart of 
claims for Desdemona’s “bewitchment” by Othello and Mary King’s “corruption” by 
abolitionists.  In her Appeal in Favor of Americans Called Africans, Lydia Maria Child questions 
white racist assumptions about a general “repugnance between the two races, founded in the laws 
of nature,” citing the existence of “interracial” desire as proof that such desire not “unnatural,” 
but dependent upon individual inclinations (200).  Characterizing interracial desire instead as a 
“matter of taste,” Child individualizes the notion of desire in a way that this racist rhetoric 
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cannot.  While the most profound anxieties about amalgamation lie in larger implications for the 
racially-construed nation, narratives of interracial romance such as William Allen and Mary 
King’s often focus on individual concerns and rights, displacing the more expansive logic of 
racist amalgamation anxieties.   
In this way, the narrow scope of “interracial” desire in such narratives indicates the 
limitations of these individualistic accounts for challenging the larger implications that lie at the 
foundation of racist discourse.  However, addressing interracial desire only as a matter of taste 
serves as an insufficient response to the racist logic that attends to larger implications for the 
future of the white race and the nation.  The particular place of interracial desire in 
amalgamationist literatures is essential for the more radical potential for antiracism and an 
antiracist futurity that speaks to the place of amalgamation in the American nation.  Examining 
when such desire is permissible and when it is denied indicates the limits and potential of these 
stories to work against racist models of national futurity.  The seemingly-slight differences 
between William Allen’s narrative and Louisa May Alcott’s loosely-related story, “M.L.” 
illustrate this point, in their different locations of and allowances for “interracial” desire.  While 
Sarah Elbert presents the connections between these two stories and argues that Alcott’s is based 
on her knowledge of Allen and King’s case, a fundamental difference exists between the two 
narratives.  This lies in the fact that Alcott stops short of fully acknowledging the possibility of a 
white woman’s fully-informed interracial desire.  This difference is central to understanding 
Alcott’s story and its limitations.173   
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In “M.L.”, the rich and beautiful, but kinless Claudia falls in love with the musical, noble 
Paul Frere.  The couple is happily engaged, when the jealous Jessie Snowden discovers part of a 
letter Paul had written but could not bring himself to send to Claudia, revealing his history as the 
son of a wealthy Spanish planter and an enslaved “quadroon” woman.  After his father’s death, 
Paul was separated from his half-sister Nathalie and sold with the estate, to suffer in slavery until 
he escaped and appealed to his now-wealthy, married sister, who purchased him and gave him 
the financial assistance necessary to start a new life as a free man.  Although she is surprised at 
Paul’s revelation, Claudia remains determined in her devotion to him, and the couple is married 
– against the advice of Claudia’s many friends.  The story closes with a narrative of a happy 
couple, with Paul gaining both kin and country through his marriage to Claudia, and Claudia’s 
former life of frivolity now replaced with new Christian meaning and substance in antiracism.  
The “interracial” couple is triumphant at the story’s close, and Claudia’s commitment to Paul re-
casts her familiar model of white Christian feminine virtue in beliefs that support interracial 
marriage.  Alcott’s revision of the virtuous white woman is not dependent on her preservation of 
racial “purity,” but in her ability to incorporate the non-white Paul into her own structure of 
family, which serves as a microcosm of racially-integrated national and Christian community. 
Although the ultimate antiracist message of Alcott’s story is quite clear, Claudia’s early 
love for Paul is predicated on her initial ignorance of his racial difference, which distinguishes 
her ultimate desire to continue her relationship with him from Mary King’s initial entry into an 
interracial relationship with Allen, having full knowledge of the probable opposition they would 
face.  Sarah Elbert argues that “Claudia’s romantic love for Paul becomes ‘true love,’ in 
nineteenth-century feminist parlance, precisely as her racial identity (whiteness) is challenged,” 
that is, her own whiteness – socially constructed – is deconstructed through this allowing for 
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“interracial” sexual desire. 174  However, as Elbert also recognizes, “her wealth, beauty, and 
‘whiteness,’ . . . ensure that she is a voluntary outcast, and therefore her privilege remains 
intact.”175   
Claudia differs from Mary King in her position as “voluntary outcast” by virtue of the 
choice that Alcott forgoes for her heroine – that which allows the “white” woman’s desire to be 
directed toward a man who is already known to be “black.”   Interracial sexual desire is diverted 
in Alcott’s story, as the desire that preexists knowledge of racial difference fails to refigure white 
womanhood at its origins.  Because her connection to Paul is already established, it need only be 
continued – a somewhat easier matter for the narrative in that it does not need to account for 
Claudia’s desire for a “black” man. Claudia’s desire is both explained and mitigated by the fact 
of Paul’s visual whiteness.  Instead of initiating a kinship relation that is known to be 
“interracial,” Alcott’s story only asks that Claudia perpetuate a pre-existing promise of love and 
marriage.  She does not offer Paul her love in the text, but simply refuses to take back that 
declaration on the basis of her new knowledge of his race.  In some respects, the story begins in a 
position unable to prohibit interracial desire.   It has already occurred; no “natural” forces repel 
Claudia from Paul, and the desire that has already been expressed cannot be undone.   
If we take this initial desire as a potential relation of kinship – a relation of potentiality 
that cannot be broken once desire has been articulated – Claudia and Paul’s story resembles even 
more closely the narrative of interracial sibling kinship, between Paul and Nathalie.  Paul and 
Claudia’s relationship is, at its outset, structured similarly to his relationship to his half-sister, 
Nathalie.  Unable or unwilling to deny her connection to Paul, Nathalie goes so far as to take 
responsibility for her brother when he arrives on her balcony asking for her help.  She asks him, 
                                                 
174
 Sarah Elbert. Louisa May Alcott on Race, Sex, and Slavery. (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1997), xl. 
175
 Elbert, Louisa May Alcott on Race, xl.  
 161 
 
“‘Who should help you if not I?’” (142).176  In this, Nathalie serves as a model of true 
womanhood, which precedes Claudia’s and structures Paul’s relationships with all (white) 
women.  His “reverence for womanhood” (126) stems from this fraternal encounter that causes 
him to look on all (white) women as a brother would.  He tells Claudia, “Since then, in every 
little maid, I see the child who loved me when a boy, in every blooming girl, the Nathalie who 
saved me when a man, in every woman, high or low, the semblance of my truest friend, and do 
them honor in my sister’s name” (142-143).  One might ask whether Nathalie’s relationship to 
Paul renders her “less white” or, at least, more proximate to blackness via this relation.  
Although Nathalie and Paul’s kinship is mediated by a white relative (their father), Paul’s 
reverence for Nathalie lies in the fact that she could have denied her own kinship with him, but 
has instead chosen to acknowledge it.   
However, recognizing a mixed-race brother may be less scandalous than accepting a 
mixed-race lover.  It is significant that this sibling relationship mediates the romantic one 
between Paul and Claudia, as Paul requires from Claudia not a lover’s passion, but a sister’s pity 
as he pleas “give your abhorrence to the man who dared to love you, but bestow a little pity on 
the desolate boy you never knew” (141).  Claudia’s elevation depends upon the story’s 
comparison of the two women: as Nathalie was Paul’s “angel of deliverance,” (142) Claudia 
becomes his “strong sweet angel” (144).  The recognition of Paul as kin seems accessible to 
these women, in part, because figuring them as “angels” dismisses any sense of racial 
contamination resulting from this kinship.  In this configuration of “angelic” compassion, their 
kinship is rendered abstract; it is a kinship more humanistic than biological, more along the lines 
of figuring a national, rather than a nuclear, family.   
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Paul’s position as universal Brother (read also in his name, Paul Frere,) permeates the 
text as the couple’s “interracial” marriage stands in for other forms of interracial national family.  
Through his marriage, we find that “Paul was no longer friendless and without a home, for here 
he found a country, and a welcome to that brotherhood which makes the whole world kin” (152).  
Here we do not only read Paul as Claudia’s individual lover, but as universal brother to the white 
American nation – a nation that must acknowledge its own history of interracial kinship.  Paul’s 
relation to his white sister (and assumedly his white wife) as “her proud protector” and “her 
willing servitor,” indicates that he does not pose the usual “threat” of overly-sexualized black 
masculinity (140).  In his marriage to the kinless Claudia, Paul is positioned to take the place of 
the father and brother she never knew.  That Paul’s own father crossed racial boundaries in his 
own sexual relations is not insignificant: Paul embodies this boundary-crossing, and his own 
sexuality is not bounded by notions of racial containment.   
Still, the more potentially radical reading of Alcott’s story lies not in the interracial 
romance plot, but in this reading and its suggestion of American (inter)racial (re)union.  What is 
most salient here is what remains unsaid, and what the characterization of Claudia-as-angel 
might allow readers to forget: the fact that interracial marriage (like other marriage in the 
nineteenth century) is likely to produce mixed-race people.  Presented as a narrative of interracial 
brotherhood, the amalgamation narrative is replaced by a somewhat “safer” one of integration.177  
In Kate Chopin’s “Désirée’s  Baby” this embodiment of racial difference functions 
differently – as a racial misrecognition: as Désirée’s  child comes to be perceived as visibly 
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black, the assumption her husband, Armand, makes is not that she has been unfaithful, but that 
Désirée, being of unknown parentage, must be racially mixed, herself.
 178
  Neither of these is 
necessarily the case, of course.  Ironically, at the story’s end, we learn that Armand is the one 
with known black ancestry, though hidden from him by his Creole father and mixed-race mother.  
Still, the racial figuring of Désirée – a figuring dependent upon the emerging “blackness” of her 
baby – has already taken effect. 
Though Désirée turns out not necessarily to be a mixed-race heroine by the end of 
Chopin’s story, she still functions as one.179  In truth, neither the characters nor the reader know 
whether Désirée  is racially-mixed or not.  The story leaves her race ambiguous, though her 
motherhood of a racially “black” child leads her husband to figure her own race accordingly.  
That Armand figures incorrectly is almost beside the point with regard to Désirée and her baby’s 
place in the narrative.  We might as well assume that they both remain “black,” permanently cast 
out of the husband/father’s house because of this supposed racial difference, as Armand is 
unlikely to reveal the truth he has discovered about his own family’s racial history.   
That both woman and child can be racially re-figured – even as Armand’s race is 
refigured for the reader – is illustrative of the slippery business of racialization, particularly for 
women who have the potential to be racially “marked” by the racialization of their children.  The 
result is an effective reversal of racial transfer from Désirée’s baby to Désirée, rather than the 
other way around. This shows how the production of “amalgamated” children has implications 
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even for racially-defined parents, especially the mothers who are held responsible for 
(re)producing race.  We’ve see these implications in Mary Jemison’s concern for her children, 
rather than herself, given the prospect of discrimination if she were to return to white society. 
Désirée’s baby indicates the futuristic concerns of amalgamation, as the racial recognition of his 
parents is dependent upon his own interracial embodiment.  Not even the “diluting” of race in 
visibly-white couplings can prevent the possibility of (inter)racial return in the visible mixture of 
the child.  The child’s implications for Désirée and its challenges to Armand’s “white” Creole 
identity also point to a national future of racial mixture and ambiguity. 
Ultimately, the “matters of taste” in Alcott’s and Chopin’s stories of “amalgamation” 
extend beyond the individual participants in these “interracial” relationships, toward a larger 
narrative of national racial mixture and national racial anxieties.  Like the “begriming” of 
Desdemona in minstrel depictions of Othello and the refigured racialization of Mary King 
alongside the mixed-race heroines of abolitionist fiction, the projection of interracial kinship 
relations toward a national futurity in these narratives extends the white women characters 
beyond normative rhetorics of white womanhood.  Just as Blackface Desdemona refigures the 
white heroine in the minstrel genre and Mary King is refigured as mixed-race heroine, Claudia 
Frere, Faith Dane, and Désirée Aubigny emerge in genres not of individual romance, but of 
national racial reunion.  Because the “interracial” kinship relations of these women are oriented 
toward a future of racial intermixture rather than the preservation of whiteness, their narratives 
more closely resemble that of the mixed-race heroine than of the white woman who must be 
protected from the prospect of interracial sex.   
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Racial Identification and Iola Leroy’s “Condition of the Mother”     
 The effects of racial malleability as determined by kinship relations can be seen in 
Frances Harper’s anti-passing narrative, Iola Leroy, or Shadows Uplifted. 180 In the early 
chronology of Iola Leroy’s title character, we read a familiar story, in the well-established 
tradition of “tragic mulatta” narratives: The young Iola, raised as the white, privileged daughter 
of a Southern planter and his wife, and educated in the North, has no knowledge of the “black 
blood” apparently flowing through her veins; and she holds no real means for identifying herself 
with the “black” race of people who she knows only as servants.  She can hardly anticipate the 
chain of events that are, however, unsurprising to Harper’s readers: her father will die 
unexpectedly, her mother’s manumission will be found faulty and their marriage determined 
illegitimate, their children will be listed among the “property” of the estate, and the sad fate of 
Iola and her brother Harry is to be sold by the unsympathetic relatives of their father. 
Before these revelations, Iola is able to see the “value” of her own apparent whiteness, as 
she tells her already-anxious mother “that she would hate to be colored” while discussing the 
persecution of a fellow-student who was found to be “passing” for white.181 While she is not 
entirely unsympathetic to the condition of African Americans in her antebellum setting, it is not 
until the revelation of her own inherited “race” that transforms this sympathy into greater 
feelings of identification and kinship with black people. Ultimately, Iola’s search for her mother 
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– who she now knows to have been enslaved and passing for white – results in both Iola and 
Harry choosing to identify with their mother’s race – as black people. 
Even as Iola Leroy re-writes the trope of the “tragic mulatta” as the central figure of an 
anti-passing narrative, it falls into the familiar trap of racial essentialism.
182
 “Passing” by 
definition, assumes a fixed starting point of racial identification. Characters who are “really” 
black (due to various imagined quantities of “black blood”) struggle with the possibility of 
“passing” for – but never being – white.  Harper frames Iola Leroy’s anti-passing narrative in 
terms of racial recognition, which emerges as function of her characters’ recognition of their 
African American kinship ties. What Harper illustrates here is a different form of kinfullness 
than “The Slave Mother”: It presents not as the legal excess of racialized kinship, but as a literal 
excess of kinfolk. The mixed-race heroine’s condition of kinfullness manifests itself in 
overabundance of kinship relations, as the conflicting “white” and “black” family members 
suggest potentially-conflicting racial affiliations.  Put another way, kinship relations that are 
initially conceived along the lines of what Nancy Bentley calls “bare genealogy” are 
reconfigured along lines that couple biological relatedness and shared racial identification, via a 
racialized, (and here necessarily maternal) kinship.
183
 That is, mixed race characters, even if they 
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might “pass” for white, choose to identify with their enslaved mothers, rather than slaveholding 
fathers. 
In what must have appeared to Harper’s post-Reconstruction readers as a familiar defense 
of slavery, the visibly-white and still unknowing Iola Leroy’s initial anti-abolitionism is based on 
the picture of her own slaveholding father as a “kind” master. Now removed to the North for her 
education, in true plantation nostalgia form Iola recalls her youth and the close relations between 
the families of white masters and enslaved people on the plantation where she was raised.
184
 Iola 
claims, “I love my mammy as much as I do my own mother, and I believe she loves us just as if 
we were her own children” (97). Once Iola Leroy has learned the truth of her biological mother’s 
(and hence, her own) legal blackness, though, this claim is exposed as dubious; much of the rest 
of Iola’s story focuses on her persistent search for and reunion with her biological mother and is 
accompanied by her corresponding forgetting of “Mam Liza,” whom Iola never seeks out, and 
the fond memory of whom almost disappears from her story.
185
   
Biological ties are necessary, then, even if not sufficient for determining kinship 
relations. Like Iola, enslaved or formerly-enslaved characters in the novel come to ignore certain 
biological kinship ties – i.e., those between masters and slaves – and to articulate kinship, 
instead, along lines of shared racial identification rather than biological genealogy, alone. 
Throughout Iola Leroy, race is determined by which kinship relations are acknowledged and 
which are rejected or forgotten, and the figure of the (black) mother lies at the center of both 
recognizing kinship and articulating race for Harper’s characters. That her hope of reconciliation 
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with her mother has “colored” Iola Leroy’s life is a telling metaphor for the rest of the story, in 
which this relationship binds biological, maternal kinship and an admittedly-biological 
conception of race (118). In this way, the novel illustrates the “social efficacy” that Spillers tells 
us is denied in slavery.
186
 
To emphasize the persistent importance of biological kinship to the text, we need only 
recognize that it is decidedly not her relationship with “Mam Liza” which has colored Iola’s life, 
as she (along with Harper’s other characters), prioritizes biological kinship relations – and, 
specifically, kinship with her mother – as formative of her racial identity. Given Iola’s previous 
declaration of affection for her “black” mammy, the choice to seek out one woman and not the 
other seems at least somewhat arbitrary. However, the only other time readers are reminded of 
Mam Liza is when Aunt Linda’s “motherly” manner “seemed to recall the bright, sunshiny days 
when [Iola] used to nestle in Mam Liza’s arms, in her own happy home” (169). Importantly, the 
dialect-speaking, illiterate Aunt Linda does not remind Iola of her biological mother. Geoffrey 
Sanborn remarks, “She chooses to be black and to perform race work in large part because of 
certain particular affections that are beyond rational explanation,” but this “rational explanation” 
might simply be the prioritization of biological, maternal genealogy.
 187
 This leaves Iola’s later 
reminiscence as rather curious amidst the novel’s prioritization of (immediate) biological kinship 
ties (grandmother, mother, uncle, and brother) rather than the “support system” of non-
biologically-related but similarly-raced and enslaved people, as only immediate biological kin 
constitute Iola’s familial obligations. Harper’s emphasis on motherhood highlights the mother-
child relationship as primary to the novel’s aspirations for racial determinacy and uplift.  
                                                 
186
 Spillers, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe,” 75. 
187
 Sanborn, “Mother’s Milk,” 708. 
 169 
 
This focus on the child-mother relation in Iola Leroy is emphatic, and can be evidenced 
in both Iola’s search for her mother following the Civil War and in her maternal Uncle Robert’s 
similar search for his mother, Iola’s grandmother.  In truth, Harper’s own motherhood is 
foregrounded in her dedication of the novel to her own daughter, Mary E. Harper.  In its 
nostalgic look at antebellum plantation life, to a generation born before the advent of the Civil 
War, the novel’s opening chapters recall the violence that chattel slavery has done to the 
enslaved family.  After the war, we find members of these rendered families in a religious camp 
meeting. “In that meeting were remnants of broken families—mothers who had been separated 
from their children before the war, husbands who had not met their wives for years” (179).  
The most poignant depiction of these separations is that between an enslaved mother and 
child. Alongside the various tales of grown children longing for their lost mothers, the scene of 
initial parting is presented by an older, dark-skinned emancipated woman named Harriet, who 
we learn is Robert’s mother and Iola and Harry’s maternal grandmother. Harriet gives witness to 
this event in what is both one of the most familiar and one of the most heart-wrenching scenes of 
Harper’s novel:  
Bredren an’ sisters, it war a drefful time when I war tored away from my pore little 
chillen . . . When my little girl . .. took hole ob my dress an’ begged me to let her go wid 
me, an’ I couldn’t do it, it mos’ broke my heart. I had a little boy, an’ wen my mistus sole 
me she kep’ him . . . Many’s the time I hab stole out at night an’ seen dat chile an’ 
sleep’d wid him in my arms tell mos’ day. Bimeby de people I libed wid got hard up fer 
money, an’ dey sole me one way an’ my pore little gal de oder; an’ I neber layed eyes on 
my pore chillen sence den. . . . But I’se prayin’ fer one thing, an I beliebs I’ll git it; an’ 
dat is dat I may see my chillen ‘fore I die.  (180)    
  
With similar emphasis on the mother-child relation, Robert’s one stated grudge against his 
otherwise “good” Mistress is the fact that she has sold his mother away from him. He tells 
another enslaved man, “Uncle” Daniel, “I ain’t got nothing ‘gainst my ole Miss, except she sold 
my mother from me. And a boy ain’t nothin’ without his mother. I forgive her, but I never forget 
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her, and never expect to. But if she were the best woman on earth I would rather have my 
freedom than belong to her” (17-18). Robert’s “except” here is indeed a great one.  It is in this 
“except” that we see biological kinship ties usurping the fiction of the plantation family that 
places white masters and mistresses in the position of patriarchs and matriarchs to supposedly-
devoted black slaves, who figure in pro-slavery discourse and white plantation nostalgia fiction 
as perpetual children.   
Robert’s reunion with his mother is equally emotional to Harriet’s story of their parting.  
Even as she is still speaking, “He found his mind riveting to the scenes of his childhood . . . 
Unbidden tears filled his eyes and great sobs shook his frame. He trembled in every limb. Could 
it be possible that after years of patient searching . . . he accidentally stumbled upon his mother – 
the mother who, long years ago, had pillowed his head upon her bosom and heft her parting kiss 
upon his lips?” (181). Although Robert “had been reared by his mistress as a favorite slave” and 
this mistress, Mrs. Nancy Johnson, “had fondled him as a pet animal, and even taught him to 
read” – and even though Harper’s narrator assures her reader that “notwithstanding their 
relations as mistress and slave, they had strong personal likings for each other” – neither a slave 
mistress’ alleged kindness nor a “strong personal liking” compares with mother-love here or 
anywhere else in the novel (7). 
 In a system in which the patriarchy (and sometimes matriarchy) of white masters 
prevents enslaved fathers and mothers from maintaining kinship ties and duties, the “black” 
mother is often framed as a rival to the white plantation mistress – particularly when the two 
women’s children are fathered by the same man. In the vein of plantation fiction which Harper 
might be most vehemently opposing (by authors such as Thomas Dixon and Thomas Nelson 
Page), enslaved – and especially, mixed-race – women appear as heartless seducers of white men 
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and dangerous usurpers of white womanhood. Authors writing against these depictions of mixed-
race women work to reveal the sexually-vulnerable position of enslaved women, whose legal 
position makes them or their female ancestors more likely to have been victims of rape than 
seducers, and emphasize a shared feminine virtue akin to that more prominently associated with 
white womanhood. This equation of respectability is particularly visible in the transfer of 
Robert’s mistress’ name to his mother in the text: the narration eventually comes to call Robert’s 
mother “Mrs. Johnson,” changing its references to his mistress, who shares this legal name, to 
“Miss Nancy.”   
While the shift of the appellation “Mrs. Johnson” from Robert’s slave-mistress to his 
biological mother indicates his ability, after emancipation, to assign his duty where his true 
affections lie, the story of Robert’s relationship with his mistress pairs his preference for 
biological kinship relations with the imagined kinship of plantation slavery. We see this in his 
encounter with Miss Nancy after the war and his reunion with his mother:  
She hardly knew how to address him. To her colored people were either boys and girls or 
“aunties and uncles.” She had never in her life addressed a colored person as “Mr. or 
Mrs.” To do so now was to violate the social customs of the place. It would be like 
learning a new language in her old age. Robert immediately set her at ease by addressing 
her under the old familiar name of “Miss Nancy.” This immediately relieved her of all 
embarrassment. She invited him into the sitting room and gave him a warm welcome.  
(151)     
 
Miss Nancy’s refusal to address Robert with the formal title of “Mr.” here is countered by the 
fact that prior to this scene (and only once in the chapters following it), Robert’s enslaver is the 
one called “Mrs. Johnson.” The narration, itself, articulates the shift of this title from the mistress 
to the mother: “‘What,’ said Mrs. Johnson, as we shall call Robert’s mother, ‘hab become ob 
Miss Nancy’s husband?  Is he still a libin’?’” (188). The formerly-enslaved characters continue 
to call the former slave-mistress “Miss Nancy,” but now the “Mrs. Johnson” that the narrative 
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has previously used to refer to the white woman is applied to her black counterpart, the woman 
who has competed with her for Robert’s affections and won. This “Mrs.” serves to establish an 
air of respectability for Robert’s mother, as the reassigning of the title “Mrs. Johnson” from his 
mistress (who never serves as a sufficient mother to Robert), to his mother represents Robert’s 
own ability to perform the duties of a son now that he is free to forsake the guise of a 
supposedly-devoted enslaved “boy.”188  
The reassignment of names, like Robert’s abandoning his mistress to search for his 
mother, couples the articulation of kinship ties between formerly-enslaved people and the 
assertion of black womanhood as both respectable and respected, on par with (if not superior to) 
white womanhood in the novel. As the narrative makes clear which Mrs. Johnson is Robert’s real 
mother, as if to avoid confusion, it strikes the other Mrs. Johnson from the text: To leave two 
Mrs. Johnsons in the novel would be excessive. It would be equally excessive to suppose that the 
faux-kinship of plantation slavery allows the white Mrs. Johnson to serve as a mother-figure to a 
man she had enslaved. 
Following the war, Miss Nancy’s economic position is such that she requires charity.  
Somewhat surprisingly, we read that “kind and generous, [Robert] often remembers Mrs. 
Johnson and sends her timely aid” in the novel’s last pages, knowing that here, this name again 
refers to his old mistress rather than his mother (280). This new position as the recipient of 
charity (including Robert’s almost over-charitable forgiveness of his former mistress) leaves this 
instance of “Mrs.” lacking its former power. With Robert reunited with his biological family, this 
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Christian charity towards the woman who once forcibly separated him from his mother and sister 
serves only to confirm him as morally superior.   
Before the war, another enslaved man, “Uncle” Ben Tunnel, claims a similar devotion to 
his mother, which causes him to remain with her rather than escape with his fellow enslaved 
brethren. Although he tells Robert that he “love[s] freedom more than a child loves its mother’s 
milk,” his comrades’ desertion to the Union army leaves him “hushing his heart’s deep 
aspirations for freedom in a passionate devotion to his timid and affectionate mother” (31).189 
We see that the condition of slavery, rather than biological relatedness, determines these 
characters’ recognition of kinship, as Ben revels that he believes his slaveholder to be his 
biological father. Recognizing no kinship ties with the man who does not acknowledge him as 
his son (and who has no legal obligation to do so), Ben’s mother becomes the determining 
kinship relation in his life, as much as she is the determining racializing relation. Enslaved, he 
follows the condition of his mother, and thereby inherits his “black” self-identification from her, 
rather than from his “white” father.190 This slave-holding father, like the “white” Mrs. Johnson, 
is an excessive kinship relation, to be discarded in favor of the shared racial identification of the 
maternal relation here. 
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Even for Harry Leroy, whose relation with his white father did not resemble that between 
master and slave, the subsequent enslavement of his mother and sister (as well as the threat of his 
own enslavement) takes precedence when he receives the news of his father’s death. Likewise, 
Iola’s racial identification now comes to be determined by her mother’s genetic ties after her 
legal/racial status is revealed. The biological kinship ties that are established and re-articulated 
throughout the narrative also function as racial ties. Significant because such ties were often 
broken through the system of plantation slavery by which people were sold regardless of 
biological family relations by preventing the performance or maintenance of kinship roles, the 
language of slavery is revisited in this system of biological kinship. “Mammy” is used as a 
designation of racialized maternity, referring not only to the “black” nurse tending the “white” 
children of her master, but as a title of affection used by both Ben Tunnel and another man, 
Salters, to refer to their biological, African-American mothers. This affectionate interchanging of 
“mother” and “mammy” contrasts sharply with the image of Iola’s forgotten Mammy Liza, who 
remains distinct from Iola’s biological mother.  
The novel offers itself as a counter to this displacement of Mammy Liza, however when 
we read remnants of another familiar designation of enslaved faux-kinship on Iola’s lips: “Uncle 
Robert,” is not a designation of imagined kinship under plantation patriarchy, but of a biological 
relation as well as an emotional tie bound by their shared memory of and love for Marie, Iola’s 
mother and Robert’s sister (205). The “uncle” figure (common to antebellum and plantation 
nostalgia fiction in popular texts like Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom and Joel Chandler 
Harris’ Uncle Remus) is here positioned alongside the story’s introduction of a biological uncle. 
The “uncles” who surround Robert at the story’s opening (i.e., “Uncle” Daniel and Uncle” Ben 
Tunnel) are re-figured as Robert is revealed to be Iola’s maternal uncle – connoting a biological 
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relation, rather than a common character of plantation slavery. In this way, Robert becomes kin 
to Iola, linking her to her lost mother and connecting her to her maternal grandmother, who she 
had never met. The ever-faithful Uncle Daniel, however, embodies a familiar stock figure in his 
devotion to his young white master. Daniel expresses a complicity with these imagined kinship 
roles, (despite the inherent violence of the power relations that seem to deny the possibility of 
genuine love between master and slave), as he claims “I used to nuss Marse Robert jes’ de same 
as ef I were his own fadder” and argues that he “beliebs [Marse Robert] lob’d me better dan any 
ob his kin’” (21, 25). Though other enslaved people are understandably suspicious of what love 
he believes “Marse Robert” to show, Daniel’s love is presented as genuine here, and for this 
honest devotion, he is rewarded. The modern reader cannot help but find herself at least a bit 
disconcerted by Daniel’s early articulations of enslaved devotion. However, he serves as an 
important referent for Harper’s emphasis on the biological kinship that has the potential to bind 
families together in shared goals of racial uplift.   
 The novel’s prioritization of biological family structures becomes clear as the biological 
relation Iola had never met before takes precedence over the more familiar mammy of her youth. 
Shared racial affiliation proves necessary, though not sufficient, for Harper’s characters’ 
understandings of kinship and belonging. The biological African American family, the heart of 
which is the mother, constitutes the center of Harper’s racial uplift novel.  Both siblings’ refusal 
to “pass” for white or to marry white people stems from the desire to remain faithful to their 
African American kin. Iola refuses the white, though upstanding and sincere Dr. Gresham’s 
proposals of marriage, citing the color line as the “insurmountable barrier” that divides them, 
even as he argues, “Your complexion is as fair as mine. What is to hinder you from sharing my 
Northern home, from having my mother be your mother?” (112, 116). While it is clear that Iola 
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cannot regard any other mother as able to fill the void hers has left, and she has experience living 
in the North as a white woman, she also cites the possibility of her own motherhood as reason 
enough for her racial alliance. She asks, “‘Doctor,’ . . . and a faint flush rose to her cheek, 
‘suppose we should marry, and little children in after years should nestle in our arms, and one of 
them show unmistakable signs of color, would you be satisfied?’” (117). Although Iola, her 
brother, and their mother were all white enough to successfully “pass” as such, the possibility of 
bearing children who cannot do so binds Iola to her race through these bonds of black maternal 
kinship.  
Further, just as this recognition of visibly-black children would bind her, so does the 
recognition of her elder kin, as Iola loses a position of employment when her race is revealed 
through these black kinship ties. Her employer observes that “there was an old woman whom 
Iola called ‘Grandma,’ and she was unmistakably colored. The story was sufficient. If that were 
true, Iola must be colored, and she should be treated accordingly” (206). While Iola’s would-be, 
also mixed race husband, Dr. Latimir, “was a man of too much sterling worth to be willing to 
forsake his [“black”] mother’s race for the richest advantages his [“white”] grandmother could 
bestow,” Iola comes to realize that the “blackness” of her own grandmother will construe her 
own “blackness” by the laws of racialized kinship (240). 
The kinship bonds that drive Iola Leroy’s racial identification also position the figure of 
the mother as essential to racial uplift. While slavery often stifled the ability of enslaved mothers 
to perform this kinship role to their own children (who were often forcibly separated from them, 
or because the demands of enslavement disallowed enslaved mothers the ability to tend their 
biological children) emancipation presents a challenge for mothers and would-be mothers to 
meet the demands of an American motherhood that, in the national imagination, is figured as 
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both white and middleclass. Miss Delaney, Harry’s fiancée, notes the importance of “colored” 
mothers to the perception of the race, as a whole. We read that “One day she saw in the 
newspapers that colored women were becoming unfit to be servants for white people. She then 
thought that if they are not fit to be servants for white people, they are unfit to be mothers to their 
own children, and she conceived of the idea of opening a school to train future wives and 
mothers” (199).  
Vashti Lewis interprets Harper’s confrontation of such derogatory images of black 
women that were popular in the 1890s as marked by “schizophrenic overtones” here, observing 
that “Although this critique on black women may have delighted white readers, certainly women 
of African descent only a generation removed from slavery must have found insulting the 
implication that diminished capacity of black women to nurture white children was a necessary 
impetus for someone to teach them (or for them to learn) parental skills.”191 It is also curious that 
Harper leaves unclear what skills, exactly, formerly-enslaved mothers need to learn.   
Once both Robert and Iola’s and Henry’s and Marie’s mothers have been reunited with 
their children, Iola goes on to express the importance of motherhood in her work toward racial 
uplift. The Reverend Eustace agrees, upon hearing Iola’s paper on the “Education of Mothers” at 
a parlor meeting, remarking that “the great need of the race is enlightened mothers” who (with 
the help of “enlightened fathers,” who with them must no longer exist as “a legally unmarried 
race,”) can help to raise a generation of children who will be fit for full participation in the 
American nation (253-54).   
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Devoted Mothers and Devalued Kin in Charles Chesnutt’s The Marrow of Tradition 
While Roxy’s ability to alternate between the figures of the mother and the mammy in 
Pudd’nhead Wilson is dependent upon her mixed race, we might read Iola Leroy’s racialized 
articulation of African American kinship via what Stephen Knadler describes as a figure “whose 
virtue and character illustrate … new biracial consciousness.”192  The figure of the “New 
Maternal Negro” is a representation of racialized maternity that refuses to identify as either a 
version of the stereotypical mammy or as a simple imitation of white motherhood.  Even more 
emphatic than Iola Leroy’s choice of African American kinship and identification, perhaps, is 
Charles Chesnutt’s version of this figure: Janet Miller in the Marrow of Tradition, a character 
who is placed in diametrical opposition to the figure of the black mammy. Woven together with 
Chesnutt’s retelling of the Wilmington riot and his depiction of Tom Delamere’s blackface 
performance is what William Andrews refers to as “a kind of spectrum of southern racial opinion 
and class identity.”193 In this spectrum, one finds Chesnutt’s more progressive African-American 
characters alongside “familiar stereotypes of the southern romance,” which include one Mammy 
Jane Letlow.
194
 Chesnutt’s version of the familiar trope critiques what is presented as a 
necessarily-derogatory representation of this figure. At its heart is the black woman’s genuine 
love for the white children she has nursed. In our very first glimpses of her, she proclaims to her 
white employer, Olivia Carteret, “Will I come an’ nuss you’ baby? Why, honey, I nussed you, 
an’ nussed yo’ mammy thoo her las’ sickness, an’ laid her out w’en she died. I would n’ let 
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nobody els nuss yo’ baby; an’ mo’over, I’m gwine ter come an’ nuss you too.”195 Chesnutt 
couples this image of the devoted black nurse with her admiration for Olivia’s child, who has 
“sech fine hair fer his age” and “sech blue eyes,” along with his physical strength and well-fed 
appearance (69). 
Mammy Jane is not only a mother figure to the white child; she emerges from a long 
history of enslaved black mammyhood and, now in the Reconstruction Era, attempts to train 
younger black domestic servants toward contentedness with their positions. As Mammy Jane 
tells Major and Mrs. Carteret, “I ‘s fetch’ my gran’son’ Jerry up ter be ‘umble, an’ keep in ‘is 
place. An’ I tells dese other niggers date f dey’d do de same, an’ not crowd de w’ite folks, dey’d 
get ernuff ter eat, an’ live out deir days in peace an’ comfo’t” (71). Mammy Jane’s nostalgia for 
the “Old South” of plantation slavery is explicit in the text, as she tells Mrs. Carteret “None er 
dese yer young folks ain’ got de trainin’ my ole mist’ess give me.  Dese yer newfangle’ schools 
don’ l’rn ‘em nothin’ ter compare wid it. I ‘m jes’ gwine ter give dat gal a piece er my min’, 
befo’ I go, so she ’ll ten’ ter dis chile right” (69). Though no longer a slave, the love and 
devotion to the three generations of children she has nursed in Olivia Carteret’s family are 
seemingly enough to keep her in this role of contented servitude.  
Chesnutt posits “good niggers” like Mammy Jane and her grandson Jerry in sharp 
contrast to his (mostly mixed-race) characters who are presented as clear models of black social 
uplift.
196
 The younger nurse assigned to the Carteret family (who never was a slave herself and 
appears to be too young to remember slavery) has no emotive ties to white plantation families 
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and does not understand the near-kinship affections Mammy Jane holds for the Carterets. “These 
old-time negroes, she said to herself, made her sick with their slavering over the white folks, 
who, she supposed, favored them and made much of them because they had once belonged to 
them,— much the same reason why they fondled their cats and dogs” (70). Denying the 
possibility of white former slave holders bearing any real love for the people they enslave, the 
young nurse’s work is clearly not a labor of love, as Chesnutt’s narration explains: “For her own 
part, they gave her nothing but her wages, and small wages at that, and showed them nothing 
more than equivalent service. It was purely a matter of business; she sold her time for their 
money. There was no question of love between them” (70). 
It is Janet Miller, however, who provides the clearest contrast with Mammy Jane. Early 
on, we learn of Janet, the wife of the “black” Doctor Miller, from Mammy Jane (who, of course, 
“knows all ‘bout de fam’ly”) (45). She tells Doctor Price “Dis yer Janet, w’at ‘s Mis’ ‘Livy’s 
half-sister, is ez much lik her ez ef dey wuz twins. Folks sometimes takes ‘em fer ne er-
nudder,—I s’pose it tickles Janet mos’ ter death, but it do make Mis’ ‘Livy rippin’” (49). Unlike 
Roxy’s “twin” boys, however, these sisters have no living parent through which to triangulate 
their relationship; their father, now dead, never publicly acknowledged Janet as his daughter 
while he lived.  Mammy Jane is wrong in her assumption that Janet can take joy in her family 
resemblance to the half-sister who refuses to acknowledge their relation. We read that “Janet had 
a tender heart, and could have loved this white sister, her sole living relative of whom she knew. 
All her life long she had yearned for a kind word, a nod, a smile, the least thing that imagination 
might have twisted into recognition of the tie between them. But it had never come” (85).  When 
Olivia is still childless, her longing for the “fine-lookin’ little yaller boy, w’at favors de fam’ly 
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so” – the child of her half-sister – does not drive her to acknowledge her own biological relation 
to the child who she covets but does not love (49).   
As the story unfolds, it is confirmed that both Janet and Olivia’s father was Samuel 
Merkel.  Following the death of Olivia’s mother, Janet was born to Merkel and Julia Brown, his 
maid, who had formerly been enslaved by his wife’s family. Olivia, after her mother’s death, had 
been raised by her aunt Polly, with whom her father had had a long-heated dispute about his 
insistence on keeping Julia in the house. Much of the Carteret family’s plot surrounds the 
mystery of this affair’s details. Olivia, who believes herself to have been her father’s only 
legitimate child and has inherited his entire estate, discovers that her father had left a will (which 
had previously been hidden by Olivia’s aunt, Polly Ochiltree), leaving some land and money to 
Julia Brown and her daughter Janet, but the majority of his estate to “my dear daughter Olivia 
Merkell, the child of my beloved first wife” (203). In this, Olivia discovers that her father had 
married Julia Brown (though their marriage would have been rendered illegal due to the anti-
miscegenation laws of that state) and acknowledges his paternity of the child in an undelivered 
letter to his first daughter before his death.   
The complexities of this particular family drama plot are significant because they help 
illustrate the intersection of anxieties about interracial mixture in kinship and the possibility of 
cross-racial inheritance of property. At the heart of anti-miscegenation law is not simply the 
belief that racial sexual mixing was “unnatural,” but that white supremacist ideologies were also 
highly-invested in preserving “white” property and inheritance.197 Characterizing the racial 
melodrama of Olivia Carteret and Janet Miller as “Chesnutt’s use of the family as a metaphor for 
the crisis in American racial politics,” Eric Sundquist connects the drama of “Negro domination” 
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with that of “Negro” kinship.198 Racial integration and the “threat” of racial equality are “family 
crises” for Chesnutt’s characters: We learn that Polly Ochletree has stolen Merkell’s papers in 
order to disinherit Julia’s child, so that Olivia would inherit her father’s entire estate. Further, 
when Aunt Polly dies, she plans to leave her house and land to Olivia’s child rather than her 
other nephew, Tom Delamere, specifically because she believes that the Carteret child “would 
never sell them to a negro” (123).   
If white supremacy is dependent upon keeping wealth in “white” families, the erasure of 
the color line in interracial marriages and the production of mixed-race children disrupts this 
system, where the system by which white men are not legally obligated to acknowledge their 
children born of “black” mothers ensures that their property will not pass to their racially-mixed 
kin.  What Chesnutt’s story also presents in this family drama, though, is the possibility of a non-
violent interracial love affair.
199
 This possibility deemphasizes the imagined threat of black male 
sexual violence toward white women in light of the racial-sexual competition between Julia 
Brown and Polly Ochiltree. While Polly contrives to paint Julia as a Jezebel figure (twice she 
calls her a “hussy”), she reveals her own heartlessness as she relates the episode in which she 
casts Julia and the child Janet out of Merkell’s house (124, 128). Horrifyingly, Polly admits, “I 
could have killed her, Olivia!  She had been my father’s slave; if it had been before the war, I 
would have had her whipped to death” (129). The image Chesnutt gives us of their confrontation 
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illustrates the cruelty of the white matron, contrasted with the quiet, passive grief of the black 
mother. Later, when the town is in an uproar over Polly Ochlitree’s apparent murder by a black 
man (though the reader knows that she has been killed by her own nephew, Tom Delamere, in 
blackface), Chesnutt persists in highlighting the real danger of white violence toward African 
Americans. This culminates in the death of Janet and Doctor Miller’s son, killed by a stray bullet 
during the race riot in which white men attempt to enact “revenge” on the town’s black citizens 
for Polly Ochlitree’s death (which was actually caused by her white nephew, Tom Delamere).   
While Janet has, until the novel’s end, been painted as a parallel mother figure to her 
sister, Olivia, here their paths diverge. Just after Janet’s son’s death, (and while the riot has 
dispersed all the town’s white doctors), Olivia’s boy is in need of medical aid, and the Carteret 
family seeks the help of Doctor Miller. Because he initially declines to leave his grieving wife’s 
side, Olivia arrives to entreat him to decide otherwise. Though Doctor Miller is mired with grief 
and anger at the white violence that has killed his own son, when Olivia throws herself at his 
feet, he is moved by her resemblance to his own wife. “He had been deeply moved,—but he had 
been more deeply injured. This was his wife’s sister,—ah, yes! but a sister who had scorned and 
slighted and ignored the existence of his wife for all her life . . . This woman could have no claim 
upon him because of this unacknowledged relationship. Yet she was his wife’s sister, his child’s 
kinswoman. She was a fellow creature, too, and in distress” (85). Doctor Miller leaves the 
decision up to his wife, and Olivia plays on both her motherly and sisterly sympathies to 
persuade her. “‘You will not let my baby die!’” she tells her, “‘You are my sister;—the child is 
your own near kin!’” (245). This appeal is not entirely unfounded: while in the child’s earlier 
illness, Janet shows sympathy for her sister as we read that “She was greatly interested; she 
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herself was a mother, with an only child. Moreover, there was a stronger impulse than mere 
humanity to draw her to the stricken mother” (85).  
It seems, then, to be the biological tie to her sister and the child – and not simply the 
bonds of universal motherhood – that drives Janet’s sympathy. Later, though, she admits to a 
hierarchy in these kinship relations, telling Olivia “‘My child was nearer . . . He was my son, and 
I have seen him die. I have been your sister for twenty-five years, and you have only now, for the 
first time, called me so!” (245). Although she rejects her sister’s all-too-convenient 
acknowledgement, Janet ultimately instructs her also grief-ridden husband to go to the Carteret’s 
aid by an act of what seems like motherly sympathy. Stephen Knadler regards this act as 
“threaten[ing] to shatter no mere sacred image of whiteness (or blackness for that matter) but to 
disrupt its form,” by which he describes the novel’s “deconstruction of whiteness as rhetorical 
performance.” 200  In Janet’s case, this form is the assumed exclusively white claim on 
motherhood.  
Janet’s embodiment of universal motherhood in this scene is what Najmi calls Chesnutt’s 
“cautious hope for racial awareness on the part of white women, especially the white woman as 
mother,” and provides the novel with a marginally-happy ending. 201 Although Janet rejects her 
sister’s convenient recognition of kinship, she is unwilling to allow her nephew to die as a result. 
The partial-reconciliation in the interracial family presents some hope for the national racial 
reconciliation that Chesnutt presents as a possibility through the Carteret-Miller family drama.  
Knadler argues that it is in Janet’s role as mother, and the recognition of universal motherhood in 
the “black” woman that allow for this hope for reconciliation. He writes “to assure her son’s life, 
Olivia Carteret must recognize that the ideal type of womanhood . . . is embodied in her “dark” 
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Other.”202 This white recognition of the black potential for universality – along with an 
acknowledgement of the existing ties of interracial kinship in the United States – are presented as 
necessary steps toward racial equality in Chesnutt’s novel.   
It was not such a universal claim to which Olivia appealed, however. We read that “This 
was the recognition for which, all her life, she had longed in secret . . . but it had come, not with 
frank kindliness and sisterly love, but in a storm of blood and tears; not freely given, from an 
open heart, but exhorted from a reluctant conscience by the agony of a mother’s fears” (245). 
The novel may leave readers intent upon a narrative of race and reunion unsatisfied, in the 
absence of a reciprocal articulation of sisterhood between the “white” and “black” mothers of the 
text. While Elizabeth Ammons argues that Iola Leroy appeals to “a sisterhood of mothers,” the 
failure of biological sisterhood to produce satisfying emotional kinship ties frustrates this 
figurative sisterhood in The Marrow of Tradition.
 203
 This sisterhood proves excessive in the text, 
as Olivia’s initial reluctance to acknowledge interracial kinship is coupled with Janet’s 
unwillingness to allow that kinship tie to be articulated solely for the benefit of a white future.  
Just as Mammy Jane’s mammy-love is marked as insufficient to produce interracial 
kinship ties that will reflect upon the national family, Janet does not perform the role as loving 
sister to a white woman, but will best promote racial uplift in her role as a sort of surrogate-
mother to a white child. As the “New Maternal Negro,” Knadler describes Janet as an “untragic” 
mulatto in her refusal “to renounce her white parentage or to be ashamed of her blackness.”204 
Through her distance from the submission of the black “mammy,” but with the potential for 
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interracial kinship, Janet becomes a newly-raced figure, in line with Chesnutt’s own dreams for 
racial uplift to be achieved by characters like Janet and Doctor Miller.   
Although the novel’s potential for racial reconciliation is rendered more possible because 
of an acknowledged kinship relation between blacks and whites, this possibility is deferred.  
Janet’s care for her white sister’s child in this moment can never compete with Mammy Jane’s 
genuine love, and the sisterly affection that might accompany this act is tenuous. While the novel 
construes these kinship relations as literal, Chesnutt suggests a more general relation that rejects 
imagined barriers of racial dualism in the formation of an integrated national family – a family 
that is clearly not yet reconciled at the end of Chesnutt’s novel. 
Chesnutt’s refusal of the fully-reconciled interracial family is a move that distinguishes 
The Marrow of Tradition from plantation nostalgia fiction. By showing a fraught interracial 
national family (though a family, in the biological sense) Chesnutt resists any impulse to place 
Janet into a role resembling the mammy figure. By prioritizing the importance of her own child’s 
death, her begrudging refusal to let her sister’s child die rejects the kinship her half-sister would 
now acknowledge (though only for the sake of her child, it seems) for a model of motherhood 
that does not necessitate biological kinship relations. Rather, it is her relation to her own child 
that drives her to help the Carteret baby and not her own biological ties to him. In this way, the 
white child is de-prioritized, even though he is the child who lives.   
The extent of the problematic interracial kinship that Janet resists might be read in its 
contrast to the imagined “yearning” of Sarah Piatt’s iconic mammy, which more closely 
resembles Mammy Jane’s nostalgia. Janet Miller poses a poignant counter-narrative to the 
“mammy” trope in her presentation of a mixed-race woman who does not yearn for the white 
child of her mother’s former-enslavers, but for her own child. The stakes of mammy-lore is clear 
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here, as kinship and servitude are conflated in the mammy figure and the accompanying black 
child is de-prioritized for the white one. The Miller’s dead child, like Twain’s “Tom Driscoll,” 
shows the results of the white child’s usurping powers. Chesnutt’s novel paints a picture of 
interracial kinship ties as reluctant though necessarily biological in the history of the American 
nation. Moreover, he presents these ties as needing to be rejected – or at least checked – by the 
New Maternal Negro’s refusal to prioritize the white child – and by extension, her refusal of an 
exclusively white national futurity.  
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Conclusion 
“Diverse Bloods”: “White” Womanhood and Interracial National Kinship 
 
 
They once thought they were a kind of family because together they had carved 
companionship out of isolation.  But the family they imagined they had become was 
false.  Whatever each one loved, sought or escaped, their futures were separate and 
anyone’s guess.  One thing was certain, courage alone would not be enough.  Minus 
bloodlines, he saw nothing yet on the horizon to unite them. 
 
Toni Morrison, A Mercy, 155-156 
 
 
Anxieties about interracial sexual mixture were already prominent in American national 
culture by the 1864 presidential election, when David Croly and George Wakeman’s pamphlet 
coining the term “miscegenation” was published.205  Although the pamphlet purported to endorse 
interracial sexual mixture, the term came quickly to carry the proscriptive weight that will 
characterize interracial unions in popular American discourse for at least another century.
206
  
Croly and Wakeman’s pamphlet was, in fact, a hoax, produced by Democrats who hoped to sway 
the election against Lincoln by inciting racial fears of racial mixture. By appearing to advocate 
for interracial mixture, the publication played on already-established fears of racial mixture by 
not only arguing against racial inequality, but by claiming that “the miscegenetic or mixed races 
are much superior, mentally, physically, and morally, to those pure or unmixed.”207  Needless to 
say, those who would claim white supremacy felt the need to respond.   
Croly and Wakeman’s proclamation, “The Blending of Diverse Bloods Essential to 
American Progress” purported to call for a re-thinking of America as an Anglo-Saxon nation, 
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and the creation of national homogeneity not by exclusion, but by amalgamation in the literal 
sense:   
It is clear that no race can long endure without a commingling of its blood with that of 
other races.  The condition of all human progress is miscegenation.  The Anglo-Saxon 
should learn this in time for his own salvation. If we will not heed the demands of justice, 
let us, at least, respect the law of self-preservation. Providence has kindly placed on the 
American soil, for his own wise purposes, four millions of coloured people. They are our 
brothers, our sisters. By mingling with them we become powerful, prosperous, and 
progressive: by refusing to do so we become feeble, unhealthy, narrow-minded, unfit for 
the nobler offices of freedom, and certain of early decay.
208
 
 
The pamphlet also predicts a future in which the duality of “white” and “black” races is 
eliminated, presenting complete racial mixture as imminent, as well as desirable.   While this 
view of racial mixture is a parody of discourses on racial equality, it is not a far cry from the look 
toward racial mixture as an answer to the problem of seemingly un-reconcilable outlook on racial 
dualism that emerges post-Reconstruction.  As Du Bois presents it, the color line is a problem, 
and some thinkers imagined its resolution not in the crossing of that line, but only in its erasure. 
Alexis de Tocqueville suggested as much in his 1835 study on America, “As soon as it is 
agreed that whites and emancipated Negroes are placed upon the same land like two alien 
nations, it will not be difficult to understand that only two possibilities exist for the future: either 
Negroes and whites must blend together completely or they must part.”209  While the latter 
proposal of parting the two predominant American races was attempted in various ways, through 
the structures of plantation slavery, the project of colonization by which black people were 
“returned” to Africa, and the political segregation by which African Americans have been 
historically denied full citizenship and participation in the American nation, no complete 
“parting” of black and white people has never been accomplished in America.  Perhaps because 
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of the impossibility of any such complete racial separation, racial mixture has been treated 
alternately as an inevitability and a “problem” in national discourse.   
As historians such as Martha Hodes and Annette Gordon-Reed have shown, not only was 
complete racial separatism impossible by the nineteenth century, but whites were never fully 
separated from other races of people on the American continent.  Clarence E. Walker suggests 
this in Mongrel Nation: The America Begotten by Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemings, arguing 
that the United States was already racially-mixed even at its conception.  Reading Jefferson and 
Hemings as more appropriate “founding parents of the North American Republic” than George 
and Martha Washington, Walker argues for reading of the nation as “a mixed-race society, not a 
white one.”210  In order to fully-explore such a national narrative of racial mixture, participation 
in interracial kinship (and not just interracial sex) must be taken into consideration.      
While much attention has been given to the preservation of national racial separatism 
with regard to laws about interracial marriage and the denial of citizenship to non-white people, 
the texts discussed here show alternative narratives which acknowledge the fact of racial mixture 
in nineteenth-century America.  Moreover, such narratives position the white woman, usually 
understood as a preserver of white racial /national “purity,” as uniquely able to incorporate racial 
mixture into models of interracial family.  In conclusion, I want to explore the implications for 
re-thinking the “white woman” as a cultural, literary figure, and especially as a national trope.  
Re-figuring the white woman with regard to her participation in interracial kinship relations 
ultimately re-figures her participation in the racialized nation.  
Here, I will briefly examine the rhetoric of white womanhood in antebellum and 
Reconstruction era narratives of racial mixture and national kinship, reading the mixed-race 
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heroine in narratives of race and national (re)union.  As a character already positioned in 
interracial kinship relations, the mixed-race heroine has a different relation to interracial desire 
than assumedly-white models of racial “purity.”  The racially-mixed characters I will discuss 
here re-position the figure of the “white” woman with relation to the nation, in the “polyglot” 
family (to use Lydia Maria Child’s term), and in already “amalgamated” American genealogies 
that work to define the nation.  Namely, I present examples of the national “polyglot” family in 
the narratives of mixed-race heroines and racial (re)union of William Wells Brown’s 1853 novel, 
Clotel and Lydia Maria Child’s 1867 A Romance of the Republic. These texts work against 
national racial-purist ideologies of white womanhood that necessitate her rejection of the racial 
“Other,” as in Linda Kerber’s model of “republican motherhood” or Amy Kaplan’s theory of 
“manifest domesticity.”  Rather, Brown’s and Child’s characters do not simply reproduce, but 
embody racial difference, indicating a shift towards a model of womanhood able to incorporate 
the Other into structures of national multiracial family. 
Eve Allegra Raimon and Cassandra Jackson focus on the figure of the “tragic mulatta” as 
more complex than previous critiques of this figure allow, presenting fundamental connections 
between race and nation-building in narratives of the interracial family.  As embodiments of 
racial “intermixture,” these scholars address the figure of the “tragic mulatta” as able to reveal 
truths not only about the state of the “interracial” nation, but about the nature of race, itself.  I 
am interested less in the ways the “interracial” figure embodies national anxieties and realities 
about racial mixture than the ways these figures draw upon mythologies about whiteness, 
breaking down the point from which these literary figures have been previously examined.  To 
this end, I do not mean to treat the figures I will discuss here as neatly falling within the “tragic 
mulatta” trope.  Rather than focus on the trope of the “tragic mulatta,” I will focus on the trope 
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of the “white woman,” on which the sentimentalist rhetorics of “white slavery” depend, and 
through which attentions to white feminine purity and vulnerability, as well as the relationship 
between preserving white womanhood and national formation are articulated.   
William Wells Brown’s abolitionist novel, Clotel; or the President’s Daughter, employs 
the familiar rhetoric of nineteenth-century anti-slavery literature, presenting slavery as 
hypocritical for the linked projects of American democracy and Christianity.  At the center of his 
novel is a recasting of Lydia Maria Child’s story “The Quadroons” in the historical context of 
Thomas Jefferson’s sexual relationship with Sally Hemings.  Brown’s novel gives a fictive 
account of the children produced by this union, writing the common trope of the “tragic mulatta” 
alongside Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, both the progeny of our nation’s “founding 
fathers.”  Using the rhetoric of white womanhood in his critique of slavery, Brown challenges 
racial categories as problematic for the racially-mixed nation he illustrates in Clotel, as many of 
the mixed-race women who are described and function as “white” in his narrative are (legally) 
slaves.  To this effect, Brown has been most criticized for falling into the trap of using the 
mixed-race heroine to garner sympathy for the enslaved, based in the assumption that his white, 
middle-class, English audience will more easily sympathize with characters who are visually-
white and who do not speak in dialect. 
While most discussions of Brown’s novel focus on his title character, Georgiana, the 
white daughter of a Virginia slaveholder, differently embodies the figure of the white woman 
and through whom Brown’s novel might be read as differently embodying this trope. Georgiana 
serves as a model of white womanhood in her ability to fulfill a domestic role that has clear 
implications for the nation.  Through her Christian critique of slavery, Georgiana serves her 
husband, Carlton, as “a lamp to his feet, and a light to his path,” the model of the abolitionist 
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woman.
 211
  The effect of Georgiana’s particular breed of Christian morality for the domestic is 
clear as her abolitionism re-frames the domestic space of the Southern plantation.  By freeing 
her own slaves following her father’s death, Georgiana attempts to make her home a model for 
the nation.   
Significantly, Brown frames Georgiana’s morality in the language of the Declaration of 
Independence.  We read that  
With respect to her philosophy – it was of a noble cast.  It was, that all men are by nature 
equal; that they are wisely and justly endowed by the Creator with certain rights, which 
are irrefragable; and that, however human avarice may depress and debase, still God is 
the author of good to man – and of evil, man is the artificer to himself and to his species. 
(181) 
 
Georgiana’s nationalistic critique of slavery is accompanied by a critique of African colonization 
projects and an assertion of America as the rightful national “home” for slaves.  Georgiana asks, 
“‘Why should they go to Africa, any more than the Free States or to Canada . . . Is this not their 
native land?  What right have we, more than the negro, to the soil here, or to style ourselves 
native Americans?  Indeed it is as much their homes as ours, and I have sometimes thought it 
was more theirs” (160).  Georgiana cites the slave labor necessary for building the nation and 
negro participation in the revolutionary war as evidence for this claim to an American home.   
 In giving the primary abolitionist argument of the text to Georgiana, Brown centers his 
critique of slavery around a model of white womanhood.  He correspondingly complicates this 
model, in his continual reference to the (apparent) whiteness of his mixed-race characters.  Most 
interestingly, perhaps, he re-casts the trope of the “tragic mulatta” in terms of white womanhood. 
It is the president’s other daughter, Althesa, who most clearly illustrates the potential slippage 
between the “tragic mulatta” and “white woman” tropes.  Though both are legally defined as 
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“quadroons” the two women meet decidedly different fates.  Clotel’s narrative is familiar:  She is 
abandoned by her white lover, Horatio Green.  Since their union has been defined as illegal, 
Horatio is free to marry a white woman, leaving Clotel alone with their illegitimate child.  
Unsurprisingly, Clotel’s narrative ends in her suicide.   
Althesa, however, is bought out of slavery by her ever-faithful beloved, the white, 
northern-born Henry Morton.  They live comfortably together as a married couple (though 
illegally, under southern anti-amalgamation law) until their deaths.  While Clotel’s story is a 
clear retelling of the “tragic mulatta” trope, Althesa’s draws upon the sympathy of Brown’s 
white readers by allowing her to function as a white woman throughout much of the novel.  
Raimon gives attention to Brown’s description of Clotel in The “Tragic Mulatta” Revisited, 
holding that “the women [in Brown’s narrative] are portrayed as exotic, sexually available, and 
aristocratic all at once” (74).  There is nothing exotic about Brown’s description of Althesa, 
however.  Although Raimon acknowledges the limitations of critiques that “focus on the 
mulatta’s approximation to white standards of beauty and bearing” (74), Brown employs 
whiteness differently with regard to Althesa.  The rhetorical function of Althesa in Brown’s 
narrative depends upon notions of white womanhood that are inscribed both in white feminine 
beauty and the domestic role of the middle-class white woman.  In Althesa’s story, Brown twists 
the tragic element, resisting the “tragic mulatta” trope as Althesa successfully passes for white.   
Brown’s employment of white feminine beauty in Althesa’s narrative is visible in his 
scene depicting Henry Morton’s initial reaction to Althesa, who has just been purchased by 
James Crawford.  Brown narrates,  
In his own mountain home he had been taught that the slaves of the Southern states were 
Negroes, if not from the coast of Africa, the descendants of those who had been imported.  
He was unprepared to behold with composure a beautiful young white girl of fifteen in 
the degraded position of a chattel slave.  The blood chilled in his young heart as he heard 
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Crawford tell how, by bantering with the trader, he had bought her for two hundred 
dollars less than he first asked.  (98) 
 
Importantly, Henry feels not only a detached sense of pity for Althesa, but also an affinity that 
compels him to become personally responsible for obtaining her freedom.  He initially identifies 
with Althesa not as a Negro slave, but as “a beautiful young white girl,” but his call to sympathy 
is given not despite, but because of her position of legal blackness. We quickly learn that “the 
young man’s sympathy ripened into love, which was reciprocated by the friendless and injured 
child of sorrow.  There was but one course left; that was, to purchase the young girl and make 
her his wife, which he did six months after her arrival in Crawford’s family” (99).  Here, Brown 
works with the particular irony of the “white” slave, as his readers are asked to sympathize with 
young Henry Morton’s shock.  Further, in Brown’s world, slaves do not just elicit sympathy 
from whites; they enter into white society and engage in romantic relationships with his white 
characters.  Whatever the fates of Brown’s mixed-race figures (which vary over the different 
editions of his novel), the presentation of mixed-race heroines both alongside and as models of 
white womanhood challenges racial essentialism, and exposes the trope as constructed by 
notions of nationally-construed racial separatism which conflict with national realities of 
interracial kinship. 
The rhetoric of white womanhood is at play in discussions of racial mixture, particularly 
in sentimental fiction and in the abolitionist press in writing about “white” female characters, 
such as Child’s Mary Conant in Hobomok and Stowe’s Eva St. Claire, who serve as precursors 
which inform the presentation of mixed-race women characters like Child’s Rosalie and Xarifa 
in “The Quadroons,” Brown’s Clotel and Althesa, and Stowe’s Eliza.  The rhetorics of white 
womanhood at work in these texts are employed not merely to marginalize mixed-race figures, 
but work to re-figure the bounds by which race is understood in ways that challenge not just the 
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nature of an essentialist understanding of race, but which expose the trope of “white 
womanhood” as national myth.  
As in my previous chapters, I do not aim to essentialize racial mixture in my discussion 
here, but to highlight the ways these characters are able to employ an existing national rhetoric 
of white womanhood in their simultaneous embodiment of (visible) whiteness in their 
representations and their performance of versions of white womanhood that sometimes reinforce 
and sometimes challenge the dominant trope.  It is not the liminality of these mixed-race figures 
that allows for their often shifting performances of white womanhood, but the nature of the 
figure of the “white woman,” itself, which never allows itself to be fully-performed, either by 
them or by their accompanying “white” women characters like Georgiana.   
While Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852) ends with the emigration of the mixed-race 
couple to Liberia, leaving Eliza and her family no place in American national formation, Mary 
and George of Brown’s first edition of Clotel (1853) similarly remain in emancipated England, 
never to return to the United States.  The 1867 edition of Clotelle however, ends with the return 
of the young couple, hopeful for the outcome of the war.  Similarly, Lydia Maria Child’s A 
Romance of the Republic (published the same year) ends with a happy interracial “polyglot” 
family represented as a microcosm of the post-war national family.  Just as Brown orients his 
novel to American history by representing his heroine through her relation to the third president 
of the United States, Child frames her “romance” in national terms, staging her revision of the 
“tragic mulatta” narrative in the landscape of Civil War drama. 
Like other “tragic mulatta” heroines both before and after them, Flora and Rosa only 
learn of their mixed-race heritage following their father’s death.  Their parents’ marriage, 
because of their enslaved mother’s status, was not legitimate and impending debt (of course) 
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causes the daughters to be sold with the rest of their late father’s “property.”  After an 
appropriately sensational series of events, Flora and Rosa (who do not die) marry white men 
who are fully aware of their African ancestry.  Both women’s husbands and Flora’s adult son 
fight in the Civil War, surviving to return to their happy family, which does not hide the fact of 
their African American ancestry, but embraces it alongside other, European origins, all of which 
are ultimately assimilated into a model of the American “polyglot” family. 
As characters like Stowe’s Eliza and Brown’s Althesa seem to enter the possibility of 
participating in an American family only by virtue of the extent to which they perform white 
womanhood, Child’s Rosa and Flora seem to find a place in the inherently-mixed national 
family by virtue of their racial mixture in both body and through marriage and reproduction.  
Rather than working to keep out the threat of the racial “Other,” as in Kaplan’s presentation of 
Republican Motherhood, these figures, in their embodiment of racial difference, also serve to 
bring racial differences into communion in the body of the national family.
212
  Despite all of 
this, A Romance of the Republic falls short of racial inclusivity.  Though sympathetic 
abolitionists, Rosa and Flora do not, themselves, easily identify with non-white women.  And 
the novel’s version of American assimilation has requirements of class and education, as 
African American characters who are not known to be mixed-race, or those who were raised 
enslaved and thereby denied opportunities of education and culture, are unable to fully 
participate in this model of American family without further “refinement.”   
In this failing, Child’s novel reveals the workings of white womanhood, and especially 
the central position of the “white woman,” in these characters’ pivotal role in incorporating 
difference into the “polyglot” national family.  Unlike the mixed-race heroines of abolitionist 
                                                 
212
 For a discussion of how the national story of the family also implicates women in issues of violence via their 
marriage and reproduction, see Shirley Samuels “Women, Blood, and Contract” American Literary History 20.1-2 
(Spring/Summer 2008): 57-75. 
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literature, whose whiteness functions as a pivot in its ability to garner sympathy only by virtue 
of the irony of enslaved, visually-white, bodies, Flora and Rosa function in the text not in spite 
of their mixed-race, but because of it.  Moreover, these mixed-race heroines take the place of 
white heroines in this text, as Child presents these women as uniquely positioned, following the 
Civil War’s devastation, to reproduce the nation.  What Child produces through these characters 
is a differently-white version of Republican Motherhood.   
Rather than simply reproductive, however, these women’s role is absorptive in nature, as 
they are able to draw together various points of difference not because their whiteness is 
essential or permanent, but because it is malleable.  These positionings of white womanhood 
centralize the connections between race and nation in these texts.  If Amy Kaplan is correct in 
presenting the white woman at the center of the national formation, with the domestic sphere 
figured as a microcosm of the nation, then this raced and gendered icon is at the center of these 
novels.  As literary and cultural depictions of white womanhood involved in interracial kinship 
relations shift expectations about race and kinship while inflecting upon popular understandings 
of literary genre and reading practices, the centrality of the figure of the white woman cannot be 
overlooked. 
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